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ABSTRACT 
 
 Complementary products contribute significantly to the growth and sustenance of 
primary products and platforms in many high technology product markets.  Although 
different literatures have investigated issues related to complementary products, our 
understanding on this topic is limited. This dissertation aims to address some of the 
questions in the growing literature on complementary products.  Following the literature 
review, the third chapter develops the conceptual underpinnings of product 
complementarity and examines commonly specified definitions to clarify the dimensions 
of product complementarity. The fourth chapter addresses the boundary question from the 
perspective of a primary product firm. The theoretical model identifies the antecedents of 
the internalization decision emphasizing the influence of type of product 
complementarity and key environmental contingences, viz., technological and market 
demand uncertainty.  
 The fourth and fifth chapters of the thesis examine the role of type of 
complementarity in predicting the governance choices of 31 public businesses over a time 
frame of 26 years in the PC industry, a setting where complementary products have 
significantly influenced the competitive and technological landscape. The study findings 
reveal that type of complementarity along with environmental contingences influence a 
firm’s choice of internalization, alliances or complementor make.  Market demand 
uncertainty influences the choice of strategy towards complementary product for 
moderately increasing levels of uncertainty while technological uncertainty predicts the 
governance choices for both low and moderately increasing levels of uncertainty. In 
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addition, in accordance with emerging literature in the Transaction Cost Economics logic 
(Leiblein & Miller, 2002; Jacobides, 2005) the findings highlight the role of firm 
capabilities. The dissertation attempts to contribute to the strategy literature by 
explicating the importance of nature of complementary products, so far not addressed in 
traditional TCE work.   
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CHAPTER 1: STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
 
 Complementary products are seen as increasingly important in many industries. 
For example, computer software is complementary to hardware (Economides & Salop, 
1992; Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1997; Binken & Stremerche, 2009). The US computer 
software development industry involves about 50,000 companies with combined annual 
revenue of about $220 billion, more than half the sales of packaged products (Hoovers, 
2010). Interestingly, clients using these applications particularly in the business 
environment source the services of information technology services companies such as 
IBM, Accenture and SAP. These information technology service providers are also many 
time producers of the prepackaged software. Thus there is a complementary relationship 
between the products they produce and the services they provide. Similarly, the role of 
complementary products was noted by Kazuo Hirai, president of Sony Computer 
Entertainment of America, in the context of video game systems, “Software is king. You 
can have the best technology, the most advanced box in the world, but without the 
applications, that box will only collect dust on the retail shelves.”1 Retail revenues from 
PDA software sales more than doubled in 2001 from 2000 to $27 million (NPD, 2002).   
These revenues correspond to the sale of around 900,000 units of software sold through 
brick-and-mortar retail channels  during  2001  (versus  225,000  units  in  2000)
2
. 
                                                          
1
 HBS Case study # 9704488, 2004, Note on Home Video Game Technology and Industry Structure, Peter J. 
Coughlan 
 
2
 ‘‘Sales of Handheld Software Skyrocket’’, Scarlet Pruitt, IDG News Service, April 08 2002, http:// 
www.pcworld.com/news/article/0,aid,93243,00.asp 
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The importance of complementary products is also witnessed in other high technology 
industries such as telecommunications. For instance, a recent (2009) independent Market 
Tools survey conducted by QuickPlay Media, a provider of mobile TV and video 
solutions, reveals that the number of people watching TV and video content on their 
mobile devices remained steady from 2008 to 2009 at 35%. The survey also suggests that 
multimedia-enabled phones will play a role in the growing adoption of mobile TV and 
video services. Specifically, the results found that while slightly less than a quarter of 
consumers are using a multimedia-enabled phone (24%), these devices will play a critical 
role in drawing consumers to watch TV and video on their mobile phone. Another 38% 
said that if they were considering changing wireless carriers, their ability to offer the 
latest multimedia-enabled PDA/smart phone would affect their decision in choosing a 
carrier. Thus the value of using a telephone or mobile phone today is enhanced by the 
extent of multimedia services/functions such as text messaging, emailing, viewing videos 
and movies, listening to and downloading music in addition to the core utility of using the 
device for communicating. The carrier service, the cellular device and the various 
multimedia applications complement one another. The mobile phone with apps 
(including OS) and the telecom carrier form the set of complements
3
. 
  The importance of complementary products is not limited to high technology 
industries. In the automobile industry, a recent automobile parts industry report 
conducted by the US Department of Commerce (2010) suggests that value added to 
vehicles by suppliers will grow from 40 percent in 2002 to 55 percent by 2015. Some 
                                                          
3
 Mergent Industry Reports, Telecommunications, July 2009 
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new technologies being added or becoming standard on vehicles are safety features like 
blind-spot detection and side/head airbags. Navigation systems, MP3 player connections, 
bluetooth wireless connections and mobile video are other examples. In addition, GPS 
and telematics packages that connect cars to home computers will become standard 
within the next few years. By 2012, Original Equipment manufacturers and aftermarket 
suppliers are expected to create a $2.4 billion telematics market in the US and global 
market of $9.3billion 
Literature Overview 
 
 Three lines of research, viz. in economics, marketing and strategy have focused 
on complementary products. We note the key lines of work in each stream of work. In the 
economics literature, formal models using the lens of game theory and rooted in cross 
price elasticity of demand have informed us about the implications and dynamics of 
product complementarity. First, by integrating into complementary product markets, a 
firm can internalize the costs of managing the development of two products externally 
and thereby pass on the benefits of the efficiencies gained to consumers through lower 
prices on the bundle of primary and complementary goods (Cournot, 1838, Economides 
& Salop, 1992). A monopolist could extend its market power into complementary 
product markets through tying and bundling as a competitive strategy (Whinston, 1990; 
Nalebuff, 1999; Nalebuff, Heeb, 2003; Nalebuff, 2004; Carlton & Waldman, 2002; 
Casadesus-Masanell, Nalebuff & Yoffie, 2007). Examples include IBM (tying tabulating 
machines with the purchase of tabulating cards in the past and that of its mainframe 
machines with its operating system, recently) and Eastman Kodak (tying products with 
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service). Tying not only restricts the entry of complementors into primary product 
markets (Choi & Stefanadis, 2001; Nalebuff, 2004), but also enables the firm to enhance 
its own primary product profitability by gaining access to the complementors’ customers. 
The antitrust litigation case that has brought the focus of economic scholars to the 
dynamics involving complementary products is that of Microsoft tying the browser with 
its primary product, to mitigate the risk of the Netscape browser emerging as a potential 
substitute to the Microsoft operating system (Whinston, 1990; Carlton & Waldman, 
2002). Such a strategy reduces the incentives for potential (i.e. firms having a new, low 
cost technology that may or may not be superior to the incumbent’s) complementors to 
enter the primary product market because of the considerable costs involved in 
innovation (in developing a primary product) coupled with reduced possibility of 
consumer demand for the complement itself.  
 However, these arguments are contingent upon important product market 
characteristics or environmental conditions, the effects of which require in depth 
examination. For example, these arguments have been considered when network effects 
are relatively strong and the primary product firm has an established presence through a 
large installed base. Under these conditions, tying increases consumer’s costs associated 
with switching to an alternative technology (that includes purchase and learning costs as 
well as the benefits from a large network of users). The superiority of a substitute 
technology could be a sufficient condition for switching, when the markets are not 
characterized by network effects and the primary product firm does not have a large 
installed base of users. Additionally, tying a symmetric complement to a primary product 
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would have a greater deterrence effect because the consumer cannot use complement 
without the purchase of the primary product. 
 Competitive strategies also influence innovation in complementary product 
markets (Farrell & Katz, 2000; Heeb, 2003). These models assume that the primary 
product firms are monopolists (or duopolies) and examine how strategies such as tying or 
pricing influence profitability potential. However, most high technology industries 
(where product complementarity is relevant) are disintegrated. Firms in one layer of the 
industry pursue strategies of integration into complementary product markets to increase 
their total share of profits (Bresnahan & Greenstein, 1999; Cheng & Nahm, 2007). While 
early research investigated vertical integration as a form of competitive action, several 
complementary product markets witness different forms of governance such as minority 
equity investments and different types of cooperative agreements. Thus firms pursue both 
competitive and cooperative strategies in high technology industries where product 
complementarity is important. Although integration into all complementary product 
markets may benefit the firm by empowering it with a high degree of control, it is yet 
impractical making cooperation an important aspect of dealing with its complementors. 
 Recently, scholars have shown interest in the coordination aspects with 
complementors (Gawer & Henderson, 2007; Kapoor & Lee, 2013). A complementor 
incurs lesser costs of making complements when the primary product firm contributes 
information or resources such as intellectual property or toolkits for exclusive 
complement development. For example, to reduce dependence on Microsoft, IBM 
supported the development of Linux, a substitute to the Windows based operating system 
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by financial investments and sharing technological know-how with Red Hat (Yoffie & 
Kwak, 2006). In another case, Intel subsidized the entry of complementors by sharing its 
IP, marketing resources for commercialization and encouraging complementary product 
development through free distribution of Software Development Kits. Primary product 
firms are also observed to enter a variety of cooperative agreements such as licensing and 
joint agreements for technology development, marketing, distribution with these 
complementors. Research is yet to investigate the mechanisms that explain the choice 
among these strategies.  
 Research in marketing has examined implications of product complementarity for 
consumer behavior (Sarvary & Parker, 1997; Duvvuri, Ansari & Gupta, 2007) and for a 
firm’s marketing strategies (Sarvary & Parker, 1997; Sengupta, 1998; Noble & Gruca, 
1999; Basu, Mazumdar & Raj, 2003). For instance, firms may adopt different pricing 
strategies when selling complementary products (Noble & Gruca, 1999), use information 
about consumer’s sensitivities for price and promotion related to one product category to 
predict their purchase behaviors in a complementary product category (Duvvuri, Ansari 
& Gupta, 2007) and incorporate the value of complements for consumers in making 
forecasts for primary products positively influences technology adoption (Gupta, Jain & 
Sawhney, 1999).    
 Complementary products play an important role in the adoption of a technology 
such as QWERTY and VHS when competing alternatives are available (Katz & Shapiro, 
1985, 1986; Farrell & Saloner, 1986; Arthur, 1994; Brynjolfsson & Kemerer, 1996; 
Cottrell & Nault, 2004). In high technology markets(such as video games and PDAS) 
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characterized by network effects, studies recommend differential pricing strategies of 
software (with respect to hardware) and variation in the availability of software variety 
over the life cycle of the hardware (Clements & Ohashi, 2005; Nair, Dube & 
Chintagunta, 2005). Poor availability of complementary products such as video tapes in 
the compatible format for VCRs and software for hardware can lead to possibility of 
technology lockout, where a firm is unable to compete in a product market because of 
technology standards (Schilling, 2002).   
 In two-sided markets, complementary interactions between products could be 
used to stimulate demand and handle competitive influences from other firms, providing 
a rationale for cross subsidization of products (Parker & Van Alstyne, 2005; Rochet & 
Tirole, 2003). Complementary products can influence whether markets with platform 
competition evolve to a “winner-take-all” standard, when complementors can 
differentiate their products and co ordinate on a standard for the platform, hardware or 
primary product (Rysman, 2009). Current work in this area is motivated in understanding 
the pricing strategies to coordinate consumers and sellers, based on cross-group effects 
(Rochet & Tirole, 2003; Caillaud & Jullien, 2003; Jullien, 2011; Amelio & Jullien, 2012). 
 There is evidence of growing interest in strategy research on the issues related to 
complementary products and the strategic implications (Afuah, 2000; Teece, 2007; 
Pierce, 2009; Adner & Kapoor, 2010; Turner, Mitchell & Bettis, 2010; Lee, 
Venkataraman, Tanriverdi & Iyer, 2010; Kapoor & Lee, 2013).  These works also 
contend that complementary products and businesses are underemphasized elements of 
industry dynamics (Adner & Kapoor, 2010; Turner, Mitchell & Bettis, 2010). A recent 
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review of strategy in network industries has directed direction to this unaddressed area in 
the literature among others - the strategies employed by firms to create availability of 
complements and how product design aspects maybe critical in influencing the network 
intensity – the size of the network (McIntyre & Subramaniam, 2009).  
Research questions  
 
Although the importance of complementary products has been examined in different 
contexts, research issues remain to be addressed (Adner & Kapoor, 2010; McIntyre & 
Subramaniam, 2009).  Although Brandenburger & Nalebuff (1997)  noted – “just as 
people have been playing catch-up when it comes to thinking about suppliers, there’s a 
lot more work to be done in recognizing and benefitting from complementor 
relationships”, the observation is relevant. First, limited attention has been paid to the 
concept of complementary products. Definitions of complementary products depict 
different aspects of product complementarity, suggesting a need for a coherent 
understanding of the factors constituting product complementarity. Second, work on 
vertical integration strategies and the impact on product market structures, issues of 
competitive foreclosure and tying raise questions about the mechanisms influencing the 
decisions of firms in primary product markets with respect to the choice of a suitable 
strategy.  Different forms of hold-up behavior are likely to exist in the context of 
complementary products (Casadesus-Masanell & Yoffie, 2006; Hogendorn & Yuen, 
2009; Yalcin, Ofek, Koenigsberg & Biyalogorsky, 2013), requiring an understanding of the 
contextual factors and the nature of such behaviors. Finally strategies pursued by firms 
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have varied according to the stage of technology competition, suggesting the need to 
address specific market and technological factors influencing the choice of the strategy. 
The specific research questions that I examine in this dissertation include - 
1. What is the meaning of product complementarity? 
2. What is the significance of type of complementarity for a primary product firm’s 
governance choice? Specifically, 
i) How does type of complementarity influence complementary product 
internalization decision? 
ii)  What are the contextual factors influencing the complement internalization 
  decision? 
Plan of the proposal 
 
This proposal adopts a multiple essay format to address these questions. The next chapter 
conducts a literature review on the topic of complementary products, reviewing the 
definitions, findings and analyses to identify the major topics examined in the literature. 
The subsequent chapter develops the concept of product complementarity, by delineating 
aspects from a thorough review of the definitions and examples employed in the 
literature.  Chapter 4 develops the conceptual model of the dissertation with testable 
propositions based on the concept of type of complementarity, product market 
contingences and predicting the choice of a governance strategy. Chapter 5 lays out the 
methodology for implementing the study and examining the hypotheses. Chapter 6 details 
the results from regression analyses and Chapter 7 discusses the implications of the 
results, and identifies limitations of the study and future research opportunities. 
10 
 
 
 
 
Contributions 
 
 The dissertation attempts to make the following contributions. First, it attempts to 
enhance conceptual understanding of product complementarity by identifying and 
describing the main dimensions and deriving a relationship between type of 
complementarity and firm interdependence. Second, it integrates theoretical mechanisms 
from the strategy literature, insights from economics and marketing literatures to explain 
and predict strategies pinned on type of complementarity for primary product firms 
competing in high technology contexts. The governance strategy is based on the 
recognition that complements influence sharing/execution of functions most valued by 
the consumer in a primary product, are a lead companion product in enabling the primary 
product to emerge as a strong contender in technology battles   and enable maintaining a 
competitive edge vis-à-vis rivals in dynamic and unpredictable environments through 
delivery of system based products (Katz & Shapiro, 1994). Third, this thesis examines the 
influence of contextual factors that characterize high technology industries. In such 
conditions, the capability to rapidly enter new product markets, without cannibalizing 
current product markets can be a source of relative sustainable competitive advantage 
(Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000).  The predictions related to complementary product 
governance are likely to assist managers in the decision making of firms competing in 
such dynamic environments. 
 In sum, considering the pervasive influence of complements in several aspects of 
a firm’s primary product market outcomes - standards battles, dominant design 
emergence, growing market share - the thesis attempts to uncover explanations of the 
11 
 
 
 
influence of a key dimension of production complementarity in a firm’s sourcing 
decisions in managing interdependence arising from complements.   
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CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON COMPLEMENTARY 
PRODUCTS 
Introduction 
 
There has been a surge of interest in the technology-based competition centered on 
platforms and ecosystems, transcending different disciplines in business. Complementary 
products are an important aspect of this phenomenon. Traditional IO research and 
subsequent research in strategic management has examined the importance of suppliers, 
buyers, competitors, substitutes and new entrants in influencing the performance, 
innovation and survival outcomes (Porter, 1985; 2008). This research is being augmented 
with the activities and mechanisms involving complementors across a range of industries 
varying in environmental dimensions such as speed, rate of technology change and nature 
of products. This paper reviews the research on complementary products that has been 
conducted in the economics, marketing and management research streams that also 
includes the management of information systems and operations research. It finds that 
despite growing and significant strides in research in these literatures, important 
conceptual linkages in product complementarity have yet to be addressed.  The purpose 
of this review is three fold; first we bring together the different assumptions, 
perspectives, contributions and arguments non tangentially related or involving 
complementary products in above literature streams. Second, we identify and describe 
common themes across the literatures in order and areas needing more clarification. 
Finally, we propose directions for future research. 
The paper is structured in the following manner. First, the method used to conduct the 
review is described. Subsequent sections highlight the findings from the review. 
13 
 
 
 
Limitations and potential research possibilities are also mentioned where applicable. The 
review concludes by identifying potential research possibilities. 
Method of Review 
 
We conducted a comprehensive search of the economics, management and 
marketing literatures to identify studies that dealt with complementary products. This 
search was accomplished in three steps. First we developed the criteria for executing the 
search, including the choice of keywords. Second, based on the keywords, we analyzed 
the (refereed) papers that dealt with the topic of complementarity. Finally, we extended 
the search to incorporate influential books.  
Our first task was identifying the right set of keywords for conducting an 
electronic search. At the outset, we searched ISI Web of Science for complementary 
product(s). This produced a set of 133 articles encompassing peer-reviewed articles and 
proceedings papers. We then read the ten most highly cited articles on this topic 
(Economides & Salop, 1992; Church & Gandal, 1993; Gilbert & Riordan, 1995; Lilly & 
Walters, 1997; Sarvary & Parker, 1997; Golder & Tellis, 1997; Parthasarathy & 
Bhatacharjee, 1998; Choi & Stefanadis, 2001; Carlton & Waldman, 2002). Second, we 
consulted some of the books published on this topic (Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1996; 
Guiltinan, Madden & Thomas, 1997, Shapiro & Varian, 1998; Cusumano & Gawer, 
2005; Evans, Hagiu & Schmalensee, 2006).  We also consulted academic experts in the 
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marketing, economic and technology strategy areas on the exhaustiveness of the 
keywords
4
.  
  We used the key words to conduct a second round of search in ISI Web of 
Science database to identify the peer-reviewed articles dealing with complementary 
products. Since there has been no prior review on the topic in any of the literatures and 
ISI allows search back until 1980, we confined our search to the period after 1980 (till 
Sept 2013). ISI WOS, an academic online database from Thomson Scientific has been 
used in the management stream for examination of literature (Bapuji & Crossan, 2004; 
Lane, Koka & Pathak, 2006; Crook, Ketchen, Combs, Todd, 2008) 
 ISI Web of Science categorizes articles into subject areas such as economics, 
business, management, telecommunications, computer science theory methods, surgery, 
biology, ecology etc.  Notably, these categories are not mutually exclusive – i.e. an article 
categorized under “energy fuels” is also counted in the “applied chemistry” and 
“chemical engineering” categories.  Since our interest was in identifying published work 
in the business literatures informing aspects of product complementarity, we applied 
filters to refine the above set to retrieve works in the economics and business & 
management categories. These categories also capture other subject areas. Thus even if 
we did not explicitly include categories such as “Communications”, but papers published 
in this category have economic or management implications, they would be captured due 
to the inclusiveness in the categories .We excluded categories such as Biophysics, 
                                                          
4 “complementary products”, “complementary goods”, “complementary components,”  
“complementary markets”,  “indirect network effects/externalities”.  
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Organic Chemistry, Spectroscopy etc. because, the papers in these categories dealt with 
subjects relating to the physical and material sciences. The search produced 665 articles.  
Finally, we further excluded  articles in the following publications because of the 
irrelevance of the articles published in the journals to the focus of our interest viz., Naval 
Research Logistics, Group Decision and Negotiation, Journal of Forest Economics,  
Expert Systems with applications, Decision Support Systems, Journal of International 
Trade Economic Development, Journal of Sport Management, Journal of regional 
Science, Queueing  Systems,  Safety Science & Transportation Research: Policy and 
Practice.  A list of excluded publication journals is provided in Table 1 
---------------------------------------------------- 
Please insert Table 1 around here 
---------------------------------------------------- 
 
This resulted in a set of 179 articles. A breakdown of these articles by included 
publication (see Table 2), year and WOS (Web Of Science) research areas/categories (see 
Table 3) 
---------------------------------------------------- 
Please insert Table 2 around here 
---------------------------------------------------- 
---------------------------------------------------- 
Please insert Table 3 around here 
---------------------------------------------------- 
 
The literature review is structured as follows. In the first section, we note the state of the 
literature of the literature on complementary products. Then we review the key topics 
addressed, identify the conceptual aspects in the context of complementarity and the main 
empirical findings related to complementary products.  Under each section, we 
summarize the analysis with the objective of highlighting the different assumptions used 
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in modeling (economics & marketing streams), the contexts in which product 
complementarity has been studied and the environmental contingencies related to product 
complementarity and identifying possible areas to be addressed. Finally, we identify the 
limitations of our review in the concluding section. 
State of the literature on product complementarity 
 
 Majority of the work, specifically in the 1980s through 1990s has been primarily 
centered on the competitive aspect of complementary products (Carlton & Waldman, 
2002; Choi & Stefanadis, 1992, Whinston, 1990) and indirect network effects. Further, 
since the 2000s there is a growth of interest in several areas spanning marketing, 
economics and management. Further the literature on product complementarity is 
fragmented and spans several  research topics including technology strategy, competition, 
two sided markets and consumer behavior to name a few.   
 Our review suggests that there are varied conceptualizations of product 
complementarity, which we briefly outline in this section. The objective is to suggest the 
need for a clarification on the concept of product complementarity in terms of the 
definitions, attributes and characterizations. Based on usage, use complements are 
products that are consumed together, while purchase complements when they are 
purchased together (Mulhern & Leone 1991).  The economics definition of 
complementary products, based on cross-price elasticity captures interdependencies in 
purchase behavior; strongest interdependences exist among products that are use 
complements (Mulhern & Leone, 1991). From a retail perspective, purchase 
complementarity exists for all products in a customer’s shopping basket (as the consumer 
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may purchase two items together for several reasons such as convenience. When 
purchase of one product is conditional upon prior purchase of another product, they are 
called contingent products (Venkatesh & Mahajan, 1997). Sarvary and Parker (1997) 
identify situations when information goods from different sellers (selling similar 
products) become complements rather than substitutes as would be the case with 
traditional goods. When customers are faced with information that has low reliability 
(quality) and sources of information are independent, customers may find it beneficial to 
purchase from several sellers. In such a scenario, there is stronger likelihood that the 
information services available from the different sellers are complements.   Along with 
cross price elasticity of demand, economic scholars also identify product complements 
based on product usage. Cheng & Nahm (2007, 2010) distinguish complements as 
symmetric and asymmetric, based on the necessity of using the complement with the 
primary product (Cheng & Nahm, 2007; 2010). Further, the proportion of consumption 
between the primary and complementary products distinguishes perfect complements and 
imperfect complements. Finally, the difference in timing of purchase and consumption of 
a pair of goods distinguishes complementary inputs from complementary goods (Fabrizio 
& Hawn, 2013). 
 To summarize, first product usage is central to conceptualizations of product 
complementarity. Second, there is evidence of differences in the nature of 
complementarity based of factors such as product durability (Bhaskaran & Gilbert, 2005), 
necessity of usage, component or non component (Sengupta, 1998) and proportion of use. 
Third, there are depictions of primary and complementarity products within a focal pair, 
pointing to a need for understanding the difference between primary and complementary 
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products. A detailed elaboration of the nature of product complementarity is taken up in 
the next chapter. 
Market Structures 
 
 A substantial portion of the literature on product complementarity is centered on 
indirect network effects. The first section reviews the concepts and findings related to 
complementary products. The second section is devoted to reviewing the findings on 
vertical integration, which includes antecedents and mechanisms followed by a 
discussion on the category. The final section reviews the findings related to consumer 
purchase behavior. 
Indirect network effects  
 
 In contrast to direct network effects generated from the number of users adopting 
the primary product, indirect network effects arise from the increase in utility from the 
complementary products available for the primary product, in turn influenced by the size 
of the network (Katz & Shapiro,1985, 1986, 1986; 1992; Farrell & Saloner, 1986; Church 
& Gandal, 1992; Gandal, Kende & Rob, 2000; Ohashi, 2003; Nair, Dube & Chintagunta, 
2004; Schilling, Gupta, Jain & Sawhney, 1999; Basu, Mazumdar & Raj, 2003; 2002; 
Shankar & Bayus, 2003; Zhu & Iansiti, 2012).  Further, indirect network effects in the 
context of informational intermediation arise, where the buyer base increases as the 
number of sellers registered with the intermediary increases (Caillaud & Julien, 2003).  
The review is categorized into the conceptual factors, antecedents, consequences and 
contextual aspects of indirect network effects. The section concludes with a discussion of 
the findings, including methodological challenges and achievements. 
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Concept: Three aspects are relevant, viz. a demand based perspective, a supply side 
perspective and attributes of the concept. The network externality argument is that 
consumers prefer to purchase products which have a large network size. Although this 
hypothesis postulates the externality that exists from the consumption perspective, 
increasing returns to scale in the production of complementary products is an alternative 
explanation for indirect network effects (Chou & Shy, 1990). I.e., consumers benefit 
from a large network because large networks are supported by a variety of 
complementary products and services. Computer software, for example, has fixed costs 
of development and low costs of duplication and marketing leading to increasing returns 
to scale in the production of software, inducing complementors to provide a variety of 
complementary products and services in software. Further, indirect network externalities 
create a two way contingency between demand (consumption) of the primary product and 
supply (production) of the complementary products resulting in a strategic 
interdependence between the strategies of primary product firms and that of the 
complementors. For example, indirect network effects is conceptualized as a market 
mediated interdependence between hardware makers and complementors, with consumer 
demand being influenced directly by the actions of hardware manufacturers and 
complementors( Gupta , Jain & Sawhney, 1999).   
 Attributes relevant to indirect network effects include scope, strength and variety. 
Scope of indirect network effects captures whether the externality is confined to 
consumers within a platform or across platforms, influenced by the exclusivity of 
software (Corts & Lederman, 2009). Strength of indirect network effects has been noted 
in several works intended to measure the extent to which consumers’ value 
20 
 
 
 
complementary product variety (Corts & Lederman, 2009; Hogendorn & Yuen, 2009; 
Zhu & Iansiti, 2012; Dube, Hitsch & Chintagunta, 2010).  Finally, consumer 
heterogeneity in the preference for variety, where different consumers seek distinct 
features provided by different formats, facilitates the survival of multiple formats in the 
product market (Katz & Shapiro, 1994). The importance of variety varies by industry or 
product type, so that the utility added by variety on books related to fishing rods is less 
valued than that added by supply of software for CD players (Church et. al., 2008). 
Antecedents: The supply of complementary products is influenced by  i) compatibility 
between hardware technologies and complementary products ii) primary product 
attributes and iii) complement attributes 
Compatibility: When hardware technologies are incompatible, the decision of software 
developers regarding which technology to provide software is determined by the 
profitability of complement provision for a particular technology platform.  
Complementor profitability is influenced by two factors, viz., i) the value contributed by 
complement variety to owning a primary product and ii) competition in the 
complementary product market. When consumers place a high value for software variety 
(i.e. availability) relative to different hardware technologies so that value of a hardware 
technology to the consumer is determined by the number of compatible complements, 
greater availability of complements contributes to increased hardware sales, contributing 
further to greater market demand for complements.  Consequently, size of 
complementary product market influences complementor’s profitability through 
increased demand for the primary product.  However, the downside of increased 
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complement supply is the impact of competition between complementors. Competition 
among complementors leads to a reduction in profits for a complementor, if hardware 
sales remain constant, but complement supply increases. De facto standardization results 
when the indirect network effects dominate the competitive effects.  However, if 
sufficient complementary software are made available for the different hardware 
technologies, they will each have sales (Church & Gandal, 1992).    
Product Attributes: In this section we review software price, hardware quality, software 
quality and the interaction of hardware and software attributes on complementary product 
availability.  
Software price: Although hardware price (Nair et. al., 2004; Clements & Ohashi, 2005) 
and quality (Nair et. al., 2004) have informed technology competition, lack of availability 
of price information for complement prices has restricted the empirical impact of this 
attribute.  The argument however is that intense competition in the software market, 
combined with low costs of software replication sets the stage for low prices in 
complements market (Shapiro & Varian, 1999; Church et. al., 2008).  
Hardware quality: Quality of the primary product impacts the sales of the hardware 
directly through the preferences of consumers to use leading edge technology products. 
Important, hardware quality influences the availability of complementary products, for 
complementors prefer to develop complements for a system with a large installed base. 
Hardware quality captures the functional and performance capabilities such as speed of 
the processors used in the video game console. In fact significant improvement in the 
processor capabilities such as multimedia graphics and sound additions have led to 
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continuous displacement of older generations of hardware systems in the video gaming 
console market. In the context of the home video game industry, Gretz (2010) shows that 
the market share is 11.4 times more sensitive to hardware quality than network size.  
Software/complement quality:  The quality of software has a significant impact on 
consumer’s choice of hardware in systems based competition. Two implications are 
notable in the literature. First, a complement of high quality and popularity contributes to 
significant network effects, regardless of the abundance in complement availability or 
size of complement network (Frels, Shervani & Shrivastava, 2003; Stremersch, Tellis, 
Franses & Binken, 2007; Hogendorn & Yuen, 2009).  In the context of the home video 
game industry, Binken & Stremerche (2009) show that high quality “superstar” software 
titles have a disproportionately large effect on hardware sales.  Similarly, Lotus 1-2-3 had 
a significant and distinct impact on the emergence of the IBM PC as the dominant design 
in the business segment (Carlton, 1997). Second, issues of shirking on quality (Yalcin, 
Ofek, Koenigsberg & Biyalagorsky, 2013), timing of product introduction (Casadesus-
Masanell & Yoffie, 2006) and conflicts over pricing (Hogendorn & Yuen, 2009) arise 
when a complementary product gains popularity with the consumers. This in turn impacts 
the availability of complementary products, when the complementor may switch to 
producing complements for another competing primary product format.  
Interaction effects: Basu et al (2003) demonstrate interaction effects between selected 
attributes of the hardware and software availability on hardware price so that increased 
software availability enhances the value of selective attributes of the CD-player.  
Stremerch et. al. (2007) model the takeoff between hardware and software sales in nine 
23 
 
 
 
markets to resolve the temporal pattern of indirect network effects, finding that hardware 
sales lead software availability in most markets and the reverse rarely. Further, in contrast 
to the well established notion that complementary product availability is critically 
important for hardware sales (Katz  Shapiro, 1986;1994;  Church & Gandal, 1992), they 
find that amount of software available does not significantly influence the hardware sales 
(in the DVD, CD-ROM & color Television markets).  
Consequences: Complementary products influence de facto standardization, technology 
failure, technology lock out and platform dominance.  
Dominant Design/Standard emergence/Technology failure:  Four case studies are 
illustrative of the influence of complementary products in technology competition. First, 
the failure of various quadraphonic audio technologies is attributed to the splintering 
effect – availability of complements supporting different quad systems, resulting in a lack 
of large supply of recorded music compatible with one single format (Postrel, 1990).  On 
the contrary, the success of Compact Digital audio system is attributed to the abundant 
provision of several recording artists on the CD compatible format leading eventually to 
the replacement of the phonograph (Church & Gandal, 1993).  Second, the rise of IBM 
PC as the dominant design in   personal computing is attested to the widespread 
availability of different types of complementary products (Bresnahan & Greenstein, 
1999).   Apple’s Macintosh received lukewarm acceptance in spite of its superior 
computing capabilities, while IBM’s open architecture strategy of sharing technical 
information with complementors facilitated abundant software availability.  Third, in a 
case study examining the format competition in the US VCR market, complementary 
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product availability (VHS rental tapes) had a significant impact on the demise of the Beta 
format and the emergence of the VHS as the de facto standard (Cusumano et al., 1992; 
Ohashi, 2003). Fourth, in the context of the video game industry, although introductory 
pricing strategy positively influenced the sales of primary product in the beginning of the 
product life cycle, increasing availability of complements determined primary product 
sales later in the product life cycle (Clements & Ohashi, 2005).  Finally, availability of 
complementary products decreases the likelihood of technology lock-out (Schilling, 
2002). 
Platform dominance: Recent studies begin to explore the structure of the relationship 
with complementors (Venkatraman & Lee, 2004; Srinivasan & Venkatraman, 2010; 
Afuah, 2013). First, Srinivasan & Venkatraman (2010) examine the impact of indirect 
network effects on platform dominance by  delineating the impact of platform specific 
factors, viz., number and variety of complementary products  and network specific 
factors, viz., platform overlap and complementor position in the network.  In addition to 
reinforcing findings of prior studies on indirect network effects (Ohashi, 1986; Gandal, 
Greenstein & Salant, 1999; Nair, Chintagunta & Dube, 2004; Clements & Ohashi, 2005), 
the study highlights the importance of diversity of ties with complementors and the 
presence of high status complementors in the network of complementors as positively 
influencing platform dominance by signaling legitimacy, stability and quality of console 
to the end customer and access to better resources. Second, Shankar & Bayus (2003) note 
that a firm’s network strength is a strategic asset since the social ties between its 
constituents make the consumer network an imperfectly imitable socially complex 
resource.  Further, relationships with complementors benefit platform contenders because 
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complementors provide access to resources essential to the success of platform 
ecosystems and facilitate coordinated product launches (Venkatraman & Lee, 2004). 
Recognizing the impact of particular complementors in the network, Hogendorn & Yuen 
(2009) argue that market leadership in platform competition requires use of strategies 
based on the impact of the complementary product on indirect network effects to retain 
complementors producing popular complementary products.  
Context: Complementary and primary product market characteristics  
 The market characteristics within which complementary products have been 
studied includes settings with i) single or multiple standards, ii) vertically integrated and 
disintegrated market structures, iii)  multi sided markets. These factors are important 
because they shed light on the varying importance of complementary products based on 
contextual features. 
Single or multiple standards competition:  Technology competition in the primary 
product market happens through the dominance of two or more incompatible formats 
comparable in technological superiority.  In the presence of multiple standards, 
consumers cannot form clear expectations regarding which technology to adopt, leading 
to a delay in the complementors making complements available (Church & Gandal, 1993; 
Rohlfs, 2001).  Thus, when multiple primary product technologies compete, the 
complementary product market is thin particularly in the initial phases of technology 
competition. Case studies highlight the failure of  classes of primary product technologies 
such as quadraphonic sound (Postrel, 1990), digital compact cassettes and minidiscs 
(Rohlfs, 2001, pg 101-103) or delay in the adoption of a primary product technology as in 
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AM stereo (Besen & Johnson, 1986) and DVD (Dranove & Gandal, 2003; Augereau, 
Greenstein & Rysman, 2006) due to the  poorly developed complementary product 
market. In de facto standardization,, complementors  switch to producing  products for  
the dominant technology, with those unable to do so facing the risk of survival (Afuah, 
2000).  Thus, the emergence of a dominant design in the primary product coincides with 
competition in the complementary product market.  In the absence of a de facto standard 
and the survival of competing technologies,   such as the video game, camcorders 
(Srinivasan, Lilien & Rangaswamy, 2006) and flash drive markets (Liu et al, 2011), 
complements competition occurs across platforms, facilitating multihoming (Hagiu, 
2009; Landsman & Stremersch, 2011).  
Vertically integrated/disintegrated markets:  Contexts include vertically disintegrated 
markets (Church & Gandal, 1992; Bresnahan & Greenstein, 1999; Cheng & Nahm, 2007) 
and integrated markets (Church & Gandal, 1993).  The nature of the market structure 
matters for if there is an existing complementary product market at the stage of primary 
product development; such a case differs from one where the complementary product 
market structure is undeveloped.  This influences the supply of complementary products,   
market development and the nature of the strategies towards complementors.  For 
example, the VCR  product market was vertically disintegrated and the basis of 
competition in the complementary product market was based on making available a large 
supply of movies in the VHS  pre recorded format (Ohashi, 2003), with  VCR makers 
forming  strategic alliances with producers of pre recorded video (e.g. Magnetic Video) 
and video rental stores (Cusumano et. al., 1992). In the CD title industry large players 
such as Sony and Phillips were integrated into CD title production and release.  Notably, 
27 
 
 
 
in the CD title industry production was controlled by a fairly small number of firms, who 
were also competing in the primary product market (Gandal, Kende &  Rob, 2000). For 
example, the CD pressing plants were owned by Sony, Phillips and EMI. 
Summary:  The literature on indirect network effects underscores the dominating 
attention to complementary product availability, and the effect of incompatible hardware 
technologies and product attributes on the availability. Hardware quality and software 
quality are both important in influencing the network size. Complementary products have 
informed several contexts, notably technology competition featuring the emergence of a 
de facto standard, the co existence of multiple standards, platform competition and 
technology lockout.   
Discussion: First, there exists some confusion in the use of terminology for 
complementary product availability and variety. Substantial portions of the literature in 
economics examine the importance of indirect network effects by means of 
complementary product availability and/or variety (Church & Gandal, 1992; Cottrell & 
Koput, 1998; Gandal et. al., 2000; Ohashi, 2003; Nair et. al., 2004) and a distinction 
between them is not made.  This distinction is important because variety implies the 
existence of different types of complements and these differences are not accounted for in 
the models. For example, in the context of hardware-software systems, scholars have 
demonstrated that the value of hardware depends on the variety of compatible software 
(Greenstein, 1993; Gandal, 1994; Saloner & Shepard, 1995; Gandal, Greenstein & Salant, 
1999), where variety is captured empirically as complement availability.   
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 Second, the settings are marked by the presence of single or multiple standards. 
Few papers explicitly account for the differences introduced by this (for example, Church 
& Gandal, 1992; Basu, Mazumdar & Raj, 2003) in competition and strategies involving 
complements. However, recent research has begun to address aspects such as tipping 
(Dube et al, 2010) and multihoming (Landsman & Stremerche, 2009). Third, recent 
papers not only find that primary product attributes influence the price and installed base 
of the product, but also examine characteristics of complements not before addressed.  
These include features such as “superstar” titles (Binken & Stremerche, 2009), tightness 
of complementarity (Yalcin, Ofek et al, 2013). Further, the examples of complements in 
these studies is hardware-software type systems such as PDA and software, CD players 
and titles, video game console and title etc, pointing to the recognition of type of  product 
complementarity . 
 Fourth, the differences in market structures suggest that competing firms pursue 
different strategies in terms of complementary product development and licensing 
strategies. Future studies could examine possible antecedents of these market structures 
and also the influence of these market structures on technology and product market 
outcomes. Finally, studies should also consider the influence of the technological and 
market environment. Since the studies formulate the models in the context of high 
technology product markets, there exists intense competition between the incompatible 
formats and/or characterized by increasing growth. So, explicitly incorporating variations 
from the environment will help to disentangle the effects of the technological 
environment from market effects such as network effects, product effects such as product 
attributes on outcomes such as hardware sales, technology emergence and de facto 
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standardization. Finally, it is interesting to examine the influence of multi platform 
complementary product introductions (Corts & Lederman, 2009) on both the competition 
between the platforms and the defensive strategies pursued by primary product  firms. 
Future studies could examine the how these variables influence technology adoption or 
hardware sales.  
 The earliest research has been dealt with by economic scholars (Farrell & Saloner, 
1985; Katz & Shapiro, 1985; Church & Gandal,1992; Matutes & Regibeau, 1992).  Early 
marketing literature in new product adoption assume that new products are autonomous, 
assume a one-way contingency (where there is an impact of the hardware attributes on 
software availability, but not vice-versa or do not distinguish between the effects of direct 
and indirect network externalities (Gupta, Jain & Sawhney, 1999). Further, we also 
observe some differences in opinion regarding the significance of  indirect network 
effects (Stremerch,Tellis, Frances & Binken, 2007).  
 While most of the extant literature in economics, marketing and strategy are 
primarily examining issues from the perspective of the primary product firm, Kude et al 
(2012) examine strategy decisions from a complementor’s perspective. The setting of 
enterprise software industry is unique to the nature of the software, so technology based 
differences may influence systems that are more tightly coupled or hardware based 
systems. Likewise, Venkatraman & Lee (2004) examine preferential linkage from a 
complementor’s perspective in high technology, networked industries. Their finding that 
complementors prefer to link with newer platforms suggests that the dynamics of 
environment, particularly technological uncertainty influence the received wisdom that 
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complementors develop products with platforms having a large installed base (Katz & 
Shapiro, 1985; 1986; Schilling, 2002). However, the study does not account for the 
influence of the nature of the game, suggesting the role of type of complementarity in 
preferential linkage arguments and consequent technology dominance.   
Vertical Integration and Competition 
 
 This section reviews the literature on strategies of monopolist firms competing in 
one product market to enter into complementary product markets with the objective of 
preserving or extending their market power into an emerging market and eliminate 
potential competition from complementors. It is useful to delineate this work as strategies 
based on pure competitive intentions (Choi & Stefanadis, 2001; Carlton & Waldman, 
2002), the boundary decision (Cournot, 1985; Gilbert & Riordan, 1995) and innovation in 
the product (Gawer & Henderson, 2007). We classify the review into the following 
categories i) Competitive intentions ii) Entry barriers and conclude with a discussion on 
the section. 
Competitive intentions: The integration decisions into complementary product markets 
and associated welfare aspects have been examined when the complement is essential for 
use with the primary product (Cournot, 1838; Matutes & Regibeau, 1988; Economides & 
Salop, 1992; Gilbert & Riordan, 1995; Farrell & Katz, 2000). First, a complementor may  
integrate into an essential good complements market with the intention of setting lower 
prices on the combined product thereby increasing consumer welfare  and  eliminating 
the double mark-up problem (Cournot, 1838). Second, a monopolist in a primary product 
market may also have incentives to integrate into a complementary component market to 
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enhance its market share by driving out competition. Third, existence of independent 
suppliers of complementary inputs creates conditions for vertical integration. For 
example, in the context of the electric power sector, Gilbert & Riordan (1995) note that 
contracting the different complementary inputs to independent entities involved in 
electric utility sector is suboptimal due to the information asymmetry regarding the costs 
of electric power generation and transmission – i.e. this information is private to the 
complementors and there is a possibility of overstatement of costs to the regulator.  
Entry barriers: The mechanisms examined include i) bundling (tying), ii) R & D 
investments and iii) compatibility. 
Bundling:  An incumbent can deter entry in complementary product markets by bundling 
the primary product with the complement (Nalebuff, 2004). Integration into the 
complementary product market by tying a complement to the primary product raises 
entry barriers in the complementary product market for two reasons. First, tying the two 
products makes success for the firm entering the complementary product market 
dependent on successful entry in the primary product market as well (Whinston, 1990; 
Klein, 2001; Carlton & Waldman, 2002). Second, the primary product firm’s market 
power deters the complementor from making this move as it has to bear significant 
expenses to match the economies of scale and reputation to make successful entry in the 
main market. For example, although Netscape’s browser was superior in technological 
attributes, it did not garner market share to survive in the browser market, because 
consumers could not use the browser without an operating system. Moreover, Microsoft 
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had a monopoly in the OS market and technologically tying the browser with the OS 
ensured that it captured the complementary product as well.   
R & D investments: Aggressive R & D investments in the complement market put 
competitive pressures on the non integrated complement suppliers and reduces their 
innovation incentives (Farrell & Katz, 2000; Heeb, 2003). Further, the presence of 
network externalities adds to the entry costs of a firm planning to enter a complementary 
product since it has to bear the costs of the installed base associated with the primary 
product (Carlton & Waldman, 2002). For example, in the example of tying the operating 
system (primary product) with Microsoft Word (the complement), users of Microsoft 
Windows will not only use Microsoft Word because the two sold only as a bundle,  but 
also prefer to engage in  file transactions with Microsoft Word or compatible users. Thus 
the installed base associated with Windows is an additional cost for the complementor 
planning to enter the Word product market with a superior substitute. 
Compatibility: In  multi component industries compatibility between components and 
systems reduces the competition between the firms, and each producer may adopt 
strategies such as setting higher prices on their individual systems and components 
(Economides, 1989; Einhorn, 1992)  increasing the profitability for all firms involved  
(Economides, 1989; Matutes & Regibeau, 1992; Einhorn, 1992; Besen & Farrell,1994). 
Consumers benefit in the following ways. First, it permits mix and match compatibility to 
end consumers so that they combine components of different firms to assemble a system 
of their choice (Einhorn, 1992). Second, the network size increases, enabling consumers 
to switch between different products and also facilitating a greater supply of 
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complementary goods and services (Matutes & Regibeau, 1992).  Thus compatibility 
decisions lower the entry barriers for complementors.  
Summary: The research on vertical integration in the economic stream addresses issues of 
double mark up problem and welfare benefits to consumers, pre empting competition 
from complementors in multi component industries and information asymmetry (Gilbert 
& Rordan, 1995).  Entry barriers are created through pricing, bundling (tying), R & D 
investments and (Choi & Stefanadis, 2001; Heeb, 2003) and lowered through 
compatibility decisions.     
Discussion: First, the boundary question in the context of non component complements is 
yet to receive systematic examination, although Cournot (1838) examined this issue from 
an efficiency and welfare perspective.  For example, the consideration of  varying levels 
of environmental uncertainty through the evolution of the  product  system, difference in 
appropriability regime over the time period, involvement of  co specialized assets (Teece, 
1986; 2007) and information asymmetry between the primary product and 
complementors (Gilbert & Riordan, 1995) suggests the possibility of opportunism, which 
in turn indicates non trivial transaction costs in market based complement transactions for 
the primary product firm. Thus an important line of work complementing the foreclosure 
perspective is the application of a transaction cost lens to examine the boundary issue 
(Williamson, 1975; 1985; 1991). Additionally, the nature of complementarity is also 
likely to have an impact on these issues.   
  Second, although the competitive perspective has been examined incorporating 
network externalities, the influence of the type of complementarity is an unexplored 
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question. Differences in the case of essential and non essential complements arise in 
markets with network externalities because of market power differences based on type of 
complement. Particularly, certain essential complements contribute to the primary 
product earnings significantly (Binken & Stremerche, 2009; Hogendorn & Yuen, 2009) 
influencing the effectiveness of vertical integration as a competitive strategy. For 
example, contrary to received theory, during the VHS vs. Beta technology battle, the 
complementor Universal Studios filed suit against Sony, a VCR manufacturer for 
marketing the VCR, claiming that the latter had infringed on its rights. This case 
witnessed 8 years of legal wrangling, indicating that market power differences exist 
based on type of complementarity and other environmental aspects such as stage of the 
technology evolution, appropriability regime and network effects. 
 Third, although the assumption of the primary product firm having monopoly 
power facilitates inferring precise outcomes, examining the propositions in dynamic, non 
monopolistic settings will lend greater validity to establishing tying or vertical integration 
as a strategy for creating entry barriers in a wider variety of settings varying in 
environmental characteristics such as technological, market and competitive uncertainty. 
Empirical studies employing large scale archival data would also enhance the validity of 
these arguments.  
 Finally, from a methodological perspective, a substantial portion of literature uses 
formal modeling to address the issues of competition, and foreclosure. Assumptions 
regarding nature of complementarity include essential complements (Choi & Stefanadis, 
2001), strict complements (Farrell & Katz, 2000) and non essential complements (Heeb, 
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2003).  The proportion of consumption is also specified in some models as fixed (Choi & 
Stefanadis, 2001) and variable (Matutes & Regibeau, 1992) proportions of consumption, 
which have implications for the extent of R & D investments to create entry barriers.  
Further, most of the models assume the presence of a monopolist primary product firm - 
such an assumption lends the firm market power to protect its market. 
 
Consumer Purchase Behavior 
 
 Aspects pertaining to the purchase behavior of complementary products have 
been examined in cross category context (Blattberg et. al., 1978; Ainslie & Rossie, 1998; 
Chintagunta & Haldar, 1998; Gentzkow, 2007; Iyengar et. al, 2003; Seetharaman et al , 
2005; Duvvuri et. al., 2007; Sriram, Chintagunta & Agarwal, 2010, 2013).  We categorize 
the research in this stream involving complementary products into i) Consumer 
heterogeneity ii) Consumer price sensitivities iii) Purchase timing related to complements 
iv) Brand choice 
Consumer heterogeneity: Consumers differ over the usage of complementary products, 
such as in time (frequently, occasionally, seasonally), target market (children, women, 
teenagers), perceived product image (low fat foods, diet drinks), technology usage 
(traditional vs. new) etc  (Varadarajan, 1986;Walters, 1991; Gupta, Jain & Sawhney, 
1999). These differences inform the timing of purchase and purchase incidence (Xie & 
Sirbu, 1995; Sriram, Chintagunta & Agarwal, 2010), price sensitivities (Duvvuri, Ansari 
& Gupta, 2007; Liu, 2010) and quantity decisions (Niraj, Padmanabhan & Seetharaman, 
2008) associated with the purchase of complementary products. For example, in the home 
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video game market, hard core gamers place a high value for new game consoles than 
casual gamers so that the latter are likely to purchase the complementary products earlier 
than casual gamers. Further, there are likely to be less price sensitive than the causal 
game player segment.  Such consumer taste differences result in specific complementary 
products significantly heavily influencing indirect network effects (Binken, Stremerche & 
Tellis, 2009). For example, the strong preference for action genre games by the teenage 
segment of the home video game market has contributed to discrete indirect network 
effects, i.e. creating a large utility for consumers as compared to other complements 
(Hogendorn & Yuen, 2009). 
Price sensitivities: Cross price, cross promotion and cross inventory variables influence 
the consumer purchase of complementary products (Mulhern & Leone, 1991; Walters, 
1991; Chen et al, 1991; Yue, Mukhopadhyay & Zhu, 2006; Duvvuri, Ansari & Gupta, 
2007; Levy, Grewal, Kopalle, & Hess, 2004).  First, based on longitudinal household data 
on purchase incidences across 6 related product categories, Duvvuri et al (2007) find 
significant cross price effects, cross promotion and cross inventory effects for retail 
consumer purchase in most product categories.  Second, consumers with strong 
preferences for new technology products are less price sensitive and hence choose to 
purchase the product when the prices are high (Karaca-Mandic, 2009; Gowrisankaran & 
Rysman, 2009;  Lee, 2010). Third, consumers price sensitivities vary based on relative 
product versatility (whether it can be used with other products) and relative price (Niraj, 
Padmanabhan & Seetharaman, 2008).  Thus, primary product firms may use the 
information on consumer heterogeneity in product and technology preferences to price 
the complementary products to maximize profits. From a retailer’s perspective, 
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consideration of the complete basket of goods (primary and complementary products) 
will facilitate in setting optimum price and promotion levels (Levy et al., 2004). 
Specifically, they can leverage the differences among consumers by directing targeted 
discounts across product categories, enabling retailers to sell related products more 
effectively. 
Purchase timing: Purchase decisions of related product categories are dependent in time 
(Chintagunta & Haldar, 1998; Manchanda, Ansari & Gupta, 1999; Sriram, Chintagunta & 
Agarwal, 2010). These include several non durable goods that are frequently purchased in 
comparison to the more durable goods which are comparatively less frequently 
purchased. Chintagunta & Haldar (1998) examine the timing of purchase based on a 
household panel datasets involving complements, substitutes and unrelated products. The 
paper finds high correlation in the timing of purchase for complementary products such 
as pasta and pasta sauce, washer and dryer. By controlling for the effects of inventory, 
marketing strategy variables (viz., price, promotions) and household demographics, they 
demonstrate that complementarity between products explains joint purchase behavior.   
 Recent works examine consumer purchase decisions in high technology contexts  
(Gowrisankaran & Rysman, 2009;  Sriram et. al, 2010; Karaca-Mandic, 2011).  Timing 
of purchase differs between complementary, non technology products (such as detergent 
& fabric softener)   and durable, technology based complementary products   (such as 
PCs & printers and PCs & digital cameras). Based on a survey of first time household 
level adoption that includes three related product categories, viz., PCs, digital cameras 
and printers, Sriram et. al.  (2010) develop and test a framework incorporating aspects 
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distinctive to technology based purchase – viz., product quality and price, product 
durability, and consumer purchase in related technologies.  First, since the quality of 
technology based products improve over time and the prices fall,  consumers purchase 
decisions are dependent on their anticipation of the extent to which prices fall – i.e. they 
are likely to adjust the timing of their decision to purchase while such consideration is 
less likely in the case of non technology based complementary products. Thus, consumers 
are likely to defer complementary products purchase to a later time period for technology 
based durable goods or conduct them in multiple purchases unlike the case of non 
technology based goods, where they purchase the goods more or less simultaneously. 
Second, the durability of technology based products suggests that consumers need not 
purchase complements simultaneously.  
 Finally, inherent relatedness of the products influence adoption decisions across 
multiple product categories, so that there is less variation in purchase decisions across 
such product categories.  For example, printer adoption is contingent on PC adoption, so 
that irrespective of consumer preferences purchase of such products is likely to occur 
closely in time. In the absence of such contingences in the adoption of two technology 
based products, consumer preferences determine the complementarity and the subsequent 
timing of purchase.  Some consumers have intrinsic preference for owning a digital 
camera not contingent on having a PC, so that their purchase of the digital camera need 
not be simultaneous with PC purchase. Other consumers may prefer to own a digital 
camera with the PC, so that they purchase the products simultaneously or in close 
succession.  
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Brand choice: Consumer purchase decisions indicate greater likelihood of purchase 
incidence for  complementary products with the same brand name than those with 
different brand names  Seetharaman et al., 2005; Ma, Seetharaman, Narasimhan, 2012). 
Under uncertainty regarding product attributes such as quality or new product 
introduction, brands signal information mitigating consumer uncertainty. 
Summary:  Consumer price sensitivities, purchase timing and product brand choice are 
essential aspects of purchase decisions, influencing the sales of complementary products. 
Further, consumer heterogeneity in the usage of complementary products and the 
involvement of a technology product also influences price sensitivities and purchase 
timing. These have implications for the primary product firms in setting prices and 
promotion, which we review in the firm strategy section.   
Discussion: Mulhern & Leone (1991) conceptualize retail price promotions as a form of 
price bundling strategy and note its different uses from a manufacturer’s and retailer’s 
perspective.  Manufacturers use price promotions to encourage brand switching and 
increase market share, whereas retailers use of price promotions has several effects, 
intended to improve store profitability. They suggest that retailers can take advantage of 
complementary relationships by providing a low price on one product that may stimulate 
the sales on a higher margin use complement.  Although their study is based on using 
data sold in grocery stores such spaghetti sauce and pasta etc., their arguments and 
findings are also relevant for technology complementary products.  Particularly, it is 
interesting to examine how retail pricing influences technology based durable 
complements that are complements by use and those that are complements by purchase. 
40 
 
 
 
They suggest that product manufacturers may be able to work with retailers through 
cooperative strategies to design price bundling options that will enhance both 
manufacturer and retailer profits. In a related work, Chintagunta & Haldar (1998) argue 
that the nature of purchase dependence between product categories should be of 
substantive interest to manufacturers and retailers.  The dependence could be positive 
(such as the purchase of the washing dryer usually follows or occurs simultaneously with 
that of the washing machine) or negative (such as the income constraints could lead to the 
delay in purchase of a PC although the TV is purchased). Separate analysis of the product 
categories in the positive dependence case would lead to independent promotions and 
pricing of the related product categories. In contrast, synergistic analysis of the products 
from related product categories could benefit manufacturers of these products as well as 
retailers involved through cooperative marketing strategies leading to reduced costs 
(because single category promotions would be sufficient) and/or increased sales. 
 An important aspect of the literature is the emphasis on leveraging 
complementarity from a retailer’s perspective; such as complementary pricing or discount 
pricing, coupons and advertizing to draw sales on a complementary good to enhance store 
profitability. There are questions that need to be addressed- first,  what are the marketing 
strategies that leverage complementarity from a manufacturer’s or primary product firm’s 
perspective; second, how do these questions play out in the case of technology based 
products; third how does type of complementarity influence the strategies. 
 Several asymmetric technology complements are complements in purchase rather 
in use. For example, printers and scanners may exhibit a negative price elasticity not 
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because they enhance the value of each other (as per the true definition of complementary 
products), but because they are complements in purchase (i.e. printers and scanners are 
typically available at the same location – retail stores or online retail, so consumers 
purchase them together).  Analysis of the different characterizations suggests that the 
core of all of them is usage aspect, suggesting the centrality of symmetric and 
asymmetric characterizations of product complementarity.  
 A notable point that Sriram et. al. (2010) bring forth is the variation in 
complementarity, in the context of technology based durable products.  They draw 
implications for retailers’ product pricing; however from a primary product firm’s 
perspective there are issues that have to yet be addressed.  Since some technology 
products are complements by design (such as PC and printer), what factors influence 
firms to design products as complements by design? Second, how do firm’s marketing 
strategies vary according to this variation in complementarity? 
Summary:  Thus, the review of market structures reveals that significant importance of 
complementary products in contributing to indirect network effects, the importance of 
vertical integration strategies as a competitive strategy and the efficacy of bundling 
(tying) and R & D investments in creating entry barriers to foreclose competition in 
complementary product markets. Further, consumer preferences and behaviors are 
influenced significantly by prices, brands and timing of purchase when complements are 
involved. The review thus reveals significant and important work covered in the context 
of market structures, and also identifies important gaps yet to be addressed in each 
subsection.  
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Firm Strategy 
 
The second major topic related to complementary products constitutes aspects of 1) 
technology strategy in the context of technology competition 2) marketing strategy, 
primarily from the perspective of a primary product firm  
Technology Strategy 
 
 A technology strategy is the set of actions taken by a primary product firm in 
contexts involving technology based complementary products intended to give it a unique 
position in technology competition. Since adaptability to changing technological 
conditions is also identified as an aspect of technology strategy (Pistorius & Utterback, 
1997; Adner, 2002), the set of actions also include those taken by firms in response to 
new complementary products or technologies.   
 The contexts in which a actions towards complementary products are identified 
include technology adoption (Katz & Shapiro, 1986; Farrell & Saloner, 1986; Nair, Dube 
& Chintagunta, 2004; Clements & Ohashi, 2005), dominant design emergence (Suarez, 
2004; Srinivasan, Lilien & Rangaswamy, 2006), technology standards (Church & 
Gandal, 1992; Cottrell & Koput, 1998; Shapiro & Varian, 1999; Gupta, Jain & Sawhney, 
1999; Gallagher & Park, 2002; Narayanan & Chen, 2012), and platform/ecosystem 
leadership (Cusumano & Gawer, 2002; Gawer & Henderson, 2007; Teece, 2007; Pierce, 
2009; Adner & Kapoor, 2010; Turner, Mitchell & Bettis, 2010).  The decisions examined 
include compatibility, entry timing and complementary product development strategies. 
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We review the strategies, antecedents, consequences, contingences and conclude with a 
discussion on fruitful areas of research. 
Technology adoption: A critical mass of complementary products is essential for a 
primary technology to establish the lead in a standards battle (Shurmer, 1993; Shapiro & 
Varian, 1999; Bresnahan & Greenstein, 1999; Rohlfs, 2001; Stremersch, Tellis, Franses 
& Binken, 2007). The existence of multiple primary product formats is a bottleneck in a 
technology gaining critical mass of complements, and becoming the product market 
standard (Church & Gandal, 1992). Multiple technologies splinter the complement 
development effort, so that no single technology gains leadership. The choice of 
strategies in product development such as compatibility, timing of entry and acquiring 
support from complementors influence the decision of complementors to join the focal 
firm’s network among competing alternatives.   
Compatibility decisions: There are two ways in which compatibility decisions have 
occurred in the literature, 1) in the primary product technology and 2) in the 
complementary product technology.  
In Primary product technology:  During the initial phases of  a technology battle,  there 
are likely to be different formats,  as witnessed in high technology markets such as the 
CD player market and Television market (Shapiro & Varian, 1998; Rohlfs, 2001). First, 
to ensure consolidation in the development of complementary products, firms may pursue 
a strategy where they negotiate with primary product firms to converge around one 
format. Such coordination and adjustments take place during the design phase of the 
primary product even before a standards war commences (Rohlfs, 2001). For example, in 
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the development of the CD players, although Philips NV pioneered the laser scanning 
technology in 1979, competing alternatives soon were soon being designed by Sony, 
Telefunken & JVC in magnetic, grooving and optical scanning formats.  Phillips 
therefore worked towards establishing a technological standard in the CD player by 
licensing its technology to the alternative producers and also making adjustments in its 
technology to incorporate attributes of the competitors’ products.  Such a strategy of 
coalescing on a single primary product design during the product design phase ensures 
the splintering effect is avoided  from a complementary product firm’s perspective and 
eliminates consumer uncertainty at the outset pertaining to which technology will 
emerge, which would have delayed adoption.   
 Second, if a standards war ensues de facto standardization involves significant 
costs associated with achieving compatibility through driving out competing formats 
(Farrell & Saloner, 1992) as well such as coordination between different entities in the 
market and involvement of institutional and government bodies (Katz & Shapiro, 1994; 
Narayanan & Chen, 2012).  
In complementary product technology: In standards competition, the question of 
compatibility addresses whether different brands or technologies of the durable goods 
(e.g. hardware) can utilize available complementary products, viz., software (Katz & 
Shapiro, 1986).  Two conflicting interests have to be addressed. First, compatibility in the 
presence of network externalities creates demand side economies of scale, allowing 
consumers to interchange complementary products, ease communication and benefits 
complementors through cost savings since interchangeability of parts facilitates mass 
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production (Farrell & Saloner, 1986). Second, in systems competition characterized by 
indirect network externalities, demand is often driven by variety in complementary 
products.  Conversion technologies in the complementary product market allow multiple 
formats to persist in the complements market, leading to both greater complement 
availability and variety (Farrell & Saloner, 1992; Church & Gandal, 1992) without the 
costs involved in standardization, while also preventing the complement market from 
tipping to a winner-take all situation (Liu, Kemerer, Slaughter & Smith, 2012). Thus, 
primary product firms may encourage the development of conversion technologies in the 
complement market. For example, in the video game product market availability of 
adapters for the VCS cartridges permitted users to play  Atari’s game on competing 
consoles such as ColecoVision.   
 In the context of the US CD player market, Gandal, Kende & Rob (2000) examine 
the effectiveness of different strategies in explaining technology adoption, in the period 
between 1985 and 1992 - the time period when CD players showed continued 
improvement in technological aspects and prices declined continuously. A 10% increase 
in the availability of software would have as large as an effect as a 5% hardware price 
cut, suggesting the importance of making available a large number of complementary 
products.  Importantly, compatibility with LPs, an alternative to CDs and a technology 
predating CDs would have considerably increased the speed of the technology adoption. 
Entry timing decisions: The primary firm has to balance the benefits entailed in 
introducing the primary product early to market, to garner first mover advantages that 
could lead to the market tipping in its favor with the risk that consumer’s delay adoption 
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of the primary product for lack of widespread availability of complementary products.  
The impasse is illustrated in two cases. First, although the US firms CBS and Sony 
invested several millions in the development of the Color Television sets, it was early in 
time because the complementary product – content was not developed enough to ensure 
widespread broadcasting, leading to a less than 4 percent ownership of color TV sets 
(Shapiro & Varian, 1998, pg 216).  Second, in the CD player technology adoption, 
although Phillips successfully coalesced the different format CD makers such as Sony 
and JVC  on its CD player technology, the lack of availability of  pre recorded tapes in 
the CD format delayed adoption (Rohlfs, 2001). This in turn suggests the importance of 
strategies to prevent uneven entry in the primary and complementary product markets. 
Further early entry of both primary and complementary products enables firms to reap the 
gains of first mover advantage, particularly since networked markets are subject to strong 
irreversibilities creating path dependence in initial technology strategy decisions 
(Basanini & Dosi, 2001, pg 45).   Schilling (2002) demonstrates that early and greater 
availability of complementary goods increases the associated installed base and prevents 
technology lock-out, when there are competing platforms. Case studies suggest that firms 
may pursue a strategy of internal production of complements and/or coordinating with 
complementors to establish support for their technologies.  We examine this dimension of 
a firm’s technology strategy in the context of technology adoption in the next section. 
Complementary product development strategy: To ensure complementary product 
availability, firms pursue internal development of complements; coordinate with 
complementors to ensure timely availability of complements conforming to its product 
specifications or a mix of both strategies.  Internal development of complements reduces 
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reliance on complementors on the one hand; however it also entails significant costs 
particularly when network effects are strong, so that widespread availability of 
complements significantly influences technology adoption as opposed to attributes of the 
primary product technology itself. Two cases are illustrative. In the context of CD 
players, Phillips owned 50 percent of Polygram, which ensured that pre recorded CDs 
were available in the market when the CD was introduced, however due to the significant 
dependence between the primary and complementary product such a strategy fell short in 
ensuring complement availability. Second in the VHS vs. Beta technology battle,  Sony  
resorted to internal development of complementary products, which has been cited as  
one reason for its failure penetrating the market , as  such strategies  in the initial phases 
of technology battles create path dependences (Basanini & Dosi, 2001).  In fact,  had 
Sony pursued an aggressive competitive strategy in the first 3 years of Beta introduction 
in terms of complement availability it could have captured as much as 98% of the market, 
as compared to the actual 8.6% (Ohashi, 2003).   
Studies also point to the effectiveness of strategies to coordinate complementary product 
development such as technology licensing agreements  with  complementors  as in the 
VHS and CD player development (Cusumano, Mylonadis & Rosenbloom, 1992),   
investing in co production equipment  and distribution networks with complementors 
(Rohlfs, 2001) , involving a range of  cooperative forms  such as  minority equity 
investments (eg. IBM and Rolm technologies) and joint ventures (CBS Records and Sony 
in the making of CDs).  
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Platform Dominance: An industry platform involves multiple interdependent components 
and complements that sit on top of a core technology serving as the foundation (Gawer & 
Cusumano, 2002; Gawer & Henderson, 2007; Gawer, 2009). Examples include software 
platforms, viz., Microsoft’s Windows Operating System,  Linux operating system and 
hardware platforms viz., home video gaming console (Corts & Lederman, 2009), the Intel 
platform (Gawer & Cusumano, 2002) , PDA (Nair et al, 2004) and IBM PC (Gandal, 
Greenstein & Salant, 1999). The business ecosystem that sustains the development of 
such platforms constitutes platform owners (primary product firms), institutions 
(regulatory bodies, standard setting bodies such as IEEE, WWW), complementors, 
suppliers and customers, strongly functionally and market interdependent (Evans, Hagiu 
& Schmalensee, 2006; Teece, 2007; Piece, 2009).   
In such systems, platform owners have to balance the requirements for continuous 
innovation in the system, at the same time maintain control over the core architecture, 
known as the “adoption vs. appropriability” issue (West, 2003).  From a complementor’s 
perspective, since independent complementors are not inclined to invest in a platform 
innovation for fears of domination (Pierce, 2009) and price squeezing by platform owners 
(Farrell & Katz, 2000; Choi & Stefanadis, 2001; Heeb, 2003), the platform owner has to 
engage in strategies signaling its commitment to complementor support and  profitability 
(Gawer & Henderson, 2007).  We review the research on platforms relating to 
coordination and control aspects of system evolution, involving the actions of platform 
owners (primary product firms) and complementors.   
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Coordination strategies:  Coordination strategies involve actions taken by the primary 
product firm to ensure the availability of complements,  based on type of 
interdependence, market and technological conditions, that involves different forms of 
cooperation,, negotiations and commitments  (Casadesus-Masanell & Yoffie, 2006; 
Economides & Katsamakas, 2006; Gawer & Henderson, 2007). The research on 
coordination actions may be categorized into determinants and outcomes of coordination 
forms.     
Antecedents: In high technology product markets, technological uncertainty is high due to 
continuous innovations by complementors in the platform ecosystem.  Such markets also 
experience intense competitive battles. First Turner, Mitchell & Bettis (2010) argue that 
generational product innovations (i.e. innovations within an existing technology regime) 
by complementors influences release of product innovations by platform owners  to 
realign the technological interdependences between the products.  In the context of the 
business productivity software markets, they demonstrate that primary product firms 
respond with matched core product innovations in response to technological uncertainty. 
Specifically innovations by complementors under increasing market concentration.  Such 
environmental contingences influence platform owner’s decisions so that parallel 
innovations by different complementors do not compromise system stability. 
Forms:  Two findings are notable, viz., 1) the choice of organizational form with 
complementors influences the core product firm’s decision to invest in an emerging 
technology, so that investment in a new technology is more likely when the 
complementors are linked in an alliance rather than arms length agreements, for an 
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alliance form facilitates the coordinated investment between the firms , while restraining 
costs involved, and 2) scope of alliance facilitates new technology investment for  scope 
aligns incentives and facilitates cooperation (Kapoor & Lee, 2013). Specifically, they 
demonstrate that hospitals and physicians that formed alliances covering a broader scope 
of activities with complementors show greater chances of investment in new technologies 
such as medical imaging technologies.  
Antecedents: Complementors form partnerships with platform providers having greater 
technological capital, reputation and the capabilities to steer system control and 
management of interdependences among different components, marketing and financial 
capabilities and the level of product complementarity (Kude, Dibbern & Heinzl, 2012). 
Further, motives to increase innovation in a platform, where the platform owner does not 
have the requisite capabilities explain some of the strategies.  For example, platform 
owners provide access to the platform technology to complementors by pursuing open 
strategies to leverage the capabilities of a broader set of external complementors (Gawer 
& Henderson, 2007), by means of technology licensing to ensure interoperability and 
overall system integrity. In addition, institutional bodies such as the World Wide Web 
and IEEE facilitate coordination in complex open source projects (Yoffie & Kwak, 
2006).   
Degree of platform openness: This involves licensing the rights to use components, 
disclosing interfaces, providing documentation and technical support (Boudreau, 2011). 
Further, the platform owner may restrict access to the type of complements by a) 
licensing its technology to a selected number of complementors, b) retaining control of 
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certain complements and allowing unrestricted access to the  development of other 
applications.   
 To summarize, in the post dominant design era, research focuses on the dynamics 
of platform performance, ecosystem management and success, emphasizing the 
importance of actions by complementors (Gawer & Cusumano, 2002; Turner, Mitchell & 
Bettis, 2010; Adner & Kapoor, 2010). The need for dealing with the challenges of 
managing the complex interdependences between the different components and 
complements, encouraging innovation to ensure platform differentiation and retaining 
control over system architecture so that overall system performance is not compromised 
dominates the nature of technology strategies in this era of technology competition. 
Further, these markets are also characterized by intense technological change, fierce 
competition and changing consumer affiliations contributing also to market uncertainty.  
Recent works suggest dealing these challenges with the strategies of alliances (Kapoor & 
Lee, 2013), opening the platform through sharing IP and  seeking assistance from 
institutional bodies and standard setting organizations  (Boudreau, 2010) and  continuous 
platform innovation to respond to rapid technological change and market uncertainty 
(Turner, Mitchell & Bettis, 2010).  
Discussion: First, the technology evolution paradigm suggests different environmental 
conditions persist through product evolution, distinguished specifically before and after 
the emergence of a dominant design in the technology management literature. 
Specifically, there are significant differences in technological and market uncertainty and 
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the appropriability regimes.  Incorporating these dimensions in the technology strategy is 
likely to yield interesting results.  
 Second, although strategic alliances are important strategies for coordination, the 
strategy with complementors has not received exhaustive treatment (Kapoor & Lee, 
2013). Specifically, how variations in product complementarity influence the 
management of interdependence requires examination of factors such as nature of 
interdependence adaptation required, involvement of cospecialized assets and possibility 
of opportunism, with the form of alliance as an outcome. For instance, managing 
interdependence in the complementary product design phase for an essential complement 
raises issues of appropriation, while coordinating in production requires significant 
upfront fixed costs, which may not be recoverable.  In the CD player technology 
adoption, because of CBS records prominent role (owing to the type of complement it 
produced and its capabilities in producing content), it negotiated substantial equity 
participation through a joint venture with Sony in the production of CDs.  Third, more 
work is needed to understand the factors influencing primary product firms decision to 
internalize complement development, i.e. whether there is a systematic variation in the 
decision to internalize complement development based on nature of product 
complementarity,  cospecialized assets and environmental dynamism. 
 Fourth, the complexity of the product system also influences the coordination 
challenges and strategies. Greater system complexity requires coordination to be aligned 
in various aspects of the products (such as R & D, production and marketing) among 
many more actors than in the case of simpler systems (Suarez, 2004). Further, type of 
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complementarity is likely to influence the strategies since the needs for coordinating 
interface development with complements that are essential is different from that required 
for interface development with non essential complements, depending on the phase of the 
technology evolution. For example, the coordination strategies executed by PC makers 
towards OS and microprocessor before the emergence of the dominant design 
development is different compared to their strategies towards peripheral applications and 
products, more prominent after the dominant design.  In the case of a comparatively 
lesser complex systems such as video gaming, the variation in coordination strategies 
based on type of complementarity is less evident. 
 From a methodological viewpoint, large scale empirical studies examine the 
propositions related to primary product firm strategies of coordination and their outcomes 
(Kapoor & Lee, 2013) , antecedents of strategies  such as complementor motivations to 
innovate in longitudinal setting in the context of platforms and ecosystems.  The settings 
include the health care  ecosystem where the hospitals and physicians constitute the 
entities that are complementary and the  technology investment decision pertains to new 
imaging technologies (Kapoor & Lee, 2013), semi conductor industry (Gawer & 
Henderson, 2007; Adner & Kapoor, 2010), automobile industry (Pierce, 2009)  and 
enterprise system software industry (Kude et al, 2013).    
Marketing Strategy 
 
 Marketing strategy involving complementary products addresses product pricing, 
distribution and promotion related factors, from a primary product firm and retailer’s 
perspective. Importantly, it recognizes the multiproduct, multi agent nature of marketing 
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decisions involving complementary products. We review this literature in the following 
categories, viz., pricing, promotions and distribution from the manufacturer’s and 
retailer’s perspective, joint marketing strategies involving the primary product firm and 
complementor/retailer.   
Pricing: Complementary product pricing strategies include razor-blade pricing, system 
pricing, bundling strategies, skim and penetration pricing (Tellis, 1986; Guiltinan, 
Madden & Joseph, 1997; Noble & Gruca, 1999; Venkatesh & Kamakura, 2003; Liu, 
2010).  We review the literature based on the type of pricing strategies from the 
perspective of the firms involved and the contingences. 
From the manufacturer (primary product firm’s) perspective: Following types of pricing 
strategies are noted in the literature viz.,  
1) razor-blade pricing, where the core product is priced low and complementary 
items such as accessories, supplies, spare parts, services, etc. are priced at a higher 
premium. An example is Gillette's strategy of selling razors cheaply and blades at 
a higher markup. Further, in many industrial markets, a firm offers a wide range 
of spare parts, and accessories, profits from which constitute a large profit stream. 
Under  this strategy,  the main product  or platform is sold  for  a  relatively  low  
price  while complementary products carry a high margin (Guiltinan et.al.,1997).  
2) in systems pricing, the primary product firm bundles the complement(s) along 
with the main product at a total price less than the sum of individual prices. For 
example, IBM’s strategy of selling mainframe systems that includes the server, 
the client, related software, databases, punch cards and printer. Based on a survey 
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of 270 practicing managers from fifteen different industries, Noble & Gruca 
(1999) find that firms were more likely to use one of the complementary product 
pricing strategies when the firms also sold complements, brands were highly 
elastic and target high growth markets where consumers are highly price 
sensitive.  
3)  bundling is likely to be effective strategy when introducing new products if firms 
vary the bundling mix based on level of complementarity, i.e. consumer 
perceptions of the fit between the products in a bundle (Simonin & Ruth, 1995). 
Specifically, mixed bundling is effective for weak complements and pure 
bundling is effective when selling strong complements (Venkatesh & Kamakura, 
2003). 
Contingences: Network effects and consumer heterogeneity in product use have opposing 
influences on the effectiveness of pricing strategies, in high technology product 
competition (Xie & Sirbu, 1995; Liu, 2010).  In the presence of indirect network effects,  
since consumer product adoption increases with installed base,   penetration pricing - 
where the products are sold at below marginal costs -  leads to faster product diffusion 
and first mover advantages in technology competition (Shapiro & Varian, 1998), 
however at the cost of initial profitability. The recognition of consumer heterogeneity in 
the usage of technology provides incentive for skim pricing, where the product is priced 
relatively high in the beginning, enabling a primary product firm to recover the costs of 
product development earlier, however at the cost of slower product diffusion and network 
growth.  Typical technology product introductions follow a price skimming strategy with 
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a declining price trajectory by targeting the early technology enthusiasts first and then 
capturing the mass market through reduced pricing (Xie & Sirbu, 1995).   
  In a comparative study of the video game market involving competition between 
Nintendo and Sony, Liu (2010) shows that Sony’s penetration pricing strategy gave it an 
early lead in the market, enabling it to win the console war for that generation.. 
From the retailer’s perspective: Retail pricing strategy generally includes the use of price 
promotions (Mulhern &  Leone, 1991), so we review this in the next section on 
promotions. 
Promotions and distribution: The impact of promotional spillovers across 
complementary product categories examines the effect of price promotions on one 
product  by manufacturers and retailers,  display and feature advertizing activities on one 
product by retailers (Blattberg, Briesch & Fox, 1995; Niraj et al., 2008) and display 
allowances to the retailers (intermediaries), Branding and advertizing alliances on the 
sales of complementary products are also examined in this category (Manchanda et al, 
1999; Chib et. al, 2002; Russell & Petersen, 2000; Wedel & Zhang, 2000; Song & 
Chintagunta, 2006; Sinitsyn, 2012).   We review the promotional spillovers from the 
perspective of the manufacturer (primary product firm) and retailer. 
From the manufacturer (primary product firm’s) perspective: The importance of the 
brand in the promotion of complementary products is notable (Walters, 1991; Mulhearn 
& Leone, 1991; Ma, Seetharaman  & Narasimhan, 2012; Sinitsyn, 2012).  Due to the 
influence of the brand on consumer purchase, when complementary products sharing the 
same brand name go on sale simultaneously, it results in joint purchase and increased 
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sales of both products.  In channel distribution involving complementary products and 
based on recent developments in technology based product markets, for e.g., the 
exclusive agreement between Apple and AT&T, where the iPhone was designed to be 
used only with the AT & T service,  Cai, Dai & Zhou (2012) examine the influence of a 
combination of exclusive deals and revenue sharing between manufacturers and retailers, 
where the manufacturer sells the primary product and the retailer sells the complementary 
good/service at the same time. Unlike traditional revenue sharing contracts, the retailer 
pays a percentage of the profit from the sale of the complementary good/service rather 
than the sale of the primary product contingent on exclusivity with the complementor’s 
product/usage.  
From the retailer’s perspective:  Promotional (retail pricing) activities in the context of 
complementary products have been examined in terms of  same store versus competing 
store sales,  magnitude of promotional expenses across product categories,  timing of 
promotions and the differential impact of promotions based on product attributes. First, 
retail price promotional activities on a product in one store, such as advertizing of price 
reductions on a weekly basis – positively influences sales of complements in the same 
store and have the reverse effect on sales in competing stores (Walters, 1991) explained 
by search costs and co location of complements (Guiltinan et. al., 1997).  Based on 
scanner level data in different consumer product categories, the papers find evidence for 
the enhancing effect of retail price promotions for complementary products within the 
store.  Second, the allocation of promotional expenditures with consideration of 
complementarity effects positively influences sales (Mehta & Ma, 2012).  Higher 
promotional discounts lead to higher profits for complementary product pairs as 
58 
 
 
 
compared to non related or substitute products (Mulhern & Leone, 1991), emphasizing 
the following implications viz., the importance of strategic co location of complementary 
products from a retailer’s perspective, retailer power in channels, opportunities for 
cooperative strategies between the manufacturer and retailer to improve primary product 
market share, from a primary product firm’s perspective.   
Third, coordinating timing of promotions influences retail sales of related product 
categories such that simultaneous promotion has a stronger effect. Finally, 
complementary product promotional spillovers are asymmetric in that retailers profit 
more when the prices of one product in a pair are reduced as compared to the other 
product (Niraj, Padmanabhan & Seetharaman, 2008), determined by relative price 
sensitivities and product versatility. 
 Co-marketing: Co-marketing alliances are contractual relationships between firms 
producing complementary products, for the purpose of coordinating marketing strategies 
including building product complementarity usage awareness, advertizing, promotion and 
branding (Bucklin & Sengupta, 1993; Son, Hahn & Kang, 2006). We categorize this 
research into the i) antecedents and types of co marketing alliances , viz., advertizing,  
joint  sales promotion and brand alliances ii) challenges in co-marketing alliances  
Antecedents and types of co marketing alliances: Antecedents include consumer brand 
perceptions, product complementarity, cost efficiency, reputation considerations and the 
stage of the product in its life cycle, informing the type of alliance. Samu, Krishnan & 
Smith (1999) shed light on the factors influencing effectiveness of advertizing alliances. 
Specifically, brand-awareness and brand -beliefs (consumer’s perception of the 
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association between product category and brand) influence the effectiveness of the type 
of advertizing strategy based on product complementarity. For example, a top-down 
advertizing strategy where the relatedness between the two products is highlighted is 
likely to be effective when consumers are unfamiliar with the nature of complementarity 
between the products, a bottom-up advertizing strategy where the advertisement’s 
headline focuses attention on the attribute linking the advertized products is likely to be 
effective when a new non essential complementarity is being advertized. For the primary 
product firm, forming an alliance with an established brand of a highly complementary 
product would result in consumers readily perceiving the complementarity between the 
products and increased purchases.   
Cooperative sales promotion involves the pool of promotional resources by two or more 
complementary product manufacturers formed to capitalize on joint opportunities for 
sales growth by promoting trial, large quantity purchase etc. In fact complementarity 
between the product lines of two distinct firms has been suggested as a motivation for 
joint promotion programs (Varadarajan, 1986). Joint sales promotions also confer greater 
cost efficiency and promotion effectiveness due to collective sales effort.  Brand alliances 
are joint alliances involving one firm with higher reputation formed to enhance the 
perception of product quality of the one of the firms involved, particularly when the 
quality of the product cannot be observed (Rao & Ruckert, 1994). Finally, stage of the 
product life cycle influences the decisions of firms to co promote their products with 
complementors in other industries by discriminating between price sensitive and 
insensitive segments (Son, Hahn & Kang, 2006). 
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Challenges in co-marketing alliances: First, joint marketing programs tend to be 
prolonged due to the negotiations required to reach shared objectives. Second, possibility 
of conflict exists when firms also compete in other product categories, with 
disagreements over product launch dates, production delays value chain leading to 
shortages at the retail level for one of the products (Varadarajan, 1986; Bucklin & 
Sengupta, 1993). Finally, possibilities of opportunistic behavior exist. As we identify in 
the next section. 
To summarize, marketing strategy has addressed aspects of pricing and promotion related 
to complementary products from a manufacturing and retailing firm’s perspectives. The 
work on co-marketing alliances examines motivations and types of agreements, along 
with the challenges involved.  
Discussion: Substantive research in marketing examines cross category purchase 
behavior for non technology based products. It is interesting to examine if similar 
findings can be generalized to technology based complements. Specifically, how do firms 
change/adapt their marketing strategies with factors such as interoperability, firm 
technological and marketing capabilities influencing decisions of firms to brand and 
promote complementary products? Particularly, there is evidence of a notable difference 
in the context of consumer based products that have informed the context of marketing 
research (for complementary products) in pricing, advertizing and promotions. Further, 
several high technology product markets are also characterized by network effects, so 
that the relevance of the marketing strategies in the context of network externalities and 
61 
 
 
 
platforms/ systems competition is likely to provide better understanding about the 
associated challenges.   
Second, an unaddressed area is how firms respond to the cross pricing, promotion and 
distribution strategies for the differences in product complementarity based on the nature 
of use. Particularly, the issues of shirking on quality and competition in the distribution 
channels are likely to have differential impact on the partner’s incentive to cooperate and 
impact the distribution of profits. 
Co-marketing alliance represent a dimension of a primary product firm’s strategy 
involving complementary products that have a significant impact on increasing joint sales 
(Bucklin & Sengupta, 1992; Son, Hahn & Kang, 2006). There is a lack of research 
examining  the nature of these co-marketing alliances in the context of complementary 
products involving technology based products and the changing market and technological 
conditions (Venkatesh, Mahajan & Muller, 2000). Relatedly, existing frameworks for co 
promotion agreements involving complementary products  do not examine the influence 
of different kinds of complementary products (such as usage, timing, image, occasions 
etc).  
Opportunism 
 
 This section reviews some of the opportunistic concerns identified in the 
literature, viz., 
1. Joint distribution of complementary products could also result in loss of profits from 
potential complements that are not part of the agreement (Xia, Xiao, Zhang, 2013), 
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mainly from competition from their complementors. For example, although Lexmark 
made additional revenues from the sale of its printers through Dell’s distribution 
channels, it also led to increased competition when Dell introduced its own brand of 
printers and started selling printer cartridges, reducing sales of complements for Lexmark 
(Bulkeley, 2005).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
2. Since consumers are more strongly influenced by the dominant or well established 
brand among complements sold as a bundle, from a primary firm’s perspective, 
partnering with a well established brand entails appropriation of rents through bargaining. 
A survey based study by Venkatesh & Mahajan (1999) reveals that consumers perceived 
Intel as the dominant brand in the PC-microprocessor product category. The implication 
is that Intel could potentially bargain for a higher share of the profits, when the firms 
conduct joint marketing activities that involve revenue sharing. The possibility of 
bargaining over the distribution of revenues has been noted in recent joint marketing 
activities involving complementary products (Cai, Dai & Zhou, 2012).  
3. Certain complementary products contribute to large indirect network effects because of 
their superstar status (Binken & Stremercxhe, 2007) and the nature of the relationship 
with the primary product (Hogendorn & Yuen, 2009; Yalcin et al, 2013). Such indirect 
network effects are a form of asset specific investment for the primary product firm. 
(Hogendorn & Yuen, 2009). Contractual instruments such as royalty rate or revenue 
sharing agreements lead to  two issues. First, the complementor may bargain for a higher 
share of the profits, threatening to defect to another network if the bargaining 
63 
 
 
 
requirements are not met. Second, the complementor may shirk of quality and deliver an 
inferior complement.  
 From a primary product firm’s perspective, the risks associated with opportunism 
not only increases the  ex ante partner search,  contract specification and monitoring  
costs, but also  ex-post transaction costs in contract enforcement, renegotiation, and 
appropriation of proprietary know-how and loss of rents, particularly if asset specific 
investments are involved. The primary lens used to examine opportunism concerns has 
been transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1975, 1976), which posits the use of 
hierarchical governance structures to shield the firm from opportunistic concerns. The 
next chapter uses this lens to propose governance structures in the context of the 
governance choice involving complementary products. 
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CHAPTER 3: CONCEPT OF PRODUCT COMPLEMENTARITY 
Introduction 
  
The literature review on complementary products indicates that that the term 
complementary product masks the variety discussed in the current literature.  Although 
the idea of cross price elasticity of demand underpins all streams of research, somewhat 
different facets of the concept have also been attended to.  For instance, nature of 
consumer usage (Sengupta, 1998; Wedel & Zhang, 2004; Duvvuri, Ansari & Gupta, 
2007; Song, Parry & Kawakami, 2009), perceived usefulness (Chintagunta & Haldar, 
1998; Samu, Krishnan & Smith, 1999), value chain related dependences (Teece, 1986; 
Adner & Kapoor, 2010) and technological aspects (Cusumano & Gawer, 2002; Gawer & 
Henderson, 2007) inform aspects of product complementarity. Further we observe 
variations in the types of complementary products, such as hardware & software, or 
components as complements that vary by context in which they are studied.  
Even though recent work addresses the differences between components and 
complements based on value chain related factors (Adner & Kapoor, 2010) and the 
necessity of complement usage (Cheng & Nahm, 2007), there is a lack of adequate 
attention in explaining this variation and the dimensions of product complementarity, i.e. 
the meaning of product complementarity.  Delineating the different aspects of the concept 
is fruitful both from an academic and practitioner perspective. First, it will enhance our 
understanding of technology related outcomes such as dominant design emergence 
(Suarez, 2004) , platform leadership (Cusumano & Gawer, 2000) and de facto 
standardization (see Narayanan & Chen, 2012 for a review) by identifying the 
components of product complementarity contributing to value creation in the different 
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contexts. High technology markets are characteristically different from others, for 
instance - the mechanism of indirect effects operates through complementary products. 
But the literature gives little guidance in terms of which complements to pay attention to, 
under which context, for it treats indirect network effects and complementary products 
fundamentally in a unitary fashion.  
The Profiting from Innovation framework (Teece, 1986; Pisano & Teece, 2007) 
emphasizes the importance of the appropriability regime, types of complementary assets 
and technology change in influencing firm strategies, in turn determining the distribution 
of rents from innovation. In spite of the widespread attention to complements in general, 
not much has been written about how the nature of product complementarity influences 
the sharing of rents in several high technology product industries with horizontal 
architectures.  Further, the increasing dependence of products and services and parallel 
innovations by multiple firms in different layers of the architecture prompts the 
examination of factors influencing technology leadership, the evolution and control of the 
system architecture (Gawer & Cusumano, 2002). Since different types of complementary 
products contribute to the performance and innovation in the platform, guidance for 
managers regarding the adoption of strategies in accordance with the interdependence 
between the complements in different layers will facilitate decision making in the context 
of platform leadership. 
  The primary goal of this paper is to develop the concept of complementary 
products by addressing three related issues, viz., the dimensions of the relationship 
between primary and complementary products, the different types of complementary 
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products, and the variation in the different types of complementary products, by 
analyzing the definitions employed in the extant literature. The definitions employed in 
the literature are summarized in Table 4. The next section delineates the dimensions, 
distinctions and the variation in the concept.   
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Please insert Table 4 around here 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Meaning of Product Complementarity 
 
The first subsection begins by identifying clusters of definitions, followed by a 
description of each cluster and ends with a discussion on the clusters. 
 Definitions  
 
We group the definitions into different clusters (see Table 4 for a detailed list)   based 
on1) cross price elasticity of demand 2) consumer usage and 3) functional 
interdependence, the factors noted in the definitions.  
 Definitions based on cross-price elasticity of demand reflect sales 
interdependence between the products  include “Two goods xi and xj  are said to be gross 
complements if δ xi/ δ pj  < 0, i.e. they are gross  complements if a rise in the price of one 
good causes less of the other good to be purchased”(Nicholson, 2005), “we  define  
substitutability  and  complementarity  from the firms' point of view  by referring to the 
sign of the cross-price elasticity of demand.  If it is positive,  products  are substitutes; in 
the opposite case they are complements” (Sarvary & Parker, 1997) and “Complementary 
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products are those products (or services) that experience a sales increase when related 
products experience an increase in support” (Guiltinan, Joseph & Gordon, 1997). 
Technological and functional interdependence between the products are another 
aspect defining the nature of complementary products. “A product maybe one component 
of an evolving technological system and exhibit strong functional interdependence with 
other components in such a system” (Gawer & Henderson, 2005), “Many products are 
complex, specified by a long array of characteristics (i.e. interdependent functions). A 
firm may choose to decompose this integrated set of features into two or more smaller 
parts…….. These smaller parts correspond to components or complements” 
(Economides, 1 989), “Systems are composed of complementary and interdependent 
products, such as hardware and software” (Binken & Stremerche, 2009). Similar 
implications are also made by other papers (Church & Gandal, 1992; Katz and Shapiro 
1994).  
From a consumer usage point of view, definitions of product complementarity 
highlight the value derived. “Complementary product is one that enhances the value of a 
focal product when the two are used together by end users” (Sengupta, 1998) , “a 
complement to one product or service is any other product or service that makes the first 
one more attractive” (Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1996), “complements are goods that go 
together” (Guiltinan, Joseph & Madden, 1996), “complementary products add value to 
the primary product beyond the basic functionality” (Sengupta, 1998), “Consumers  
receive  a positive  benefit  from  consuming  a system  where  a system  consists of one 
primary  unit and one complementary  unit ” (Carlton & Waldman, 2002).    Some of the 
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definitions emphasize the relative benefit derived from using the products jointly in 
comparison to benefits from using them separately as in “complementary products are 
those for which a consumer’s utility derived from using both the goods together is greater 
than the sum of the utilities that the consumer would have derived by using them 
separately”.  Consumers may also benefit from indirect network externalities, i.e., the 
value the products contribute to the consumer in using the primary product when a large 
number and variety of complements are available (Katz & Shapiro, 1985; Afuah, 2000; 
Shankar & Bayus, 2003; Clements & Ohashi, 2005). In this context, “Systems are 
composed of complementary and interdependent products such as hardware and software 
(Farrell and Saloner 1986; Katz and Shapiro 1986; Binken & Stremerche, 2009). 
We analyze these clusters to derive the underlying dimensions of the concept of product 
complementarity in the following section. 
Product Complementarity: Underlying dimensions 
 
Sales interdependence: suggests greater sales of one product (by reduction in its 
price) increases demand for the other product (Cournot, 1838; Economides & Salop, 
1992; Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1996; Sarvary & Parker, 1997). In two sided markets, 
complementarity between products stimulates demand, generating externalities across the 
markets (Parker & Van Alstyne, 2005). As an example, consider Television and 
programming (Bhaskaran & Gilbert, 2005). A decrease in the price of Television will 
likely lead to greater purchase of TV sets and a corresponding increase in the availability 
of programming content. Further, increase in programming variety and bandwidth is 
likely to spur demand for newer television sets. Further, the cross price elasticity is 
69 
 
 
 
reciprocal, although the magnitudes may not be proportional. For example, between 
detergent and softener, price changes in detergent had a larger effect on softener purchase 
than the other way (Manchanda, Ansari & Gupta, 1999). These differences may be 
explained by factors such as the primary product, nature of functional interdependence, 
and consumer usage. 
Functional interdependence: Different types of product systems are involved, 
viz., multi component systems (Economides, 1988; Matutes & Regibeau, 1988), two 
product systems (Bhaskaran & Gilbert, 2005; Duvvuri, Ansari & Gupta, 2007), product-
service system (Guiltinan, Madden & Joseph, 1997; Costa & Dierickx, 2005), platforms 
(Gawer & Cusumano, 2002), industrial and business ecosystems (Gawer & Henderson, 
2007; Teece, 2007) and two sided markets (Parker & Van Alstyne, 2005), there is 
considerable difference in the nature of functional and technological interdependence 
between the core and the complementary products.  Examples of complementary product 
pairs illustrating the different type of product systems include CD player and titles (Basu 
et. al., 2003), computer hardware and software (Shankar & Bayus, 2003; Chou & Shy, 
1989) and Wintel platform (Casadesus-Masanell & Yoffie, 2006). Variation in functional 
interdependence implies that the performance of one product is differently influenced by 
the performance of another in the context of the systems considered.  For example, the 
platform/ecosystem based definition incorporates the complexity of functional and 
technological interdependences (Evans et al., 2006; Gawer & Henderson, 2007; Pierce, 
2009), while the CD player and CDs encoding the software are relatively separable and 
modular systems, although they closely related in function.  
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Consumer usage: Definitions based on consumer usage indicate variations in the 
concept from two aspects, viz., nature of use and enhancement in the value of a primary 
product.  Variation in usage arise from the fact that they are inherently used in 
conjunction (Guiltinan, Paul & Madden, 1996) such as computer and printer, there is 
greater value from using the products together than using them individually (Bhaskaran 
& Gilbert, 2005) or there is increase in the value of a basic product beyond that provided 
by supplies and components (Sengupta, 1998).  
Further, there are differences in how the value of a primary product is enhanced, 
i.e. by attainment of the basic product functionality, improvement in product quality 
(Costa & Dierickx, 2005), product features (Guiltinan, Madden & Joseph, 2007) or 
addition of new functions desirable to the end user (Heeb, 2003; Cheng & Nahm, 2007; 
Gawer & Henderson, 2007). The following examples are illustrative. The video game 
console and video game are product complements that have to be used together to be of 
any value to the consumer. On the other hand, bread and butter are complements 
sometimes used independent of each other and at other times jointly and each usage 
behavior provides its own distinctive value. The PC and printer exhibit a different usage 
pattern where the PC is used by itself or with a host of other complements; the printer on 
the other hand renders minimal value without the PC.  Definitions also suggest possible 
variations in the nature of use, such as the proportion in which the complementary 
products may be consumed – i.e. whether the primary and complementary products are 
used in the same or different proportions.  
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Summary:  First, there is variation in the nature of the interdependence and the 
variations arise from the nature of usage, and how value is derived (i.e., value 
enhancement and functional interdependence). Thus sales interdependence, value 
enhancement and functional/technological interdependence form the dimensions of 
product complementarity. Second, sales interdependence is a fundamental aspect of all 
complementary products since products that enhance the value of a primary product and 
are functionally interdependent are sales interdependent.  
Finally, although product complementarity has been defined from the consumer 
usage perspective, intermediate products have also been considered complementary as 
when they are inputs to an assembly sector (Carr & Karmarkar, 2005) or components in a 
multi component product system (Matutes & Regibeau, 1988). This distinction maybe 
important because 1) complements from a firm’s perspective relevant to  a consumer 
purchase decision yet hold strategic relevance for the firm and 2) certain other 
complements are important for a consumer’s use (such as roads and cars or bread and 
butter), yet not impact a firm’s strategy significantly. This in turn suggests the importance 
of the following 
i. The distinction between the primary and complementary product, noted in 
some of the definitions is relevant for further examination, for there is a need 
for clarity in making this distinction. 
ii. the need for a typology of complementary products to capture the variation in 
the different examples of complementary products. 
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A typology of product complementarity 
 
 I classify the examples of different complementary product pairs into different 
clusters, then identify and describe the common and varying attributes, based on which I 
propose a useful typology of complementary products viz., type of complementarity. 
i.  Components and systems: Components have been defined as complements, 
for the functionality they contribute to the multi component product system. 
For instance, the stereo system may be broken down into its components - 
amplifier, receiver and speaker; photography where the typical product line 
includes cameras, lenses, film and film processing services (Matutes & 
Regibeau, 1988; Matutes & Regibeau, 1992; Economides, 1989).  
ii.  Durable goods and services: Many durable goods and services are 
complementary. Examples include cell phone and service; television and 
programming; paper making machines and pollution control devices, airplane 
purchase and servicing contracts among others (Bhaskaran & Gilbert, 2005; 
Aribarg  & Foutz, 2009; Costa & Dierickx, 2005; Economides, 1989). 
Financing, homeowner’s insurance, furniture, lawn mowers, grass seed as a 
partial list of complements to residential houses (Porter, 1985). Similarly, 
product and training courses, manuals and books are complementary 
(Schumer, 1993). 
iii. Hardware and software: Hardware and software based systems are 
complementary (Casadesus-Masanell & Yoffie, 2007; Sengupta, 2008; 
Binken & Stremersh, 2009; Gupta, Jain & Sawhney, 1999) primarily through 
the mechanism of indirect network externalities. Examples include CD player 
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and CD titles, PDA and software; DVD player and DVD title, game console 
and video games, HDTV & programming among others.   
iv.  Information goods: Bundles of information products have been considered 
complementary based on the quality and reliability of information (Sarvary & 
Parker, 1997) and the functional interdependence between the products 
(Carlton & Waldman, 2002; Heeb, 2003; Nalebuff, 2004; Turner, Mitchell & 
Bettis, 2010). Particularly, under market uncertainty, since information 
regarding product quality is not perfectly reliable, consumers are likely to treat 
information based substitute products as complementary. For example, online 
databases, valuation of firm targets, professional opinions given by medical, 
engineering, accounting/financial, and legal   professionals, are characterized 
by low reliability so that information goods from competitors behave as 
complements rather as substitutes (Sarvary & Parker, 1997).  The functional 
relationship between applications software and operating system leads to a 
value adding complementary relationship (Heeb, 2003; Turner et. al., 2010). 
Varying attributes: First, product durability as an attribute of complements (Bhaskaran & 
Gilbert, 2005) explains some of the variety in complementary products, however is not 
common to all complementary product clusters, i.e. durability, by itself is a not a factor 
that sufficiently captures the variation in the types of complements.  Second, the 
component or non component attribute places the complement in the perspective of the 
complete product system, as an input to the primary product (Matutes & Regibeau, 1988; 
Sengupta, 1998; Carr & Karmarkar, 2005) or consumed alongside the primary product 
(Adner & Kapoor, 2010). Like durability, it addresses some of the observed variety in 
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complementary products, but does not do so exhaustively for all the clusters.  Similarly, 
hardware and software as a criterion sheds light on a substantial amount of variation in 
complementary products viz., video games and console, PC and application software; 
however falls short of being a universal attribute to all the product categories.    
Common attribute: The nature of usage dependence is a central feature of all the 
complementary product clusters and explains the variation in types, and is in alignment 
with product durability, component, non component or service and hardware-software 
differences. Based on the dependence of one product on another for use or fulfilling a set 
of functions in a product architecture, there are two distinct types of complementary 
products, viz.,   
1.  Symmetric complementarity, where both the products – the primary product and 
complementary product are essential for value enhancement (or value attainment) 
for the user and there is a reciprocal functional interdependence between the two 
products, 
2.  Asymmetric complementarity, where the primary product provides stand-alone 
functionality and using the complement with the primary product provides 
additional value to the user. 
In asymmetric product complementarity, one of the products maybe used independently, 
while the other is dependent on the first or both products may be used independently,   
but is value enhancing when used together. Type of complementarity is a defining aspect 
in all examples of complementary product pair categories (component-non component, 
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component-component, hardware-software, durable-non durable, IS-IS). The next section 
elaborates the conceptual distinction between primary and complementary products.  
Summary:  Product complementarity maybe conceptualized in terms of sales 
interdependence, functional interdependence, value enhancement and type of 
complementarity.   
Some definitions of product complementarity refer to primary and complementary 
products (Sengupta, 1998; Carlton & Waldman, 2002; Clements & Ohashi, 2005; Binken 
& Stremerche, 2009) or core product and complementary product (Gallaher & Park, 
2002; Nambisan, 2002), indicating the importance of some products as complements.  
This topic is examined in the next section. 
Distinction between primary and complementary products 
 
A scheme to distinguish primary and complementary products enhances our 
understanding of the concept of product complementarity. Specifically, how is a 
complementary product differentiated from a primary product by sales, functional, value 
enhancement and type of complementarity? This section first suggests the importance of 
such a distinction and then develops a set of heuristics. 
Importance of the distinction: Complementary products have received selective 
attention from scholars and businesses alike, i.e., not all complements that are value 
enhancing or functionally interdependent have received attention and some complements 
that are stand-alone have received more attention. Examples of technology based 
complements that have received attention include the operating system and 
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microprocessor related issues since the beginning of the PC Industry (Teece, 1986; 
Bresnahan & Greenstein, 1999; Casadesus-Masanell & Yoffie, 2006; Lee, Venkatraman, 
Tanriverdi & Iyer, 2010), however the power supply or resistor although essential for use 
have not received as much attention.  The video gaming industry has been the context for 
research from the outset (Economides & Salop, 1992; Gallager & Park, 2002; Shankar & 
Bayus, 2003; Hogendorn & Yuen, 2009; Liu, 2010; Zhu & Iansiti, 2012), however the 
attention related to VHS tapes, complement to the VHS recorder declined after the 
emergence of the dominant design (Cusumano, Mylonadis & Rosenbloom, 1992). 
Moreover, issues related to asymmetric complements, such as the browser, add-on 
complements to the PC have informed scholarly interest (Whinston, 1990; Sengupta, 
1996; Carlton & Waldman, 2002; Choi & Stefanadis, 2003; Heeb, 2003; Cusumano & 
Gawer, 2002). Further, in the business arena, the selective attention is witnessed in the 
tying strategies of IBM and the court battles involving Microsoft over its strategies 
pertaining to the browser.   
 Rules of distinction between primary and complementary products 
Add on: The nature of dependence between the products: Among a pair of products, one 
of them provides a basic value and hence can be used as a stand-alone product, but an 
add-on product is useful only if consumed with the basic product (Cheng & Nahm, 2007; 
2010; Chou & Shy, 1990, IJIO; Gaudet & Salant, 1992). In such a case, the basic product 
is the primary product and the add-on product is the complement. The rule is relevant for 
most asymmetric complements. For example, in the case of PC and printer, the PC is the 
primary product while the printer is the complement. 
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First in time: Product that is developed first is the primary product, when identification of 
such a separation in time is possible (Shapiro & Teece, 1992). For example, between 
airplane manufacturing and servicing contracts, the airplane is the primary product and 
the service is the complement (Costa & Dierickx, 2005). The next set of rules is relevant 
for symmetric complements when a basic product cannot be identified.  
Durability: The product that is more durable of the two is the primary product (Bhaskaran 
& Gilbert, 2005). For example, between TV and programming, TV is the primary product 
while programming is the complement.  
Magnitude of cross price elasticity: Complementary products are reciprocally 
interdependent in sales, i.e. a reduction in price of one product in a pair, increases 
demand for that product as well as for the other product; likewise when the price is 
reduced for the second product in the pair, the first product experiences increase in 
demand.  The magnitude of cross price elasticity among a pair of products is uses an 
indicator of the primary product (Manchanda et al., 1999).  The price change in a primary 
product has a larger impact on the purchase of the complementary product. 
Hardware & software: In a system made of hardware and software goods, hardware 
products are primary products while software goods are complementary. For example, 
between CD player and titles, CD player is the primary product.  
Exceptions:  There are also situations where a primary product cannot be identified. In 
examples of weak complements, such as bread and butter, spaghetti and sauce the 
primary product cannot be determined based on heuristics that are entirely detached from 
consumer preferences. As another example, the case of cell phone and landline maybe 
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complements for a particular consumer because it allows him to conference call or 
transfer address books from one to other, providing enhanced functionality. The primary 
product is determined largely by the consumer preference.  Adner & Kapoor (2010) make 
a distinction between components and complements based on the location of the primary 
product in the value chain context– components are bundled upstream by the primary 
product firm and complements are bundled downstream by the consumers along with the 
primary product. A key difference between component based components and non 
component based complements is that non component based complements are extrinsic to 
the primary product. 
Summary:  Thus, a primary product is determined by the ability of the consumer to use it 
independent of the complement, relative magnitudes reciprocal sales interdependence, 
occurrence in time, durability and hardware technology. Further, since symmetric 
complements cannot function independently,  the  relevant heuristics include relative 
magnitudes of sales interdependence, occurrence in time, durability and hardware 
technology. Finally, the section also identifies cases where we cannot unambiguously 
make a distinction between primary product and complement. 
The literature review points to the importance of strategies related to complementary 
products from a primary product firm’s perspective in domains such as technology 
adoption (Katz & Shapiro, 1985, 1986, 1992; Shapiro & Varian, 1999; Ohashi, 2003) 
competitive battles (Casadesus-Masanell & Yoffie, 2007; Turner, Mitchell & Bettis, 
2010)  supply chain coordination (Carr & Karmarkar, 2005; Nagarajan & Sosic, 2009), 
innovation, ecosystem control and dominance (Adner & Kapoor, 2010; Pierce, 2009), 
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technology lockout (Schilling, 2002) and two sided markets (Landsman & Stremersch, 
2011). Based on our conceptual development of the different dimensions of product 
complementary, it is essential to analyze the implications for a primary product firm’s 
strategies. Considering the centrality of type of complementarity, we elaborate the 
influence of this dimension in the next section.  
Strategic importance of complementary products: The importance of a complement to 
a firm is influenced by the impact of the complement on its product’s performance and 
market share. The more strategic the complement is to the primary product functionality, 
the more likely it is to impact the sale of the firm’s focal product. The factors determining 
complement specificity may be categorized into two broad factors, viz., product level and 
market level factors.   Product level factors include i) Type of complementarity ii) 
Product functional, physical and technological interfaces and market level factors include 
i) Substitute availability and ii) Competitive supply iii) network effects iii) product 
variety and iv) bargaining power 
Product level factors: Type of complementarity directly influences the performance of a 
primary product by being essential for use of the primary product and by contributing or 
enabling the core functionality of the product. Asymmetric complements do not impede 
core product performance and hence are peripheral in the sense of directly impacting the 
primary product use and sales.   Second, the physical, functional and technological 
specifications influence complement specificity based on whether they are standardized 
or not standardized. i.e., whether modularity has enabled complement functionality 
encapsulation and separation (Baldwin & Clark, 2001) and technology standardization 
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has resulted in interface compatibility. Specifically, the more non standardized 
specifications closely influence primary product performance (functionality), hence its 
use and purchase. The Nintendo’s video game cartridge is essential for using the game 
console and the functionality is reciprocally shared between the cartridge and the console. 
Further, the physical design permits use only with Nintendo’s machine (unlike a CD).   
These factors make the console usability closely dependent on the availability of 
cartridges. 
Market level factors: Although product level factors influence the usability of primary 
product, availability of substitutes for the complement functionality and the 
complementary product market structure influences the specificity of the complement, 
i.e. how closely it impacts primary product’s performance and market sales. Availability 
of substitutes reduces the dependence of the primary product’s performance 
(functionality) on the complement and hence reduces the dependence of product use on 
the complement. Similarly, a competitive supply of complementary products ensures that 
product related dependences do not mitigate the availability of complements and 
purchase or primary product. For example, although VHS tape is a symmetric 
complement to the VCR, the large scale availability of compatible tapes in the VHS 
format reduces the impact of complement specificity on VCR purchase and sales. In 
contrast, the less developed complements market (cells) in the hybrid cars market makes 
the purchase of hybrid cars closely dependent on complementary product level factors, 
such as type of complementarity and functional specifications.   
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Complement specific network effects: A complementary product has significant network 
effects associated with its usage (Carlton & Waldman, 2002). Importantly, network 
effects associated with a symmetric complement can closely impact the sales of the 
primary product. For example, purchase of the video game console is influenced by the 
number of other users of the same format console as consumers derive greater value by 
the ability to exchange games with other users. Users of Microsoft Word (complementary 
application to the OS/PC) could exchange files with other users have the same format 
complement, increasing the value of owning a Microsoft OS based machine (Carlton & 
Waldman, 2002).  
Bargaining power: Type of complementarity, technological interoperability and market 
factors (differences in the primary and complementary product market characteristics), 
may create differences in advantage based on the ability to control primary product 
architecture evolution and influencing timing of primary product introduction and 
pricing. These differences in turn influence the  bargaining power  between primary and 
complementary product firms when there are conflicts over decisions related to product 
architecture evolution, introductions and pricing. Bargaining power of primary and 
complementors influences the distribution of profits (Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1997; 
Gal-or, 2004; Yoffie & Kwak, 2006; Casadesus-Masanell & Yoffie, 2006; Nagarajan & 
Bassok, 2008). Microsoft and Intel differ in their motivation in making R & D 
investments; timing of product introductions and pricing, primarily from Microsoft have 
a higher edge in the relationship due to the nature of interdependence between the 
operating system and microprocessor (Casadesus-Masanell & Yoffie, 2006; Yoffie & 
Kwak, 2006).    
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Product variety: After the emergence of the dominant design, if the interoperable 
interfaces with complements are standardized, economies of specialization favor the 
complement development and manufacturing by complementors (Church & Gandal, 
1992; Farrell & Saloner, 1992; Economides & Salop, 1992), as evidenced in the stereo 
systems and PC product markets. Product variety enables a primary product selling firm 
to introduce differentiated products, when the existing product market becomes highly 
competitive so that profitability is marginal (Langlois & Robertson, 1992; Sanchez, 1995; 
Ulrich, 1995; Uzimeri & Sanderson, 1995; Garud & Kumaraswamy, 1995; Cottrell & 
Nault, 2004).  A complementary product provides the opportunity for continued returns 
from its primary product by adding value enhancing complements, i.e. increasing primary 
product variety. For example, when the PC product makers lost their leadership due to 
low barriers to entry in the PC market and horizontal specialization of the industry 
(Langlois & Robertson, 1992; West, 2003; Heeb, 2003), HP attempted to re-assert 
leadership by entering the printer product market. The Windows based Operating System 
continues to offer enhanced value through the integration of complements ranging from 
the browser, Office suite and Media Player. 
Summary: Type of complementarity influences the importance of complementary 
products with symmetric complements closely impacting the sales of the primary 
product, through the reciprocal nature of functional, usage and sales interdependence. 
Moreover, market factors such as availability of substitutes and competitive supply also 
determine the importance by influencing the specificity associated with the development 
of the complement. Further, the contribution of a complementary product to the network 
effects associated with a primary product and the increase in primary product variety 
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increase the switching costs associated with the primary product system, deterring 
entrants in the primary and complementary product markets.    
This is illustrated by the operation of firms in the video game industry, where 
firms such as Nintendo and Sony continue to make profits on their consoles from a 
continuous stream of a variety of complements (in genres such as sports, action, 
mythology etc) delivered by a growing number of complementors (Binken & Stremerche, 
2009). Nonetheless, asymmetric complements contribute to increased value in the usage 
of  the primary product through variety by satisfying latent needs (Uzumeri & Sanderson, 
1995; Schilling, 2000) and new market opportunities to the firm.  The next section 
synthesizes the scheme from the literature review on complementary products to 
distinguish primary and complementary products, sorted on the basis of their importance 
from a primary product producing firm’s perspective. 
Conclusion 
 
Managing interdependence is important because firms can derive a basis for 
differentiating from competitors by harnessing the strategic interrelatedness between the 
value chains (Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1996). In markets characterized by network 
effects, volume sales strongly influence the emergence of a dominant design (Suarez & 
Utterback, 1995) as well as continued growth in the product market; support from 
complementors influences the size of the installed base (Katz & Shapiro, 1985; Schilling, 
2000; Srinivasan & Venkataraman, 2010). Differences in managing the 
interdependencies identified earlier influences the outcomes related to the primary 
product.  
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Furthermore, post standardization, the basis for competitive advantage shifts to 
innovation in complements markets, leading to systems based or platform competition 
(Katz & Shapiro, 1994; Shapiro & Varian, 1998). This is witnessed in the computer, 
mobile phone and video gaming product markets and information technology product 
markets, where consumers value a system of primary and complementary products more 
than a standalone product (Lee, Venkatraman & Tanriverdi, 2010).  A greater number of 
complements co-evolving and functionally interdependent with the primary product 
increase the complexity of the primary product, transforming it into a platform, 
introducing different coordination challenges and need for control (Gawer & Cusumano, 
2002). Consequently, firms that adopt varying strategies depending on the technological 
and market conditions are likely to see a longer endurance in their primary product life.  
From the perspective of a primary product firm, its strategies in coordination, control and 
system growth could potentially enhance its product market position primarily by 
increasing barriers for entry and imitation and increasing switching costs.  
Although scholars have emphasized the need for coordination among activities 
with complementors (Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1997; Iansiti & Levien, 2004; Adner & 
Kapoor, 2010; Kapoor & Lee, 2013), there has been little academic working examining 
the mechanisms that constitute a firm’s strategies to manage the interdependence in the 
various activities. In the subsequent chapters, I examine how firms manage 
interdependence with complementors through internalization and coordination strategies 
based on type of complementarity and market characteristics in the subsequent chapters. 
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Discussion 
 
This chapter was devoted to explaining the concept of product complementarity, based on 
interdependences associated with product, consumer and firm factors. Further, it suggests 
the role of type of complementarity and the significance of this dimension for firm 
strategy, particularly in determining the boundaries of the firm. The primary theoretic 
lens used to examine boundary decisions is Transaction Cost Economics (Williamson, 
1976, 1981, 1991). Although significant work has examined the  governance structures 
employed by firms when it comes to sourcing of component complements (Klein, 
Crawford & Alchian, 1991; Masten & Meehan, 1991; Oxley, 1997, David & Hand, 2004; 
Hoetker, 2005) research in non component complements has only started to take off 
(Adner & Kapoor, 2010). Further, the contexts that TCE has been traditionally employed 
have not considered the contextual aspects relevant to technology adoption.  Having 
elaborated upon the dimensions of product complementarity, the next chapter builds on 
this conceptual development to develop firm boundary decisions from a primary product 
firm’s perspective for non component complements. 
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CHAPTER 4: COMPLEMENTARY PRODUCT GOVERNANCE CHOICE: 
THEORETICAL MODEL 
 
 Introduction 
 
 Several aspects of firm interdependence have been examined in the literature in 
the context of components or inputs to a system. The design, production and sale of 
components constitute the vertical scope of the primary product manufacturing firm. The 
boundary question receives continued attention in the literature based on  opportunism, 
asset specificity and uncertainty in the TCE logic (Williamson, 1975; Klein, Crawford & 
Alchian, 1978; Monteverde & Teece, 1982; Walker & Weber, 1987; Leiblein & Miller, 
2003; Colombo, 2003; Geyskens et al., 2006) competence based perspectives (Kogut & 
Zander, 1996; Conner & Prahalad, 1996, Silverman, 1999; Leiblein & Miller, 2003; 
Jacobides & Hitt, 2005) relational views of strategy (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Gulati & 
Singh, 1998; Chung, Singh & Lee, 2000; Hoetker, 2005), real options (Chi & McGuire, 
1996) and game theoretic lens(Parkhe,1993).  
 Relatively little has been written in the strategy literature examining the 
mechanisms and factors that influence the boundary question of non component 
complements (that are not inputs to the production of the primary product). Differences in 
strategies in managing the interdependence influence primary product market related 
outcomes such as market share and a primary product firm’s competitive advantage. The 
objective of this chapter is to examine how the boundary decision is informed by TCE 
arguments, based on different contextual and product complementary related factors. The 
chapter is structured as follows. First, I review the tenets of Transaction Cost Economics, 
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viz., technological uncertainty, market demand uncertainty and opportunism. Then, I 
review the different governance modes employed in the TCE literature. Finally, I develop 
a conceptual model for the governance choice for complementary products   from a 
primary product firm’s perspective incorporating the conceptual aspects of type of 
complementarity.   
Overview of Transaction Cost Economics 
 
  The theory identifies characteristics of a transaction that suggests a better fit of 
internal organization or markets, based on a comparison of the costs in conducting a 
market exchange and in house development.  Costs of an external transaction include ex-
ante search, writing and enforcing contracts, monitoring performance and dealing with 
contingences arising from opportunistic behaviors resulting in negotiating or bargaining 
with partners (Williamson 1975, 1985, 1991, 1996; Klein et al., 1978; Joskow, 1987). 
The assumption of bounded rationality makes contracts incomplete and does not rule out 
the potential for opportunistic behavior from one of the partners involved in an exchange 
(Williamson, 1985).  Importantly, involvement of asset specific investments in an 
exchange creates the opportunity for hold-up. The risks of opportunistic behavior add to 
ex-ante transaction costs in the form of specifying and incorporating extensive 
contractual safeguards if the firm. The central argument is that if the characteristics of the 
market exchange increase the costs considerably, firms are better off adopting a more 
hierarchical form of governance and internalizing aspects of the problematic market 
exchange.  Internalizing the transaction with involvement of specific assets is the best 
defense again opportunism due to i) superior monitoring of the transaction facilitated by 
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internal controls of firms relative to markets and ii) since employees do not have a direct 
claim on the distribution of profits, there is no loss of profits from opportunistic behavior 
Although traditionally researchers in transaction cost economics have focused on 
the dichotomy between markets and internal organization, alliances have emerged as a 
feasible alternative to internal organization, particularly when the risk of opportunism is 
non negligible, but not high enough to require internalization. Contractual clauses in 
alliances facilitate coordination, reduce information asymmetry between partners and 
prevent unexpected events such as production scheduling delays, etc. (Mayer & Argyres, 
2004). Thus, hybrid modes have also since been folded in the TCE governance 
framework (Pisano, Russo & Teece, 1988; Williamson, 1991; Oxley, 1997; Robertson & 
Gatignon, 1998; Gulati & Singh, 1998, Colombo, 2003), where the firms make a choice 
between equity forms such as joint ventures, minority equity holdings or bilateral 
exchanges involving exchange of technology and non equity based agreements such as 
franchising, long term supply and distribution contracts. Scope of activities and 
involvement of technology component (Oxley, 1997; Gulati & Singh, 1998), determine 
extent of damage from opportunism, in turn influencing the choice of an equity or non 
equity based alliance.  
The governance question has been examined in the R&D (Pisano, 1989; 
Sampson, 2004), production (Monteverde & Teece, 1982; Walker & Weber, 1987; 
Leiblein & Miller, 2003) and marketing contexts (Anderson & Schmittlein, 1984; Dutta, 
Heide & Bergen, 1999). 
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Asset specificity 
 
Asset specificity captures the extent to which the current assets in an exchange are 
redeployable in an alternative transaction. Four types of asset specific investments, viz., 
site specificity, physical asset specificity, human asset specificity and dedicated asset 
specificity are identified (Williamson, 1975, 1981, 1985) the characteristics of these are 
described in Table 5. Asset specificity creates opportunities for quasi-rents to be held up 
by opportunistic exchange partners by creating a situation of mutual dependence 
(Williamson, 1975, 1987; Robertson & Gatignon, 1998). Asset specific investment(s) is a 
condition for market failure, where a partner gets locked into a relationship creating a 
small-numbers situation with limited or no resource deployment alternatives ex-post the 
transaction.    
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Please insert Table 5 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
  Studies have shown that firms choose to vertically integrate under the following 
conditions, viz., 1) specialized human assets in the form of tacit engineering know-how  
in the context of R&D or technology development (Pisano, 1990; Robertson & Gatignon, 
1998) because such specialized assets create the threat of small numbers bargaining 
hazard in R& D markets, 2) sourcing of specialized components (Monteverde & Teece,  
1982;Masten, Meehan & Snyder, 1989) requires transfer of the transaction specific 
know-how to the supplier, in turn creating high switching costs for the assembler and 3) 
sales personnel with know-how specific to the products were involved (Heide & John, 
1988; Anderson, 1985) or specialized distribution equipment (John & Weitz, 1988) made 
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the relationship with an intermediary vulnerable to opportunism. Klein et al (1990) 
examine different forms of hierarchical exchange include markets, alliances and 
integration. 
Frequency of exchange:  This attribute to whether a transaction is one-time or recurrent. 
Recurrent transactions create a condition for internalization due to scale effects as well as 
reputation effects (Williamson, 2002). This factor has received less empirical attention as 
compared to asset specificity and uncertainty (Geyskens et. al., 2006). 
Opportunism   
 
Table 6 lists some of the opportunistic behaviors identified in the TCE literature, the 
types of asset specific investments and their impact. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Please insert Table 6 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Conditions of information asymmetry, where one of the parties to an exchange does not 
have information about the efforts or committed involvement of the other and lock-in, 
where a partner cannot leave the transaction without incurring significant losses 
contribute to the increased risk of opportunistic behavior.  Information asymmetry is 
acute under uncertainty when external commotion makes it even more difficult to 
accurately assess the information coming from the partner.  Lock-in typically arises 
owing to asset specific investments (Anderson & Schmittlein, 1984). Opportunistic 
behavior manifests in the form of  hold-up (Klein, 1996) where unanticipated events lead 
the opportunistic partner to appropriate  quasi-rents associated with asset specific 
investments, moral hazard  which is essentially non-performance and could be avoided 
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were a perfect contract written (Klein, 1996). Moral hazards include shirking where there 
the opportunistic party withholds efforts or involve product deviance from quality.    
Opportunism maybe classified based on the manner in which profit distribution is 
affected (Wathne & Heide, 2000) and can occur in passive forms as shirking. The involve 
instances where a partner fails to deliver a quality product in accordance with the 
expectations of the sourcing firm, evading obligations, refusal to adapt in the face of new 
circumstances, for the opportunistic partner may enjoy short term gains. Active forms of 
opportunism include more explicit forms where the contract terms are violated or involve 
significant losses from asset specific investments. One such example involved in 
technology based transactions are the rents from technology appropriation (Oxley, 1997; 
Gulati & Singh, 1998).  Further, differences in market conditions requires adaptation, 
specifically when there is long-term bilateral dependence and  renegotiation in 
contractual clauses, at which point the partner may refuse to change leading to bargaining 
over terms of execution and profit, which imposes costs (Williamson, 1991, pg 279).   
 Due to the variation in complementary products, opportunistic behaviors differ 
based on type of complementarity, the environmental factors and the contexts. Table 7 
describes different forms of opportunistic behaviors possible in the context of 
complementary product development.  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Please insert Table 7 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Environmental Uncertainty 
 
Two types of uncertainty have been widely used in TCE work - demand uncertainty and 
technological uncertainty. The assumption of bounded rationality in TCE limits the 
ability of firms to specify all the contingencies related to an exchange in a contract. 
Environmental uncertainty increases the possibility for opportunistic appropriation of 
rents especially occur when asset specific investments are involved (Klein, Crawford & 
Alchian, 1978), by 1) contract renegotiations may be required to adapt to changing 
circumstances and 2) the opportunistic firm may refuse to alter the terms of the contract, 
leading to bargaining and enforcement - these factors increasing the costs of carrying out 
the transaction. I review the major arguments and findings related to the influence of the 
two types of uncertainty. Demand and technological uncertainty are relevant to the topic 
complementary products because the contexts where complementary products are 
important, viz., technology adoption or leadership contexts are characterized by 
variations in technological and demand uncertainty in the related product markets.  
Market demand uncertainty: Market uncertainty reflects the fluctuation and 
unpredictability in demand in the market for the final good. Firms incur high transaction 
costs in high volatility markets arising from the need to monitor and enforce a workable 
contract (Balakrishnan &  Wernerfelt, 1986; Teece,1986). Such a situation is also 
captured as volume uncertainty (Walker & Weber, 1984; Geyskens et al, 2006) where it 
becomes difficult for the firm(s) to accurately predict the volume requirements in a 
relationship. Under these conditions, the suppliers may experience unexpected strain on 
their production lines or land up with excess capacity. The buyers on the other hand, may 
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either face shortage of critical resources or have to bear the costs of excess inventory. 
Thus, increasing demand uncertainty may call for dealing with a number of contingencies 
ex-post and firms have to incur costs in renegotiations and also deal with problems of 
frequent information co ordination (Heide & John, 1990). In the context of technology 
development, Robertson & Gatignon (1998) increasing demand uncertainty to predict 
internal technology development than a technology alliance (externalize) since 
disagreements are likely to arise on different critical aspects of technology development 
due to several contingences in high demand uncertain conditions, reducing the efficacy of 
alliances.  The likelihood of internalization of the production decision under uncertainty 
has received support in the production decision (Walker & Weber, 1984; MacMillan, 
Hambrick & Pennings, 1986). Increasing uncertainty has been associated with the 
likelihood of direct channel rather than intermediaries for distribution (Anderson & 
Schmittlein, 1985; John & Weitz, 1988; Klein et al, 1990).  Such conditions may need 
renegotiations and refusal on the part of the partner firms to adapt. 
Technological uncertainty: Technological uncertainty makes it difficult to predict the 
technical requirements in a relationship (Walker & Weber, 1984). It is created by 
technological changes, such as rapid obsolescence of current technologies, changes in 
standards, specifications of components and end products that make current efforts in 
capability building subject to rapid obsolescence (Robertson & Gatignon, 1998; 
Geyskens et al, 2006).  Two different sets of theoretical arguments leading to different 
predictions have been employed. One line of argument suggests that in industries 
characterized by short product development cycles and rapid product obsolescence, if 
innovations are to be introduced at a faster rate, externalization provides greater 
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flexibility in rapid product introduction. The transaction costs associated with market 
contracting or alliances are likely to be offset by the benefits offered by timely market 
entry (Robertson & Gatignon, 1998). External modes render firms the flexibility to 
terminate the contract or relationship and switch to partners that have the requisite 
capabilities or resources (Balakrishnan & Wernerfelt, 1986; Geyskens et al, 2006; Klein 
et al, 1990). The second line of argument is that the risk of opportunism and needs for 
communication during product design changes leads to the choice of internalization 
(Hoetker, 2005).  
Internal/behavioral uncertainty: Although the two types of uncertainty that has been 
frequently used in the TCE literature is external uncertainty, early work also examines the 
impact of uncertainty that arises within the context of the exchange itself (John & Weitz, 
1988; Klein et al, 1990). This refers to the difficulty of assessing the performance of the 
partner, which in turn can lead to false claims by the partner (such as an intermediary in 
the channels context) about the use of committed resources.  
Summary: Vertical integration eliminates the issues out of opportunism by means of fiat 
through 1) the provision of extensive administrative rules and procedures to help 
reconcile differences among the parties in an exchange and specifically for problems 
aggravated by uncertainty 2) the need for restructuring contracts (Williamson, 1975, 
1991). Thus vertical integration is posited as a viable solution to the problems posed by 
high uncertainty. Both lines of arguments have found empirical support. In fact, studies 
have shown that under technological uncertainty, the likelihood of firms sourcing the 
components from the market is higher when there are numerous upstream suppliers in the 
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automotive industry (Walker & Weber, 1987). On the other hand, firms in the computer 
industry vertically integrated into the making of displays for the laptops, under increasing 
technological uncertainty (Hoetker, 2005). Interestingly, Poppo & Zenger (1998) found 
no relationship between increasing technological uncertainty and the outsourcing of 
information services by large American firms. More recent advancements of TCE posit 
that increasing uncertainty will conditionally affect vertical integration decisions. 
Uncertainty is a stronger predictor of the vertical integration decision when asset specific 
investments are involved (Leiblein & Miller, 2003). Market exchange is not hazardous in 
uncertain environments because it is more costly to write complete contracts in uncertain 
environments per se, but uncertain environments facilitate subsequent contractual 
renegotiation that can be costly in the presence of specific investments.  
Governance choices 
 
Table 8 summarizes the governance choices in the TCE literature 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Please insert Table 8 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Governance choices in the TCE work considers arms-length licensing contracts, tightly 
coupled co development partnerships and joint ventures, and vertical integration. 
Scholars in the TCE lineage have treated the limiting points (of the sourcing mode) in the 
decision to internalize or not. For example, Schilling & Steensma (2002) focused on the 
two extremes in this continuum, market contracting through licensing and the use of firm 
hierarchy through acquisition. Robertson & Gatignon (1998) focused on the choice 
between technology development partnerships and internal development. Pisano (1990) 
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examined the internal R & D decision versus market contracting for technology 
development. Hybrid modes, such as alliances with varied degree of control and equity 
are more suitable for transactions that involve a technology component (Columbo, 2003). 
The equity modes permit greater incentive alignment through the mechanisms of shared 
ownership, superior monitoring and control. JVs are a preferred and commonly used form 
of equity alliance involving an autonomous formal managerial hierarchy (see, Pisano et 
al, 1988; Pisano, 1989; Osborn & Baughn, 1990; Gulati, 1995; Garcia Canal, 1996; 
Gulati & Singh, 1998; Oxley 1997; 1999a). A continuum of governance modes, that can 
be addressed through the TCE lens and addresses different opportunistic concerns that 
arise in the transactions associated with a primary product firm’s  activities related to 
complement development, is illustrated in figure 1a  and 1b.   
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Please insert figure 1a & 1b about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
In the next section, I examine the firm’s strategy for complementary product 
development, reflected in the degree of internalization.  
Hypotheses development 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the conceptual model for this chapter. Using transaction cost 
economics as the theoretical lens, I propose type of complementarity as influencing the 
decision of the primary product firm to make or externalize the development of 
complements. Importantly, the governance decision is influenced by technological and 
market demand uncertainty.  
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Direct influence of type of complementarity  
 
 A significant stream of work in network economics emphasizes the importance of 
complementary product availability on the market share of the primary product firm 
(Katz & Shapiro, 1985; 1986; Farrell & Saloner,1986; Church & Gandal, 1993; Gandal; 
1993; Ohashi, 2003; Nair et al, 2004).   The literature however does not address how 
variation in the type of complementarity influences firm decisions. Functional 
interdependence is stronger in symmetric than asymmetric complements, influencing 
extent of asset specific investments needed.  Due to the bilateral dependence, greater 
asset specific investments are needed in aspects of product architecture such as 
interoperability, partitioning of functions and overall system reliability. Assets such as i) 
proprietary information exchange to develop interfaces and internal common modules or 
shared components and ii) hardware tools and components, software to ensure  inter 
product compatibility iii) human and financial resources. The process of preproduction 
heuristic development generates design as well as production know-how that is 
specialized and may be non-patentable (Monteverde & Teece, 1982).  For example, the 
first generation video game was wired to the game console, requiring tight coordination 
in the development of both products.   
 Further, there are likely to be fewer providers of complements with the 
capabilities to deliver the symmetric product, particularly when the primary product 
market is not developed.  These aspects increase the chances that the investments 
between the firms become specialized to the relationship and are not easily redeployable 
in alternative transactions. The know-how becomes specialized to the primary product 
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over time, making replacement of the complement developers difficult.  Hold - up in the 
form of  delays in product releases by the complementor, primary product technology 
appropriation or deviance from the agree upon terms of  a contract such as withholding 
information pertaining to common components or module development can lead to a 
setback for the primary product firm in competitive battles.  Early and synchronized 
product release enables the primary product firm to 1) create a reputation for  products  2) 
allows time to experiment with the different combinations of the primary and symmetric 
complements, adapt them to suit consumer tastes and re introduce the products before 
competitors. The importance of entry timing has been noted in technology related 
contexts, such as the battle for dominant design (Suarez, 2004), standards creation 
(Narayanan & Chen, 2012) and preventing technology lock out (Schilling, 2002).  
Similarly, alignment in product design decisions, production schedules, and marketing 
activities are important in giving primary product firms an early lead in competition for 
market share or technology dominance. For example, consumers are likely to perceive the 
products as part of the system when pricing, advertizing and distribution between primary 
product and symmetric complement is coordinated. 
In asymmetric complementarity, consumer may use the primary product 
independent of the complement. Due to reduced functional interdependence,   product 
design, production, product introduction and marketing of the primary product can be 
carried out independently. Development of asymmetric complements benefits the primary 
product firm once the primary product technology itself has been accepted by the 
consumer. This also increases the willingness of a larger number of complementors 
developing asymmetric complements. So the primary product firm is likely to have more 
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control over its technology and its relationship with the asymmetric product 
complementors, reducing the impact of opportunistic behaviors in contractual 
relationships with complementors. Hold-up in the form of product introduction delays, 
withholding of information related to asymmetric complement development or lack of 
coordination in aspects related to asymmetric complementary product development and 
selling is less likely to impact the delivery of the primary product to the market 
Type of complementarity thus influences the potential for opportunistic behavior 
through the involvement of asset specific investments and the small numbers condition.  
Specifically, the primary product firm risks losing its advantage to a complementor or its 
primary market competitor if it shares its technology through contractual agreements, the 
complementor does not deliver the complements on time or appropriates the technology 
and becomes its competitor. Internal organization reduces transaction costs as compared 
to external modes by eliminating potential for hold up behaviors (Williamson, 1975, 
1987; Walker & Weber, 1987), reducing a need for bargaining with complementors, and 
enabling coordination through internal organizational controls (Williamson, 1979; Novak 
& Eppinger, 2001).  Hierarchical controls in internal organization offer superior 
information processing mechanisms arising from the increased division of labor, creating 
cooperation and coordination among organizational teams involved in the development of 
the primary product and complementary product.  
Hypothesis 1a: Symmetric product complementarity is positively associated with higher 
degree of internalization  
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Hypothesis 1b: Asymmetric product complementarity is negatively associated with 
higher degree of internalization 
 Two environmental factors, viz., technological uncertainty and market uncertainty 
are notable in contexts involving complementary products. Next, I consider the influence 
of technological uncertainty, a predictor of firm governance structure in the context of 
complementary products.   
Moderating influence of technological uncertainty 
 
  In contexts characterized by increasing technological uncertainty, there is a lack 
of clarity and knowledge regarding technology evolution and change, the length of time a 
technology and product will survive. In early stages of primary product development and 
technological changes, there is increasing uncertainty regarding the technology trajectory 
evolution and outcome of the primary product and symmetric product development. 
Similarly, when the pace of technological change is rapid, it creates unpredictability in 
the value of long term investments in research and development.  There may exist a 
limited number of complementors with capabilities in symmetric complement technology 
development or complementary assets such as stock of patents and software modules, 
particularly when there is information asymmetry regarding the nature of primary product 
technology evolution.  
The uncertain nature of technology evolution requires greater levels of 
communication, information exchange, personnel involvement to facilitate and 
coordinate the closely interdependent phases of product design, development and testing 
of commonly shared modules and interfaces due to the tight nature of interdependence 
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between the primary product and the symmetric complement, without loss of system 
integrity. In contexts where technology change is rapid, sharing the information with all 
the teams involved in the wake of new developments is critical for rapid product 
introduction. Specifically, such contingences may require modifications to commonly 
shared modules, changes in production engineering processes and design advancements.  
For example, RCA was not only involved in the design and production of the Television, 
but also integrated into programming through ownership of NBC studios. Such tight 
interdependence introduces potential for opportunism due to the co specialization in 
knowledge assets and proprietary production equipment that are specialized to the 
product pair.  
Although a milder form of opportunistic behavior, complementor shirking on 
optimal commitment of resources, refusing to commit to a different technological design 
in the context of new information from the development process or changing market 
conditions impacts the prospects of the primary product.  Such conditions are difficult to 
anticipate and specify at contract formulation stage and leads a situation for bargaining 
on pricing and sharing of profits or disputes, contributing to transaction costs 
(Williamson, 1991; Casadesus-Masanell & Yoffie, 2006). This impacts production 
schedules and timing of product releases which have to adapt as well.  The primary 
product firm may thus incur ex-post transaction costs from renegotiation, revision of 
formal agreements between independent partners or involving a third party to settle 
irresolvable disputes (Williamson, 1985, 1991; Walker & Weber, 1984; Anderson & 
Schmittlein, 1984; Pisano, 1990; Schilling & Steensma, 2002).  TCE based explanations 
of governance structure provide evidence of increasing governance costs under 
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technological uncertainty in several components industries (Masten, 1984; Globerman, 
1980; Anderson & Scmittlein, 1984; Hoetker, 2005).  
Internal development of symmetric complements enables the primary product 
firm to deal with the contingences in product development rapidly, eliminate the 
inefficiencies from technological uncertainty and prevent any severe forms of 
opportunism such as technology appropriation, which can severely impact the firm’s 
competitive position.  This facilitates synchronized product market entry, an advantage 
when the focus of competition is on establishing the leadership of the primary product 
design, for which symmetric complements are essential. 
 The purchase of asymmetric complements is guided more by the choice and needs 
of the consumer. Due to the nature of the relative functional and technological 
independence, the primary product maybe developed independent of the asymmetric 
complement. Particularly, the firm has greater flexibility in implementing primary 
product design changes in the wake of unanticipated technological developments or in 
introducing new versions of its products, regardless of the changes in complements. 
Further, the primary product firm is less likely to incur costs on technologies and 
products that are not directly related to the primary product until the uncertainties in the 
primary product technology are resolved.  
 However the development of asymmetric complements is beneficial to the 
primary product firm, for greater complement variety is valued by consumers, increasing 
the market share and complement development by external players sends signals of 
primary product credibility to consumers. Although the demands on the primary firm are 
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considerably less for rapid investments in asymmetric complement technology 
development, changing technological and prevailing market factors such as network 
effects have emphasized the role of asymmetric complements.  The benefits of having a 
greater supply of asymmetric complements are likely to influence the primary product 
firm strategies. However, exchange of intangible knowledge assets, required during 
update of product architecture involving primary product and asymmetric complement 
does not rule out technology appropriability concerns by the complementor.  Thus, under 
high levels of technological uncertainty, the primary product firm is likely to opt for a 
governance strategy which allows it some degree of control in asymmetric complement 
development. 
 Hypothesis 2: Technological uncertainty moderates the relationship between type of 
complementarity and degree of complement internalization such that 
 2a) (+):  Higher internalization is more likely in high technologically uncertain 
environments than in low technologically uncertain environments for symmetric 
complements, 
2b) (-): Higher internalization is more likely in high technologically uncertain 
environments than in low technologically uncertain environments for asymmetric 
complements. 
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Moderating influence of market demand uncertainty  
 
 Market demand uncertainty reflects the fluctuation and unpredictability in the 
level of demand in the market for the final good - arising from factors such as consumer 
product demand variations and competitive dynamics.   The source of market uncertainty 
in the TCE literature is demand unpredictability, so in this dissertation I examine how 
fluctuations in demand influence the primary product firm boundary decisions for 
complementary products. To deal with demand uncertainty, the firm has to adopt a two 
pronged approach of  i) allaying consumer expectations of primary product decline or 
stagnation and  ii) minimizing forms of opportunistic behavior.  
 Since consumers’ value variety in complementary products, firms deal with the   
consumer demand expectation contingency by adopting tactics that facilitate complement 
variety in the market. Contractual agreements involving technology licensing, sharing of 
APIs, etc. encourage entry of complementors in the complements market, who develop 
have the capabilities to develop superior quality complements compatible to the primary 
product (Gawer & Henderson, 2006; Binken & Stremerche, 2009).   This in turn 
contributes to increasing installed base of the primary product (Ohashi, 2003; Nair, 
Chintagunta & Dube, 2004).   
 Opportunistic behaviors such as increasing prices or delaying the complementary 
product development by symmetric complementors impact the primary product sales 
more than similar hold-up actions by asymmetric complementors. In symmetric product 
complementarity, arms length contracting may not be the ideal choice for the main reason 
that the primary product is always dependent on its symmetric counterpart, irrespective of 
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the product market structure changes (such as market separation after technology 
standards and modularity developments) although the market for symmetric complement 
suppliers is unlikely to be thin (Hogendorn & Yuen, 2009).  In general, TCE researchers 
have found that the transaction costs to specify, monitor and enforce a workable contract 
are higher in high volatility markets than in low-volatility markets (Balakrishnan & 
Wernerfelt, 1986; Teece, 1988), making internalization the transaction-efficient 
governance structure.  However, the contexts are different mainly in the need for variety 
in complement availability and internalization does not address the need.  Consequently, I 
argue that the primary product firm will opt for a governance choice that gives it greater 
control in its relationship with symmetric complementors than with asymmetric 
complementors. Alliances with involvement of different levels of equity facilitate or non 
exclusive contractual agreements provide the firm with more security in dealing with 
opportunism in the case of symmetric complementors. 
  The technologies and products that maybe used independent of the primary 
product, but yet enhance its value are not known to the primary product firm.  The 
relative functional independence of the primary product on any one asymmetric 
complement is an incentive for the primary product firm to encourage availability of 
several complements, particularly when market uncertainty is high.  The likelihood of 
primary product-complement adoption is greater if consumers have the option to mix and 
match a primary product with a number of other complements, which address different 
needs of consumers. This in turn will permit several system configurations to co-exist 
(Baldwin & Clark, 1994; Sanchez, 1995) lending the choice to the consumer to adopt a 
system that suites their requirements the best (Matutes & Regibeau, 1988). 
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 The impact of opportunistic behaviors such as pricing issues or product quality 
degrades in asymmetric complements are lesser than in the case of symmetric 
complementary product development  since the primary product firm has the resources to 
deal with such contingences.  The choice of the external market of complementors 
increases the chances of availability of a wide variety of complements in the market place 
as the external players have greater diversity in resources and capabilities than the focal 
firm alone. Further, non equity forms of cooperative relationships such as licensing 
contracts provide a way of sharing information and commit complementors to 
complementary product development. Complementors benefit from developing 
complements compatible with the primary product as they can reap the advantages of an 
already installed base of consumers devoted to the primary product.  
 Hypothesis 3: Market demand uncertainty moderates the relationship between type of 
complementarity and degree of complement internalization such that  
3a) (-): lower degree of internalization is more likely in high demand uncertain 
environments than in low demand uncertain environments for symmetric complements, 
3b) (+): lower degree of internalization is more likely in high demand uncertain 
environments than in low demand uncertain environments for asymmetric complements.  
Conclusion 
 
Based on the tenets of Transaction Cost Economics, this chapter examines the influence 
of type of complementarity on the boundary question. I detail the opportunistic behaviors 
relevant under changing market and technological conditions and formulate hypotheses 
regarding the governance mode. Specifically, primary product firms choose between 
hierarchy, different hybrid forms, and external modes (which include market contracting 
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and letting complementors make the complements). Type of complementarity has a 
different influence on the governance mode, moreover the technological and market 
conditions before and after dominant design emergence have different influences on the 
governance choice. The flexibility to adapt to changing circumstances is a determinant of 
opportunistic behavior (Williamson, 1991; Wathne & Heide, 2000). This aspect has 
different influences before and after the emergence of the dominant design on the 
governance decision.  
Limitations  
 
The dissertation does not address two aspects of technology battles that are likely to have 
an influence on the boundary question, viz., i) appropriability regime ii) firm competence  
 Appropriability regime: The efficacy of legal mechanisms of protection prevailing in the 
industry provided by patents, trademarks and copyrights is likely to influence the primary 
product firm decisions and complementor decisions in terms of which platform to 
collaborate with or produce complements for.  The stage of technology development also 
determines the efficacy of  these mechanisms - for  example,  patenting has its limitations 
in protecting technology appropriation in the early stages  of  technology development 
(Teece, 1986) and the effectiveness of the public institutions in establishing and 
enforcing the rights of the inventor (primary product firm) is stronger in later stages of 
the technology battle.  Although this dissertation does not address the influence of these 
mechanisms, the nature of opportunistic behaviors in dealing with complementors is 
unlike those of other technology based transactions. First, not all know-how can be 
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patented, such as specific assets based on experience or unstructured technical dialogues 
in design and production (Monteverde, 1995).   
 Second, the consideration of this factor only reinforces the arguments proposed in 
this thesis. For instance, in the context of technology life cycle, the early stages of the 
symmetric product development are characterized by weak appropriability since there are 
few standard enforcing institutions.  Consequently, the threat of technology 
appropriability and its impact on the primary product firm’s prospects are even stronger, 
increasing the likelihood of internalization.  However, in the later stages of the product 
life cycle, the appropriability regime is likely to provide safeguard against active forms of 
opportunism such as technology appropriability and violation of contracts, so that 
governance choices with lower hierarchy and control enable firms to increase their 
market share by encouraging complement variety.  
Competence based explanation: A firm may internalize a transaction associated with a 
complement because it represents the firm’s core competence (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990; 
Murray & Kotabe, 1999). Thus, firms with greater capabilities in production tend to 
perform this activity internally rather than choosing the markets (Jacobides & Hitt, 2005). 
Other works demonstrating support for the capabilities driven explanation of vertical 
scope include capability differences between suppliers and buyers (Hoetker, 2005),  
licensing of technology that is rare, unique and valuable (Schilling & Steensma). Further, 
in the context of choosing external modes of governance such as equity or non equity 
forms of alliance, technology capability differences and similarities inform the decision 
logic (Colombo, 2003).  
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 The theoretical mechanisms for the influence of appropriability regime and firm 
competences are not clarified in this dissertation. However, I account for the influence of 
these factors in the empirical study based on the selection of the sample and research 
design, as detailed in chapter 6.  In the next chapter, I detail the methodology to 
empirically validate hypothesis for the complement internalization. 
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CHAPTER 5: RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
This chapter describes the steps in the methodology I followed to test the 
propositions in the theoretical model. The research design is organized under the 
following framework 1) Sampling strategy 2) Data collection 3) Analytical model. 
Sampling strategy 
 
The sampling strategy is discussed in 5 steps: 
I.  Identifying the primary product market.  The choice of the primary product is critical 
because the predictions in the model are from the perspective of a primary product firm, 
and the nature of product complementarity is defined with the primary product as the 
reference product. The choice of the primary product was made based on following 
criteria 1) variation in type of complementarity with known availability of different types 
of complements of 2) variation in technological and market uncertainty – the moderator 
variables in the study. A comparison of complements in the some high technology 
product markets (see Appendix I: section A) suggests the prevalence of a greater number 
of different type of complements in the PC product market than others. Consequently, 
firms from SIC codes 3570 (Electronic and Office Computers), 3571(Electronic 
Computers) from COMPUSTAT formed the sample of primary product firms. Several 
product categories are complementary to the computer viz, 
i. Microprocessor, operating system, motherboard which are essential to the use of the PC 
(Matutes & Regibeau, 1988; Economides, 1989).   
ii. Desktop monitor and computer terminals 
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iii. Different storage drives such as removable tape drive, disk drive, cartridge, flash/zip 
drive.  
 iv. Services such as internet connectivity, IT services (Costa & Dierickx, 2005)   
v. Peripherals such as modems, fax, scanners, printers and network connectivity products 
(Sengupta, 1998). 
vii. A range of application software for video streaming, security, back up and recovery, 
remote desktop management, file management, PC protection,  database and business 
productivity software, games etc (Heeb, 2003).  
viii. Other electronic products such as TV, video camera, digital camera, portable music 
systems, projectors etc with HDMI interface or Firewire port or USB. 
Thus the PC and related product markets allows examination of the dynamics between 
primary product firms and complementors making different types of complements 
including component, non component, service, symmetric and asymmetric. I test the 
hypothesis based on hardware based complements only, since the software based 
complements involve different consideration of different factors in terms of technological 
interdependence, product deployment and copyright aspects. Further, there is variation in 
the PC market for the following reason. 
II: Identifying the list of primary and complementary product pairs. All possible pairs of 
hardware based complements to the PC were identified (PC, desktop and laptops) from 
the following sources, viz., i) Technical/academic books on computers and ii) Trade 
publications in the computer industry, validated with two librarians, knowledgeable on 
the industry and Examples of complements in the strategy, economic & marketing 
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literatures. The list of trade journals and books referred to are listed in the Appendix I: 
(section A, B).  
III: Categorizing the primary and complementary product pairs. The product pairs were 
categorized using the assistance of four industry experts
5
  into three distinct categories 
viz., symmetric complements, asymmetric complements and not sure according to the 
sorting technique often used in management research (Anderson & Gerbing, 1991; 
Nadkarni & Narayanan, 2007). The initial rate of inter coder agreement was 88%.  The 
“cannot decide” categories were re coded after they were provided with a definition of 
the products and thereafter the agreement was above 90%.  
IV:  Identifying announcements for the primary product category. First, a dictionary of 
complementary product keywords was derived based on literature review on 
complementary products, dictionary meaning search and synonyms and consultation with 
industry experts in the information services sector to validate the keywords
6
. This list of 
keywords include complement(s),Complementary product(s),Complementary good(s), 
Complementary market(s), Complementary part(s), Complementary component(s), 
Complementary module(s),Complementary gadget(s),Complementary package(s), 
Complementary system(s), Peripheral(s),Peripheral good(s), Peripheral product 
(s),Peripheral component (s),Peripheral part (s),Peripheral gadget(s),Peripheral 
module(s),Peripheral market(s),Peripheral system(s),Add-on(s),Add-on good(s),Add-on 
                                                          
5
 Deepa Mundewadi, Manager, Accenture,India  Sunder Siva, Systems Architect at PTC,PA     
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Chanda Jackson, Business Analyst, BSCI; Mike Betschart, Business Analyst, BSCI; Mike Schary, Project 
Manager, PTC, Baburaj Panicker, Software Architect, PTC 
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product(s),Add-on component (s),Add-on part (s),Add-on gadget(s),Add-on 
module(s),Add-on package(s),Add-on system(s),Accessories, Feature 
enhancement(s),Consumable(s),Synergistic product(s), Synergistic module(s), Synergistic 
system(s), Synergistic market(s), Synergistic part(s), Synergistic component(s), 
Synergistic complement(s). Second, I searched search the newswire database for all 
computer related complementary product category announcements, in the Businesswire 
based on these keywords and applying different criteria between 1980 – 2010. Firms 
disseminate information on actions related to primary product and the information is 
visibly captured in the business press announcements (Westphal  & Zajac,1998).  Prior 
research in management has referenced these databases (Kalaignanam, Shankar & 
Varadarajan, 2007; Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2008).  
Figure 3 shows the steps involved in the data collection process  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Please insert Figure 3 about here 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Figure 4 shows the flowchart for the selection of announcements 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Please insert Figure 4 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
V: Identifying the sample of product pairs with primary product firm and their strategies. 
The resulting final set of documents is fed to a software program I developed to match 
primary product firms with those from COMPUSTAT, identify complementors and 
identify the governance strategies. Although historically action coding in texts such as 
news documents has been done manually by coders trained to conduct such activity, 
recently software packages are replacing this manual intensive effort. Studies provide 
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evidence of the comparable accuracies in coding done manually and that by a 
computerized effort (Laver et al, 2003; Uotila et. al., 2009). I developed a custom 
software package to identify the strategies for a particular primary product-
complementary product pair in an announcement on a sample of announcements. The 
strategy identification involved the following steps. 
i. A set of keywords for the different strategies proposed in the theoretical model was 
derived, based on a review of the academic literature and consultation with business and 
academic experts. The set of keywords included release(s/ed), debut(s/ed), 
introduce(s/ed) new,  unveil(s/ed), launche(s/ed), ship(s/ed), announce(s/ed) new, 
deliver(s/ed), extend(s/ed) support, offer(s), produce(s), present(s), manufacture(s), 
develop(s), reveal(s/ed), acquire(s), purchase(s), takeover, buyout, merger, 
consolidation, subsidiary, syndicate, hostile, absorb, parent, white knight, suitor, 
integrate, acquire, purchase, buy, merge, equity stake, equity position, agreement, 
alliance, ally, allies, signs pact, sign pact, signs deal, sign deal, pact, collaboration, 
collaborates, jointly develop, joint development, jointly developed jointly market, joint 
market, joint marketing, joint production, joint R & D, joint R&D, co-brand, co-
develop,co development, co produce ,co production, co-market, co-marketing, co-
branding, cross license, cross-licensing, cross licensing, joint distribution, joint 
advertizing. 
ii. The announcements were searched to locate a match between the primary product-
complementary product pair in the set of announcements.  The matched set of 
announcements was then selected for further processing.  
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iii. The subset of announcements from step ii) above was examined for a match of  the  
primary product firm in the title and/ (or) header of each announcement with the master 
list of all primary firms from SIC 3570 (Computer And Office Equipment) and 
3571(Electronic Computers).   
iv. The set of announcements with a primary product firm were matched for identifying a 
match with validated strategy keywords
7
 (see Appendix I: section F) for internalization, 
alliance and complementor make by the software program. The flowchart for the 
software program and criteria used in programming are listed in the Appendix I (see 
section G).  I also did manual verification checks to improve the accuracy of the software 
program (Appendix I: see section H).  
Data 
 Data Source 
 
The data sources for creating the list of complementary products include the trade 
journals  in the PC industry, academic books on computers and peripherals, industry 
reports on computer peripherals, review of the academic literature and industry experts. 
Technological, market demand uncertainty and control variables data are from 
COMPUSTAT, firm annual reports and the Almanac of Industry ratios. Patents data are 
from USPTO (http://www.uspto.gov). Governance strategies data is from Lexis Nexis 
Academic, specifically announcements reported in the Business Wire and SDC database. 
Availability of data restricts data clection to primary product firms and their activities 
headquartered in the United States.    
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 Business Wire disseminates full text news releases from thousands of companies 
worldwide to several audiences including news media, financial markets, market research 
firms, investors and databases. To deliver accurate and fast reporting, it has carriage 
agreements with several premier news agencies such as AP, Dow Jones, Reuters, and 
Thomson One. Business Wire research polls and surveys have been cited in academic 
work (Filson, 2004; Houde, 2012).     COMPUSTAT for sales, assets and expenditures 
(viz., R & D, advertizing).  
Data Description 
 
  
 
 
 
The sample consists of 88 pairs of primary product-complementary product pairs. The 
complements are hardware based such as CPU, monitors, disk drives, scanner, printer, 
digital camera, camcorder, projector, keyboard and mouse.  Strategies pertaining to 31 
primary product firms are captured in the sample, between 1982 and 2010, which were in 
the PC market for all or some period, generating a total of 307 pooled observations.   
 
Measurement of variables 
 
Dependent variable: Degree of complement internalization 
  Observations 
Total  Product pairs  108 696 
Primary product firms 31  
Product pairs associated with a 
primary product firm 
88 307 
Symmetric product pairs 56 112 
Asymmetric product pairs 32 195 
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 This variable captures the choices of the primary product firm conducting the 
complementary product development within the boundaries of the firm, or outside its 
boundaries. Vertical integration and markets, including long term contracts are the two 
basic forms of organization examined in the TCE literature. Hybrid governance structures 
that include joint ventures, relational contracts and bilateral arrangements are located 
between the markets and hierarchy spectrum. From a transaction cost perspective, equity 
form of governance structures including JVs and partial equity investments relationships 
are subject to the transaction hazards of both markets and hierarchies as they are located 
intermediate between hierarchy and markets (Park & Russo, 1996). Consequently, I 
coded degree of internalization involving complementary products as a variable with 
three distinctive, non overlapping values 
1. Complementor make: These include complementary product development by 
complementors. Product announcements by complementors for a particular 
primary product were coded in this category. 
2. Alliances: Agreements involving primary and complementary product firms such 
as jvs, minority or partial equity, supply contracts, OEM agreements and retail 
contracts between primary and complementary product firms were also coded in 
this category (Oxley, 1999; Columbo, 2003).  
3. Vertical integration:  Complementary products developed internally by the 
primary product firm were captured by complement announcements from primary 
firms. 
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Independent variables  
1. Symmetric and asymmetric complementarity:  
The development of the measure required industry expert validation and categorization. 
First, two experts validated the definitions for symmetric and asymmetric product 
complementarity, specifically that the distinction in the type of product complementarity 
was clear (see Appendix –Section C, D).  Examples include 
Symmetric  Complementarity Asymmetric complementarity 
PC Microprocessor  PC Printer 
PC keyboard PC scanner 
PC power supply PC web camera 
PC RAM chipset PC videophone 
PC motherboard PC DVD player  
PC OS PC digital camera 
 
Second, four industry experts categorized the product pairs into two categories. The 
extent of agreement in the categorization was significant enough to proceed with the 
coding of the construct into two distinct categories (see Appendix – Section E). 
Third, since these are distinct and identifiable usage behaviors from a usage perspective 
of a primary product, I it as coded as a dichotomous variable, i.e. a product pair is either 
symmetrically or asymmetrically complementary. For this study, it is coded as: 
TOC =0; asymmetric complement 
TOC =1; symmetric complement 
2. Primary product market technological uncertainty: 
 In the TCE literature, technological uncertainty is operationalized as the frequency of 
changes in product specification, the probability of technological improvements (Walker 
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& Weber, 1984; 1987; Shelanski & Klein, 1995), frequency of new product 
introductions, the frequency of technological change (Lazzarini, Claro & Mesquita, 2008; 
Ragatz et. al, 2002) and the change in product configurations resulting from frequent 
technological change (Poppo & Zenger, 1998). Firms are likely to respond to frequent 
and unpredictable product or technology developments influencing the primary product 
functions with investments in new technology development. Further, technological 
developments involving process innovations (such as the fabrication equipment in CPU 
manufacture) require investments in capital equipment. Technological uncertainty is 
measured as the average ratio of the sum of research and development expenditures and 
capital expenditures averaged for all firms in the primary product market (Snyder & 
Glueck, 1982).  
3. Primary product market demand uncertainty: 
Product market uncertainty reflects the unpredictability in sales in the corresponding 
product market (Dess & Beard, 1984; Bergh, 1998). I calculated volatility for the current 
year as the standard error of the regression slope coefficient, where past 3 previous years’ 
net product market sales were used in the regression equation. Sales data pertaining to the 
relevant product market was obtained through Compustat Segment data to include only 
those data relevant to operations for the primary product (i.e. BUSSEG, OPSEG). The 
volatility is an indicator of the unpredictability of product demand, user needs, pricing 
and distribution.   
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Controls 
Diversification motive, core competence or past alliance experience may be suggested as 
an explanation for a particular governance choice. Prior research in transaction cost 
economics has identified the influence of asset specificity, firm size, experience and 
capabilities as influencing the firm’s decision to internalize. Since the study is focused on 
the choice of governance strategy from a primary product firm’s perspective, I use the 
following primary product firm level controls. 
1. Primary product firm size:   
Larger firms are more likely to have the resources essential to conduct the 
complementary product activities internally as compared to smaller firms. Firm size has 
been used a measure of the scale of operations which influence the decision to choose the 
governance strategy (Gatignon & Anderson, 1988). Larger firms could leverage the 
existing production and marketing assets as compared to smaller firms who are likely to 
seek external complementors in producing or marketing the complements. Further, small 
firms are likely to be more nimble in terms of the choosing strategies such as Similar to 
prior research, size is measured as the natural logarithm of the number of employees 
(Gatignon & Anderson, 1988; Brouthers, Brouthers & Werner, 2003).  
2. Primary product firm age:   
 
Older firms are likely to have more complementary product related activities in progress 
as they have had more time for planning the activities, assessing the competitive 
environment and implementing different strategies.  Further, older firms are also more 
likely to have to have entered more alliances than younger firms (Sorensen & Stuart, 
2000). Younger firms are unlikely to know how to manage subjectively, monitor and 
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assess the performance of partners or markets (Gatignon & Anderson, 1988). It is 
measured as the number of years in the industry since date of founding.   
3. Primary product firm technological capability:  
 
Arguments based on the resource based view of the firm in the context of buyer supplier 
make or buy decisions supports the likelihood of internalization as being influenced by 
the technological capabilities of the firms (Argyres, 1996; Hoetker, 2005). Technological 
capabilities encompass trade secrets, know-how generated by R & D and technology 
intellectual capital (Dollinger, 1995; Lee, Lee & Pennings, 2001; Carlsson, Jacobsson, 
Holmen & Rickne, 2002). Firms may not involve another partner or have to depend on 
markets if it has the essential set of capabilities in development, production and 
marketing to make complements. Technological knowhow embedded in patents reflects 
the primary product firm’s ability to innovate and develop complementary products 
related to its primary product technology.  Technological capability is measured as the count 
of patents held by the primary product firm. Such a measure has been used in prior research, 
reflecting the firm’s ability to innovate (Shan, Walker & Kogut, 1994) 
4. Primary product firm R & D Intensity  
Asset specificity, a determinant of a firm’s decision to conduct product development within its 
boundaries has been measured in terms of the firm’s R & D Intensity (Gatignon & Anderson, 
1988; Henisz, 2000). Higher R & D intensity is a proxy for intangible assets such as engineering 
personnel know-how and technology assets whose value is difficult for outsiders to assess and 
difficult to redeploy (Balakrishnan & Fox, 1993), influences the choice of a governance form that 
gives the firm greater control over the assets. 
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5. Firm Capital Intensity 
Firms with large fixed assets dedicated to the development of its primary product line have lesser 
flexibility in realigning their production line, technology laboratories and personnel in the 
development of newer product lines without significant costs or time delays, in turn influencing 
their decision to internalize other product lines.  It is measured as the ratio of capital expenses to 
sales for each year.  
6. Firm alliance experience 
Prior sourcing relationships enable firms to develop capabilities in identifying partners 
and better implement the phases of a transaction, viz., negotiating, monitoring and 
enforcing the terms of a contract (Gulati, 1995; Hoetker, 2005). Firms with greater 
experience are likely to choose alliances for implementing the phases of complementary 
product development as compared to other modes since they provide firms with greater 
flexibility in scaling up the commitment or reversing the transaction.  Similar to prior 
research, I control for past experience in alliances with a count variable (Oxley, 1997; 
Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004).   
7. Time controls 
The computer product market has undergone growth and downturn due to business cycle 
effects, macroeconomic factors such as recessions, and other factors that cannot be 
explained by technological or demand uncertainty over the study period. For example, the 
Y2K scare
8
 around 1998-2001 caused an increased demand in the sales of the computers, 
                                                          
8
 The computers were so designed to function (due to the software) that it would not be able to make a 
difference between the year 1800 and the year 2000, for many of them used only two digits for the year 
field as opposed to four. 
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where the sales of computers were influenced by a need to ensure Y2K compliance. This 
was followed by a decline in sales as computer orders declined, firms had invested in 
machinery and equipment and the limited shelf life of the equipment in a rapidly 
changing technology market. To account for the impact of the broader economic 
fluctuations and time related variations in the dependent variable, year dummies t1……t26 
were included. 
Model specification 
 
The unit of analysis is the product pair. The governance choice in this study takes distinct 
and non substitutable values, viz., the markets option includes complementor making the 
complement, unilateral licensing or contracting agreements such as supply contract, 
distribution contract or non exclusive technology licensing as the default choice (0); 
alliances as the second and vertical integration as the third choice.    
Specification1: The multinomial probability that the governance strategy is i for the j
th
 
observation is expressed as –   
          1 
Pij = Pr(GSj=i) = ----------------------------- , if  i = 0  --------- (1) 
               1 + ∑exp(xjβm) 
 
     exp(xjβi) 
Pij = Pr(GSj=i) = ---------------------------- ,  if  i ≠ 0     (i=1,2) -------- (2)  
                1 + ∑exp(xjβm) 
 
where  xj  is the vector of observed values of independent variables for the jth observation 
and βm  is the coefficient vector  for outcome i, such that 
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∑exp(xjβm) = β1-34Controls + β35TypeofCompleit,j + β36TechUncertaintyit,j + β37MktUncertaintyit,j 
+β38TypeofComple*TechUncertainty+ β39TypeofComple*MktUncertainty (3)  
for the governance choice for symmetric or asymmetric complements, 
where   β1-34Controls=β1FirmSize+β2Firmage+β3FirmTechCapability +β4FirmAllianceExperience  
+β5FirmR&DIntensity + β6FirmCapitalIntensity+ β7Industry+ β8t1… β 34t26  
Specification 2: The make vs. buy literature has largely employed binary choice models 
to test the relationship between a set of predictors and the governance decision 
(Monteverde & Teece, 1982, Pisano, 1990; Poppo & Zenger, 1998; Leiblein & Miller, 
2003). Based on the firm’s decision to internalize or not, the analytical model is 
expressed as:  
GSit,j = αj + λt + β1…xFirmControls + β7TypeofComp1,2it,j + β8TechUncertaintyit,j + 
β9MktUncertaintyit,j+ β10TypeofComp1,2*TechUncertainty + 
β11TypeofComp1,2*MktUncertainty               (4) 
where  GSit,j  indicates the choice of governance strategy for a pair of products i at time t 
for primary product firm j, αj captures subject specific heterogenerity(firm/product pair) 
and λt  captures the variability introduced by time. Control variables include primary 
product  firm size, firm age, firm technological capabilities, firm alliance experience , 
firm R&D intensity firm capital intensity.  
A pooled model specification for the binary choice is expressed as 
GSit,j=β1….xFirmControls + β6…32TimeControls + β33TypeofComp1,2it,j + β34TechUncertaintyit,j + 
β35MktUncertaintyit,j+β36TypeofComp1,2*TechUncertainty+ β37TypeofComp1,2*MktUncertainty(5) 
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CHAPTER 6: RESULTS 
 
The chapter discusses I) correlations, II) multinomial logit regressions, II) Logistic model 
regressions. The analyses were conducted using Stata 10 as the statistical software. 
I. Correlations 
 
The pair wise correlations are in Table 9.     
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Please insert Table 9 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 Type of complementarity, the main predictor variable is correlated with R&D 
intensity (p<0.1) suggesting involvement of asset specific investments for symmetric 
complements.  Strategy is correlated with firm technological capability (p<0.1), in line 
with prior research findings based on the resource based logic that firms are likely to 
internalize with increasing stock of valuable technological resources.  Technological 
uncertainty, one of the moderator variables is positively associated with R&D intensity 
(p<0.05) and firm technological capability (p<0.05)  in accordance with past findings that 
firms increase investment in research and development, when technological environment 
is unpredictable due to frequent technological change (Zhou & Wu, 2010). Technological 
uncertainty is also positively associated with strategy (p<0.05), suggesting the use of 
higher governance modes with increasing uncertainty, in line with arguments on the 
influence of technological uncertainty in transaction cost economics (Walker & Weber, 
1984). Finally, market uncertainty is not significant but shows a negative association with 
strategy suggesting lower equity governance choices with increasing uncertainty.  
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II.  Multinomial logistic regressions 
 
 Governance strategy values viz., complementor make, alliances and 
internalization are non substitutable alternatives, making multinomial logit a suitable 
analytical model for testing the hypotheses. The iia test does not suggest significance in 
the interdependence of the alternatives. To check for multicollinearity between the study 
variables, I conducted OLS regression. The VIFs for the main predictor variables viz., 
type of complementarity, technological uncertainty and market uncertainty were below 
10.  Further, the likelihood ratio test and Wald tests indicate that the individual effects of 
the independent variables, viz., type of complementary, technological and market 
uncertainty are distinct.  Since the data contain multiple observations for the same firm 
across years, to address the problem of unobserved heterogeneity, I used the multinomial 
logit model with robust standard errors, along with clustering. To account for 
interdependence between observations within a firm, product pair and firm product pair, I 
performed the analysis by clustering on these three factors that accounts for 
interdependence within each of 31, 88 and 207 clusters.  
1.  Full sample multinomial logit regressions: I conducted multinomial logit regressions 
employing the full sample (Table 2 – Models 1 & 2). To address issues of heterogeneity 
introduced by repeated alliance or internalization strategies by a particular primary firm, I 
used dummy variables that indicate repeat alliance or internalization strategies by the 
same firm, similar to prior research (Wang & Zajac, 2009). I did not account for 
interdependence among observations where the strategy was complementor make because 
the analysis is focused from the primary product firm perspective. Complementors make 
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strategies involve decision logic from a complementor’s perspective as well and this 
study does not address those mechanisms. The results are reported in Table 2 - Model 3 
& 4.     
Summary of results:  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Please insert Table 10 about here 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
 
 Hypotheses 1 predicts a direct effect of type of complementarity on the 
governance choice of a primary product firm for complementary products.  The models 
do not support this prediction.  Hypothesis 2a and 2b predict an interactive effect of 
technological uncertainty and type of complementarity on the primary firm’s governance 
choice. This hypothesis is not supported in the full sample multinomial logit model 
analysis. Technological uncertainty has a direct impact on the likelihood of alliance 
formation as well as the internalization decision, suggesting that rapidly changing 
technologies influence the firm strategy. Hypothesis 3a and 3b predict an interactive 
effect of market demand uncertainty and type of complementarity on the primary firm’s 
governance choice. This hypothesis is not supported in the multinomial logit model 
analysis.  
 Primary product firm variables, firm technological capabilities and alliance 
experience are significant in explaining the choice of alliance over complementor make 
and the choice of internalization over complementor make.  Further, the alliance 
governance choice is also influenced by prior alliances involving the same primary 
product firm and product pair influence (p<0.05) (Table 2 – model 4a). Thus, the 
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significance of both overall alliance experience and  product pair specific past alliances 
indicate the possible role of i)  alliance capability in firm’s preference of choice of 
alliance (Kale & Singh, 2007) and ii) complementary product specific factors  
influencing .the choice of alliance strategy over others. In conjunction with the finding 
that technological uncertainty is also significant (p<0.05), it is likely that firms on the one 
hand adopt strategies which give them flexibility at the firm level, and  on the other hand 
identify and develop competence in a strategy that fits a particular primary product-
complementary product pair in dynamic environments (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000).  
 To test the influence of varying levels of uncertainties on the governance choice 
of the firm, I split the sample by different levels of technological and market uncertainty, 
viz., low, moderate and high.   
 Impact of Technological Uncertainty 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Please insert Table 11 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Low levels of technological uncertainty: The relative risk of the choice of alliances 
relative to complementor make is higher for symmetric complements as compared to 
asymmetric complements and the relative risk of the choice of internalization relative to 
alliances for symmetric complements decreases at lower levels of technological 
uncertainty.  On the one hand, this supports the prediction that primary product firms are 
likely to opt for higher modes of governance for symmetric as compared to asymmetric 
complements. It also shows that the propensity for internalization is lower at low levels 
of technological uncertainty. However, the results do not provide evidence of the 
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predicted choice of complementor-make at low levels of technological uncertainty for 
asymmetric complements.  
Moderate technological uncertainty: The relative risk of the choice of internalization 
relative to complementor make for symmetric complementarity increases by a factor 
6.976 times as compared to asymmetric complements at moderate levels of uncertainty 
(p<0.05) and the relative risk of the choice of internalization relative to alliances 
increases by a factor 3.851 times as compared to asymmetric complements at moderate 
levels of uncertainty (p<0.05). The results support the idea of a strong choice of 
internalization for symmetric complements relative to asymmetric complements at 
moderate levels of uncertainty.  
High technological uncertainty: The moderating effect of increasing technological 
uncertainty on the predicted relationship between type of complementarity and the 
governance choice diminishes at high levels of technological uncertainty.  The results 
indicate that firm technological capabilities and firm age are only significant in 
explaining the choice of internalization over other governance strategies for symmetric 
complements. However the magnitudes of the coefficients still indicate a stronger choice 
for internalization than other modes for symmetric complements.   
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Impact of market demand uncertainty 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Please insert Table 12 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Low demand uncertainty: The results do not provide a discerning effect of type of 
complementarity at low levels of market demand uncertainty. The magnitude of the 
coefficients suggests that symmetric complements are less associated with alliances than 
internalization or complementor make.   
Moderate market demand uncertainty: The relative risk of the choice of internalization 
for symmetric complements relative to complementor make decreases by 0.546 (p<0.1) 
and the relative risk of the choice of internalization relative to alliances decreases by 
0.396 (p<0.05)  as compared to asymmetric complements. Further, the results also show 
that firms are more strongly likely to choose alliances (p<0.05) as compared to 
complementor make (p<0.1). This result provides support to the moderation hypothesis 
that primary product firms are more likely to choose alliances as a governance strategy 
under increasing levels of market demand uncertainty for symmetric complements.  Firm 
age is also significant in explaining the choice of alliances relative to other governance 
modes for symmetric complements. 
High level of market demand uncertainty: There is no effect of demand uncertainty on 
governance choice of the primary product firm at high levels of demand uncertainty. The 
magnitude of the coefficients however indicates that symmetric complements are less 
associated with internalization or complementor make and more likely associated with 
alliances.   
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III.  Logistic regressions 
 
   Research in the TCE lineage has traditionally examined the boundary question 
with two choices viz., make or buy and has employed binary choice models (Monteverde 
& Teece, 1982; Walker & Weber, 1984; Safizadeh, Field & Ritzman, 2008). To examine 
whether type of complementarity and the primary product market contingences predict 
the internalization vs. not internalize decision, I performed following analysis. I 
conducted logistic regressions (pooled and panel regressions) for predicting a firm’s 
choice between  a) alliance and internalize  b) internalize and complementor make 
(excluding complementor make) and c) alliance and complementor make  (excluding 
internalize).  I explain the results next.  
Summary of results in the pooled logistic regression models: The results are reported in 
Table 13, Models, 1 to 3.  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Please insert Table 13 about here 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
 
Although the main explanatory variables (type of complementarity, interaction variables 
technological uncertainty*type of complementarity, market uncertainty*type of 
complementarity) are not significant, firm controls and technological uncertainty are 
significant. Specifically, primary product firm technological capabilities is significant in 
explaining the firm’s choice of alliances over complementor make and internalization 
over complementor make (please see Table 13 - models 1 & 2 respectively). Further, 
firm R & D intensity (p<0.1) and alliance experience (p<0.05) are significant in 
explaining internalization over complementor make (please see Table 13 – model 1). 
Technological uncertainty is significant in explaining the firm’s choice of alliances over 
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complementor make and internalization over complementor make (please see Table 13 - 
models 1 & 2).    
 
Summary of results in the panel logistic regression models: The results are reported in 
Table 14 - Models, 1 to 6.  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Please insert Table 14 about here 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Fixed effects model (Table 6 – Models 1, 2, 3): Firm technological capabilities (p<0.01), 
alliance experience (p<0.05) and technological uncertainty are significant (p<0.1) in 
explaining firm’s choice of alliance over complementor’s strategy to make (model 1). 
The other explanatory and control variables, except technological uncertainty (p<0.05) 
were non significant in explaining the firm’s decision to internalize (Table 14 - model 2). 
Interestingly, primary product firm capital intensity is significant in explaining the firm’s 
choice of internalization over alliance.   
Random effects model (Table 14 – Models 4,5,6):  Primary product firm’s technological 
capabilities and alliance experience are significant in explaining alliance over 
complementor make (Table 14 - model 4), technological uncertainty and technological 
capabilities are significant in explaining internalization relative to complementors’ 
making the product.    
 Conclusion 
 
 The data analysis provides partial support for the hypothesized effect of type of 
complementarity that symmetric complements are generally associated with higher 
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modes of governance as compared to asymmetric complements. The results however are 
evident at moderately increasing levels of technological and market demand uncertainty 
than at very high levels of uncertainty.  At low uncertainty, primary product firms are 
likely to rely less on internalization for symmetric as well as asymmetric complements. 
Further, the dominant choice of strategy for symmetric complements at low levels of 
technological uncertainty is alliances, higher than that for asymmetric complements.  At 
moderately increasing levels of technological uncertainty, the results indicate that firm’s 
choice for internalization increases for symmetric complements, and for asymmetric 
complements the overall preference (split sample results by type of complementarity) is 
alliances with increasing technological uncertainty. At very high levels of technological 
uncertainty, the results are not clear.  
  Further, market demand uncertainty also moderates the relationship between 
symmetric complementarity and governance choice, mainly at moderately increasing 
levels of uncertainty. The results indicate a greater likelihood of firm’s adopting 
strategies that enable them to have greater flexibility in the development of 
complementary products. In contrast to increasing likelihood of internalization with 
increasing technological uncertainty, symmetric complementarity is associated with a 
propensity for alliances with increasing demand uncertainty.  
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CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION 
 
I discuss the results in the context of the supported and not supported hypothesis.  The 
thesis proposed to examine the following hypotheses:  
Hypothesis1a:  Symmetric product complementarity is positively associated with higher 
degree of internalization and  
Hypothesis1b: asymmetric product complementarity is negatively associated with higher 
degree of internalization 
 
Hypothesis 2: Technological uncertainty moderates the relationship between type of 
complementarity and the governance choice of a primary product firm such that 
Hypothesis 2a) higher internalization is more likely in high technologically 
uncertain environments than in low technologically uncertain environments for 
symmetric complements and  
 
Hypothesis 2b) higher internalization is more likely in high technologically 
uncertain environments than in low technologically uncertain environments for 
asymmetric complements 
 Hypothesis 3: Market demand uncertainty moderates the relationship between type of 
complementarity and the governance choice of a primary product firm such  
Hypothesis 3a) lower internalization is more likely in high demand uncertain 
environments than in low demand uncertain environments for symmetric 
complements and 
 
Hypothesis 3b) lower internalization is more likely in high demand uncertain 
environments than in low demand uncertain environments for asymmetric 
complements. 
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 The study finds partial support for the moderating influence of technological 
uncertainty and market demand uncertainty. The results indicate that primary product 
firms are more likely to internalize symmetric complementary product development at 
moderately increasing levels of technological uncertainty and likely to form alliances at 
low levels of technological uncertainty. Further, the results indicate that firms are more 
likely to internalize the symmetric complementary product development at moderately 
increasing levels of market demand uncertainty than at low or high levels of market 
demand uncertainty.  Thus, overall the results support the general direction of the 
association between type of complementarity and governance choice, contingent on 
different levels of technological and market uncertainty. 
I. Hypothesis supported 
 
 The technological uncertainty moderator hypotheses predict the influence of 
technological uncertainty between type of complementarity and the governance choice of 
the primary product firm such that internalization is more likely at higher levels than at 
lower levels of technological uncertainty for symmetric complements and externalization 
(specifically alliances) is more likely at higher levels than at lower levels of technological 
uncertainty for asymmetric complements. The split sample multinomial regression 
analyses reveals that at low and moderate levels of technological uncertainty, firms are 
more likely to adopt alliances and internalization for symmetric complements 
respectively.  Further, the likelihood of the firms adopting alliances and internalization 
are also higher for symmetric than asymmetric complements at low and moderate levels 
of technological uncertainty.   
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 The increasing propensity to internalize symmetric complements at moderately 
increasing levels of technological uncertainty may be attributed to the fact that, although 
the technological developments in the PC industry do not classify as significant during 
the study period, the nature of technological development in the all the symmetric 
complement markets has been quite to the contrary. Significant advancements 
characterize memory chips and display panel technologies. Although primary product 
firms lost control of the critical complement markets, they have adopted strategies that 
permit them to retain control over other essential complement markets. Thus, firms have 
been involved in the making of several symmetric complements such as keyboards, 
chipsets, displays and internal disk drives, even though there has been a competitive 
complementor market.  This provides support to the arguments made in the dissertation 
that firms anticipate some level of opportunism in these markets and one way of ensuring 
control over these markets is by also making these complements.   
  Further, the results suggest that firms are less likely to internalize symmetric 
complements at low levels of technological uncertainty as compared to making a choice 
between alliances or letting complementors make the products.  Thus, when 
technological development path is relatively known or the nature of technological 
breakthroughs is minor or predictable in the industry, the threat of possible opportunistic 
behaviors is minimal, and nature of functional interdependence does not provide a basis 
for internalization. However, the increasing propensity for alliances (involving 
technology licensing, co-marketing, production , distribution and minority equity 
agreements) over complementor make for symmetric complements even at low levels of 
technological uncertainty suggests that firms may not completely relinquish control of 
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symmetric complements. These inferences have to be however be considered in the 
context of the PC and related product markets as well as I explain the result for high 
technological uncertainty (Section II). 
 The market demand uncertainty moderator hypotheses predicts the moderating 
impact of market demand uncertainty between type of complementarity and the 
governance choice of the primary product firm such that alliances is the preferred choice 
at higher levels than at lower levels of market demand uncertainty for symmetric 
complements and externalization (specifically letting complementors make complements) 
is more likely at higher levels than at lower levels of technological uncertainty for 
asymmetric complements. The results provide evidence of a moderation effect of market 
demand uncertainty at increasing levels of uncertainty over a specific range. The choice 
of alliances for symmetric complements lend support to the following arguments put 
forth in the study – 
 i) Firms deal with demand fluctuation in the primary product market by encouraging 
growth in the complementary product markets. Internalizing in such conditions restricts 
the ability of the firm to reach a broader market audience and tap into the needs of 
different customers who have varying needs from complementary products.  Specifically, 
the innovations in the complement markets including the plug and play capabilities 
facilitated by innovations in the operating system, the increasing processing power of the 
microprocessor and the growth of the internet    opened new consumer markets as well as 
expanded the composition of existing consumer segments. Moderately increasing 
uncertainty could also coincide with growth phase of the primary product and growing 
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opportunities in related product markets. Forming alliances with complementors enable 
the primary product firms to better understand the needs of the complement markets and 
co-develop or co-market the products        
ii) The results indicate that firms are not likely to choose the complementor make option 
in comparison to the choice of strategic alliances for making symmetric complementary 
products.  This supports the main idea for the need for some level of control in symmetric 
complementary product development to minimize opportunistic concerns. Bargaining 
over pricing (Yalcin et al, 2013) or delays in complement introduction and innovation 
(Casadesus-Masanell & Yoffie, 2006) impair the ability of the primary firm to capture a 
greater market share, more harmful in the context of symmetric complements than in 
asymmetric complements.   
II.  Hypothesis not supported 
 
  First, there is no evidence of a direct effect of type of complementarity (in the 
absence of product market contingences). Second, at high levels of technological 
uncertainty, the firms do not show a greater propensity for internalization of symmetric 
complements as hypothesized by moderator effect of technological uncertainty. Further, 
the findings do not support the prediction that alliances are the preferred governance 
choice at high levels of market demand uncertainty. I suggest possible reasons for these 
results. 
 The following reasons may explain the lack of significance for a choice of 
symmetric complement internalization at high levels of technological uncertainty. First, 
the study does not take into account variations in the structure of the complementary 
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product markets. IBM’s open architecture policy influenced subsequent complementary 
product market structures, with the critical components being in the control of external 
firms (West, 2003). In the case of the PC and related markets, the rapidly increasing 
installed base of users committed to the DOS and Windows operating systems served as a 
strong deterrent for PC manufacturers to make this complement. Similarly, the control of 
the microprocessor rested with Intel. Second, it is useful to understand the sources of high 
levels of technological uncertainty in the data, occurring between 1985 and 1995. 
Significant innovations occurred in the operating system and the microprocessor, from 
the release of the Windows 1.0 to the release of the Windows 95; matched with upgrades 
in the CPU processing power and RAM capacities.  
 These innovations had remarkable impact on the PC architecture as well because 
the innovations spelled the beginning of fax/modems, email, the new online world, and 
multimedia games and educational software.  For instance, Windows 95 has built-in 
Internet support, dial-up networking, and new plug and play capabilities. To keep pace 
with these developments and to ensure overall system integrity and interoperability, it is 
likely that primary product firms may have made significant investments in research and 
development. Thus, i) a separation of control from the primary product firm to a limited 
set of symmetric complementors for the critical components in the PC in conjunction 
with ii) rapid technological developments in these complement markets during the time 
period of high technological uncertainty may be reasons why the results do not support 
the prediction at high levels of technological uncertainty.  In order to verify these 
inferences, however it is essential to also examine in detail the technological 
developments in the different complementary product markets associated with the PC; 
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specifically, whether the pace of innovation in the complement markets is largely 
restricted to the operating system and microprocessor markets (during the period of high 
technological uncertainty). 
  I suggest following reasons may explain a lack of support for the preferred 
governance mode of alliances for symmetric complement development at high levels of 
market demand uncertainty 
 i) High demand instability maybe a transient state, so that firms are likely to adopt a wait 
and watch approach before formalizing a strategy. Investing in alliances to capture broad 
sections of the market may be futile, if the sources of uncertainty are independent of the 
type of complementarity or immediate product market contingences. For example, the 
periods of dot com boom and bust and the Y2K eras (1999-2001) are periods where firms 
may have delayed adopting a specific strategy. I.e. it is not evident whether the 
fluctuations in demand during this time period are caused by real, lasting changes in 
consumer needs or changes in consumer demographic segments. A sudden increase in the 
demand for PCs may not be driven by a need for greater needs for data storage, but rather 
by an increase in the new PC purchases by small businesses who cannot afford the large 
investments needed to correct the problem imposed by the Y2K issue in older machines 
 ii) Technology life cycle: The technology life cycle models suggest that high levels of 
market uncertainty characterize the period around the acceptance of a dominant design 
(Abernathy & Clark, 1985; Tushman & Anderson, 1986; Anderson & Tushman,1990). 
There is significant uncertainty regarding the consumer adoption of competing 
technologies until a dominant design emerges (Katz & Shapiro, 1985; 1986). Market 
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demand instability in the initial period of the study (between 1981-1986) could be 
attributed to the reason that the PC market was relatively new. During this period, the 
primary product firms are less likely to adopt specific strategies targeting complementary 
products. They are likely to develop strategies to deal with rivals in their primary market 
first before focusing on complement markets. 
  The results do not support the prediction for the direct effect of type of 
complementarity on the governance choice, when the varying levels of  technological and 
market demand uncertainty are not included in the models. The types of opportunistic 
behaviors in the complement markets are slightly different from issues of technology 
appropriability, as discussed in the TCE literature include delays in complement 
innovations, delays in complement releases, bargaining over pricing terms and switching 
to another primary product firm with a larger installed base of users.  One possible reason 
is that anticipation of such concerns may not be sufficient for firms to invest in 
internalization. Second, the structure of the PC product market and the related 
complement markets pre empted possibilities of opportunism that require internalization 
based on type of complementarity alone. 
III. Limitations and future research 
 
 First, although the dissertation examines the strategy at the level of the primary 
product class, it also points to the importance of firm factors giving pointers to the 
possible differences in strategies related to complements. Specifically, since the study 
examines the governance decisions over a long time period, it is likely that firms have 
adopted different strategies along the time period. Thus, although firms such as IBM, HP 
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and Dell are in the same product market, firm competences and weaknesses are likely to 
influence the nature of the decisions, relating to complements. Most of the large firms 
have moved away from vertical integration to outsourcing in relation to component 
development, few works have examined the structure of the industry and firm strategies 
with respect to complementary products.  The data suggests that IBM pursued a strategy 
of internalization in the first decade of the study period (1980-1990), with a mix of 
complementor-make and alliances in the second decade of the study period (1990-2000) 
and fewer appearances in the last decade.  In this direction, comparing the resource 
profiles of the firms over the longitudinal time frame may give insights into differences in 
strategies pursued. 
 Second, since the dissertation is focused on identifying strategies from a primary 
product firm’s perspective, it does not take into account the non specific complementor 
product introductions.  The substantial number of these product introductions, is 
suggestive of a complementor firm strategy. Recent research provides some evidence of 
the antecedents of such a strategy (Kude, Dibbern & Heinzl, 2012). Since platform 
dominance involves competition and collaboration among the different primary firms and 
complementors (Gawer & Cusumano, 2002; Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1996; Yoffie & 
Clark, 2006), future research could examine decisions from a complementor’s 
perspective. 
 Third, some methodological limitations are also likely to explain the nature of the 
findings viz., 
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 i) The sample consists of 307 observations. Limitations of the software program 
in terms of the number of parsers that can be included to correctly identify the exact 
match between primary product and complementary product, in the context of a primary 
product firm involvement limits the ability to capture all relevant announcements. 
Increasing the robustness of the software program to process more complex textual 
parsers would allow a greater number of announcements to be captured and hence 
increase the accuracy of the findings. 
 ii) The nature of the primary product market: This study is limited to the PC 
product market. Although the setting is ideal for the variation in type of complementarity, 
and the variation in environmental contingences, the complementor strategies of two 
important complements – viz., microprocessor and operating system have tended to 
dominate the nature of strategies of all other players in the PC ecosystem. Examining the 
hypothesis in other high technology product markets is needed for improving the validity 
of the study findings. 
 iii) Inclusion of other primary product firms: This study includes only public, US 
based firms. Several primary product firms in the last decade (2000-2010) include firms 
that are headquartered in China, Taiwan, Japan & South Korea. Firms such as Toshiba, 
Sony, Acer and Samsung are on the one hand highly diversified, yet have contributed 
significantly to the nature of both primary and complementary product development. 
Moreover, the study considers only those firms that have survived the different events in 
the PC industry. Inclusion of both private firms and diversified non US firms may give 
different results. 
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 iv) The sample includes only hardware product complements. Several 
complements are software complements and future research could examine the 
antecedents of a primary firm involving these complementors to get a complete picture of 
a primary firm’s strategy towards complementors. The features of software raises issues 
such as appropriability involving patenting and licensing aspects (Arora & Ceccagnoli, 
2006; MacCormack & Iansiti, 2009), product design aspects such as modularity 
(Nambisan, 2002) and complementary capabilities, viz., software production and 
deployment.  
 Finally, this dissertation has attempted to examine one aspect of a primary 
product firm’s strategy towards complementors. Several other factors govern the 
evolution of a technological system. For instance, research examines how the market 
perception of a complement, viz., and “superstar software” strongly influences the sales 
of a primary product (Binken & Stremerche, 2009). Second, differences in retail strategy 
such as promotions and pricing influence the consumer’s purchase choices among 
competing complementary product pairs (Lam & Mukherjee, 2005). 
IV. Implications 
 
From a theoretical perspective, the findings contribute the broader discussion of the role 
of transaction cost mechanisms, firm capabilities and inter organizational relationships in 
dealing with complementary products.  First, the significance of firm capabilities 
suggests that firm specific factors, related to complementary products are an alternative 
explanation for the choice of a governance strategy. Since system based capabilities 
provide a competitive edge against rivals, incumbents are likely to build a portfolio of 
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patents and modules that are closely related and in turn, are likely to opt for 
internalization to build a set of value chain competences in the technological system.  
Second, the significance of alliances suggests that coordination is a relevant decision 
making factor when choosing a complement strategy.  The role of coordination 
mechanisms may be further examined by considering how equity involvement is related 
to the types of activities governed in the alliance (Gulati & Singh, 1998).     
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      Table 4:  Definitions of complementary products 
No. 
Definition Literature 
Origin 
Categorization Citation 
1 
Complements are goods that “go together” such as coffee and cream, fish and 
chips, or brandy and cigars. Two goods xi and xj  are said to be gross 
complements if δ xi/ δ pj  < 0, i.e. they are gross  complements if a rise in the 
price of one good causes less of the other good to be purchased. The “gross” 
definition includes both inc income and substitution effects that arise from 
price changes.  
Economics Sales 
interdependence 
Walter Nicholson, 
2005 
2 
Product complements are products that are used  in  conjunction with  one  
another to satisfy  some particular need  
Marketing Usage 
interdependence 
Walters, 1991 
3 
Complementary product is one that enhances the value of a focal product when 
the two are used together by end users 
 
We distinguish between components and supplies on the one hand and value-
adding complementary products, on the other hand. Without all the 
components and supplies the primary product cannot function and has no value 
to an end-user. Complementary products add value to the primary product 
beyond the basic functionality provided by the components and supplies 
Marketing Usage 
interdependence,  
Functional  
interdependence 
Sengupta, 1998  
4 
A complementary product is one that enhances the value of a focal product 
when the two are used together  
Marketing Usage 
interdependence 
Nambisan, 2002 
5 
Complementary products are those for which a  consumer’s utility derived 
from using both the goods together is  greater than the sum of the utilities that 
the consumer would have derived by using them separately 
Marketing Usage 
interdependence 
Bhaskaran & 
Gilbert, 2005 
6 
We  use  the  term  “complementor”  in  the  sense  defined  by  Brandenburger  
and Nalebuff (1997), as a short-hand for “the developer of a complementary 
product” where two products are complements if greater sales of one increase 
demand for the other.  Formally, A and B are complements if the valuation by 
consumers of A and B together is greater than the sum of the valuation of A 
alone and of B alone. Va+b = (1 + δ) (Va + Vb), δ > 0. 
Economics, 
Management 
Sales 
interdependence, 
Usage 
interdependence 
Gawer & 
Henderson, 2005 
7 
Complementary products are those products needed to maximize the utility of 
the core product 
Management Usage 
interdependence 
Gallagher & Park, 
2002  
8 
A complement to one product or service is any other product or service that 
makes the first one more attractive. 
A player is your complementor if customers value your product more when 
they have the other player’s product than when they have your product alone.  
Economics Usage 
interdependence 
Brandenburger & 
Nalebuff, 1997 
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   Table 4 (continued) 
9 
We define  substitutability  and  complementarity  from the firms' point of 
view  by referring to the sign of the cross-price elasticity of demand.  If it is 
positive, products are substitutes; in the opposite case they are complements. 
 
Marketing Sales 
interdependence 
Sarvary & Parker, 
1999 
10 
Systems are composed of complementary and functionally interdependent 
products, such as hardware and software  
 Marketing  Functional 
interdependence 
 Binken  & 
Stremersch, 2009 
11 
Many multiproduct firms sell systems - lines of products (components), where 
each good cannot, or usually is not, used separately but might still be 
purchased separately. Components are complements 
Economics  Usage 
interdependence 
Matutes & 
Regibeau, 1988 
12 
A number of strongly complementary components are used together in a 
system to provide consumer benefits;Components A & B are valuable only 
when used together; there are independent suppliers of A & B (A may supply 
B as well) 
Economics  Usage 
interdependence 
Farrell & Katz, 2000 
13 
As viewed by customers, high-technology ‘products’ are often systems. These 
systems consist of interdependent components resting on ‘platforms’. There is 
strong functional interdependence amongst components of the system. 
Complements often sit on top of what might be thought of as ‘platforms’, 
which are managed by an incumbent enterprise  
Management Functional 
interdependence 
Evans et al., 2006. 
14 
Model: One of the two firms develops a complementary product, that when 
used with the homogeneous basic product produced by both firms in the 
model, results in an enhanced, higher quality product XE. Speciﬁcally, one 
unit of the enhanced product XE consists of one unit of the basic product XB 
plus one unit of the innovation y.  
Complementary product/service maybe sold as an add-on/upgrade to the main 
product 
Management Usage 
interdependence 
Costa & 
Dierickx,2005 
15 
Perfect (strict) symmetric complementarity: Consumers cannot get any utility 
from one product  unless they use both 
 
Asymmetric complementarity: The relationship between the basic product and 
the CP is such that a basic product provides its own functions , but an add-on 
product is useful only if consumed with the basic product 
Economics Usage 
interdependence,  
Functional 
interdependence 
  
Cheng & Nahm, 
2010  
16 
Complementarities  are  present  whenever  having a  bundle  of  goods  
together  provides  more  value than the total value of having each of the goods 
separately 
Management Usage 
interdependence,  
Functional 
interdependence 
Amit & Zott, 2001 
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  Table 4 (continued) 
17 
The  outputs  of  upstream  suppliers  serve  as  inputs  to the  focal  actor.  We  
refer  to  such  inputs,  which are  bundled  by  the  focal  actor  into  its  product, as  
components. A customer may also 
need  to  bundle  other  offers  alongside  the  focal actor’s product in order to 
utilize it. We refer to such offers, which are bundled downstream by the customer, 
as complements. Thus, components and complements are defined according to 
where elements are bundled in the flow of activities relative 
 Usage 
interdependence 
Adner & Kapoor, 
2010 
18 
Complementary products are those products (or services) that experience a sales 
increase when related products experience an increase in support. 
 
Products that are used together or purchased together and serve related needs are 
complements 
Marketing/ 
Economics 
Sales 
interdependence 
Guiltinan, Gordon 
& Madden, 1997 
19 
“complementary products”  refer  to  unfinished  goods  that  are  inputs  to  the  
same  assembly sector. 
 Management Functional 
interdependence 
 Carr & 
Karmarkar, 2005 
20 
Products that depend entirely on the availability of another product are called 
contingent products ; 
In the  contingent  diffusion  model, the  purchase  of one  product  (the "contingent 
product") is conditional  on  the  prior purchase  of  another  product  (the  "primary 
product"). 
Marketing Functional 
interdependence 
Peterson & 
Mahajan, 1978 
21 
Indirect network effects arise when the benefit of using a good increases with the 
use of a complementary set of compatible goods. 
Marketing,  
Economics 
Usage Nair, Dube, 
Chintagunta,  
2004 
22 
Consumption benefits rise in markets  where a large customer network leads to 
increases in complementary goods and services, which in turn leads to increased 
consumer utility (Farrell & Saloner, 1985; Katz & Shapiro, 1985) 
Management Usage Shankar & Bayus, 
2003 
23 
The greater the availability of complementary  products  (the "software"), the more 
attractive  the  capital  good  (the  "hardware") for  consumers (based on Church & 
Gandal, 1992) 
Marketing Usage Gupta, Jain & 
Sawhney, 1999 
24 
We say that A  and B  are complements if Va+ b  = 1+δ  (Va+ Vb ),  δ>0 . If  δ< 
0, then A and B are substitutes.  When the complementarity is not symmetric:  Va+ b  
= (Va+ Vb ) if the two goods are purchased together, but  Vb = 0 if  good B is 
purchased alone 
Economics Usage Nalebuff, 2004 
25 
The  greater  the  variety  of  compatible complementary    goods,   the  "software,"  
the  greater  the  value  of  the  services rendered   by  the  capital   good,   the  
"hardware,"  and  hence   the  greater   the willingness   of  a  consumer   to  pay  
for  the  hardware  good. 
Economics Usage Church & Gandal, 
1992 
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    Table 4 (continued) 
26 
Two software products are defined to be complementary when changes in the 
activity levels of one of the products (e.g., sales, functionality & ease of use) affect 
marginal returns to changes in the activity levels of the other software product as 
well   
Management Sales 
interdependence, 
Functional 
interdependence, 
Usage 
Lee, Venkatraman et 
al., 2010 
27 
We define product level complementarity as the relative distance of two products 
within a layered software stack model 
Management Functional/ 
Technological 
interdependence 
Kude et al, 2012 
28 
Complementary inputs are consumed are purchased and consumed at the same time 
as the focal good 
Management Usage Fabrizio & Hawn, 
2013,  
29 
With strict complementary products,  a consumer derives positive utility only when 
both products are used together  
Marketing Usage Yalcin, et al, 2013 
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       Table 5: Asset specificity in TCE  
Type Definition Examples Source of transaction 
costs 
Physical 
asset 
specificity 
The manufacturer and supplier/distributor 
make investment in plant and machinery 
dedicated to producing or selling the products 
of the firm(s) 
1.Component maker invests in specialized component 
manufacturing & tooling equipment  (Monteverde, 1995; 
Klein, 1991) 
2.Distributors invest in facilities or train sales employees 
specifically for a particular product (Heide & John, 1988) 
 
Use in alternative 
transactions requires 
significant retooling or 
adaptation 
Site 
specificity 
firms or production plants/distribution 
channels/inventory storage maybe located in 
close proximity  to minimize costs of 
transportation.  
 
The importance of locating upstream 
operations in proximity to subsequent stages 
of the manufacturing process (Masten, 
Meehan & Snyder,1989) 
Mine-mouth coal generating plant (Joskow, 1985) Immobility of the asset  
Human 
asset 
specificity 
Human capital investments where there is a 
learning-by-doing component (Williamson, 
1983; Joskow, 1985) or product development 
requirements unstructured technical dialogue 
(Arrow, 1974; Monteverde, 1995) between the 
firms involved in the design and production or 
production and marketing or any two adjacent 
operations related to the product 
 
 
1.Applications engineering effort in the development of a 
component (Monteverde & Teece, 1982) 
2. face-to-face discussion and unstructured, undocumented 
communication between the product design and production 
engineers in the semiconductor manufacturing 
(Monteverde, 1995) 
3. Customer specific knowledge and product specific 
knowledge when salespeople interact with customers 
(Anderson & Schmittlein, 1985) 
Specific components 
manufacture involve 
greater engineering 
know-how than generic 
components,  
Tacit know how, relation 
specific (such as between 
(manufacturer & supplier 
for a specific component 
or  sales team and 
customers for a specific 
product- related to use, 
features, service, 
installation etc) 
Dedicated 
assets 
Investments made for a particular  customer 
that their release on the market would depress 
the market value of assets (Williamson, 1985) 
Specialized distribution facilities such as refrigeration 
(Hennart, 1988) 
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       Table 6: Opportunism in TCE literature  
  
Opportunistic 
behaviors 
Description Value chain Asset specificity Gains for the 
opportunistic 
firm 
Losses for 
the primary 
product firm 
Example 
Appropriability 
problems  
1.In R & D projects or those 
involving a technology 
component involving 
different firms, contractor 
sells the know-how arising 
from the project to the other 
firm’s product market rivals, 
mainly due to the nature of 
the R & D process and 
difficulty in specifying tacit 
know how components in 
contract (Pisano, 1990; 
Pisano, Russo & Teece, 
1988; Gulati & Singh, 1998) 
2.  Holder of the technology  
may use or modify the 
technology in ways that were 
not intended in the contract 
(Oxley, 1997; Anand & 
Khanna, 1997) 
Product 
design/Techn
ology 
development 
Human asset 
specificity 
Profit gain 
from 
sale/appropriat
ion of IP 
Loss from 
proprietary 
technology, 
Imitation  
1.In the 1960s, RCA 
licensed its color television 
technology to Japanese 
companies, they reversed 
engineered the technology 
and entered the US market 
 
Shirking With-holding expected  or 
committed efforts (Wathne & 
Heide, 2000) 
 
Poor quality of resources in 
the production 
 
Delay in schedules (Masten, 
2000) 
Production 
 
Physical assets 
such as 
production 
equipment, raw 
materials for 
manufacturing;  
Intangible assets 
such as 
production 
know-how 
Cost saving 
from diverting 
the efforts to 
the firm’s 
product line 
 
Delay may be 
an effective 
strategy for 
eliciting price 
concessions 
(Masten, 2000) 
Difficulty of 
arranging an 
alternative at 
short notice , 
especially 
when timing 
is critical 
(Masten, 
2000) 
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       Table 6 (continued) 
 
  
Shirking  Non performance (Klein, 
1996),   (Wathne & Heide, 
2000) primarily       
1)contract does not specify it  
2)not monitored 
3)Could  involves 
misrepresentation of  skills 
4)Delivery of inferior 
product/technology (Oxley, 
1997) 
Marketing May or not be 
involved, 
although the 
problem is 
serious if  asset 
specific 
investments are 
involved 
Cost saving, 
Sort term 
improvement 
in profits 
1.Customer 
dissatisfactio
n, if product 
quality is 
compromised 
2. Costs 
incurred by 
the primary 
product 
firm/manufac
turer  if 
shirking on 
internal, 
unobservable 
aspects (such 
as production, 
marketing) 
that are 
specialized to 
the exchange 
1.Retailers withhold the 
display of promotional 
materials, but take 
allowances from 
manufacturers (Murray & 
Hiede, 1998) 
2.Shirking on quality 
inputs in franchising 
(Lafontaine, 1992) 
Hold-up Involves appropriation of 
quasi-rents by the trading 
partner,  particularly when 
unanticipated events occur 
(Monteverde, 1995; Wathne 
& Heide, 2000) 
Production Physical asset 
specificity, 
Site specificity 
Profit gain  
that actually 
belonged to 
the other firm 
Loss of 
profits from 
asset specific 
investments 
In the face of increased 
demand, Fisher Body 
adopted a highly inefficient 
production process and 
located its plant far away 
from GM’s assembly plant. 
Ex-ante contractual 
commitment required GM 
to source the component 
from Fisher exclusively for 
10 years (Klein, 1996) 
Product 
Design & 
Production 
Human asset 
specificity 
(between the 
main firm and 
the production 
firm) 
  With the technology 
specifications known to the 
production firm, it can 
begin selling what it has 
been making (Monteverde, 
1995) 
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       Table 6 (continued) 
    Marketing    Taco Bell introduced a 
new food concept which 
led to the appropriation of  
rents from its franchisees 
who introduced a similar 
concept in the first 
place(Wathne & Heide, 
2000) 
Free riding A trading partner acting in a 
manner as to derive the 
benefits without incurring the 
associated costs (Anderson & 
Gatignon, 1986; Anderson & 
Gatignon, 1988) 
Marketing Physical assets 
Dedicated 
assets 
A lesser 
known brand 
or new entrant 
benefits from 
association 
with an 
established 
firm and may 
dilute the 
value of the 
brand  by 
supplying 
lower quality 
products than 
what 
consumers 
associate with 
the brand 
 1. A GM dealer cutting 
service to the bone and 
advertizing new GM cars 
slightly above wholesale 
2. In selling of complex 
products, extensive 
upfront investment in 
educating the consumers is 
needed , so that some 
distributors reduce the 
expenses (Dutta, Heide, 
Bergen, 1999) 
Breaching of 
contract 
violations 
Deviating from clauses 
specified in the contract 
   Higher costs 
to incorporate 
monitoring 
and  
Violation of exclusive 
dealing contracts (Heide, 
Dutta & Bergen, Wathne 
& Heide) 
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        Table 7: Opportunism in the primary product firm – complementor context 
 
 
 
 
  
Opportunism Assets Description Impact Example 
Technology 
appropriability 
Common 
modules, 
proprietary 
knowledge 
assets such as 
patents, 
software 
packages  
If a complementor is licensed to develop 
complementary products through simple 
contract, it may appropriate the 
proprietary technology. It may either 
develop a primary product or incorporate 
the technology in other products that is 
not covered as part of the agreement. 
Proprietary primary product information 
may also be inadvertently leaked to a 
complementary product design engineer 
during joint product development, which 
may be required when complement 
interfaces and product functionality 
boundaries have not yet clearly evolved.   
In early stages of the technology 
battle, when there are several 
competing technologies, 
appropriability regime is weak 
and threat of imitation is high, it 
can lead to loss of market share, 
technology lock out or primary 
product failing to emerge as the 
winner in technology battles  
Lotus Inc did not honor a licensing 
agreement with Verity Inc , a 
complementor for sharing Verity’s 
products such as-  its “concept-
based-retrieval add-on” , a text 
retrieval module to some of Lotus’ 
products and “topic agent” – an 
electronic information locator on a 
Lotus Notes Network (1992,1995). 
Apparently, Lotus Inc deployed 
Verity’s products in several its 
other products not covered within 
the scope of the agreement (1998).  
Source- Business Wire News 
Announcements. Lexis Nexis 
Academic 
Shirking/  
hold-up 
 
Interdependent 
functions  
i. With holding of information related to 
product development  
ii. Delays in product introduction: A 
complementor may not share the 
incentives of a primary product firm to 
introduce a new complement to support 
a new primary product 
introduction/innovation (Bucklin & 
Sengupta, 1993). 
Product failure, 
Delays in introduction of a 
complement impact the size of 
the primary product firm’s 
installed base, detrimental to 
primary product adoption/market 
growth in markets with strong 
indirect network effects.  
Poor quality games developed for 
Atari’s game console, led to 
insufficient time for Atari to make 
market entry for the new versions 
of its console  
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       Table 7 (continued) 
Free-riding  In high technological environments, 
continuous product upgrades are 
required to reinforce the installed base 
and to add new consumers.  For a 
primary product upgrade to be 
successful the must-have component or 
symmetric complementor likely requires 
similar product or interface changes.  
This creates a potential for hold-up 
problems, particularly when there is a 
misalignment of incentives due to one of 
the parties being at an advantage. The 
opportunism manifests as  
bargaining for improvement of product 
pricing, refusal  or intentional delays in 
committing to product development 
decisions 
Simple contracts or markets 
option, where the complementor 
makes the products and pays a 
royalty fee to the primary 
product opens the possibility of 
bargaining, that come to the 
forefront when product upgrades 
or pricing requires coordination 
among the firms.  Such 
bargaining is costly 
(Williamson, 1991), as there are 
no clear guidelines for profit 
sharing 
Microsoft benefits from existing 
installed base of users, while Intel 
derives its profits primarily from 
releasing new product versions. 
However, the firm cannot release 
the upgrades without 
corresponding changes in the 
operating system. Thus Intel loses 
profits on potential innovations 
were it not locked in with 
Microsoft because of the dedicated 
installed base of users, which is a 
form of asset specific investment 
(Casadesus-Masanell & Yoffie, 
2006) 
Free-riding reputation/ 
brand 
Compromising on product quality: 
When the efforts of the complementor 
cannot be monitored, it may release 
complements that are not reliable or fail 
to comply to the quality standards of the 
primary product firm: Complementors 
may intend to free ride on the reputation 
of the primary product firm and 
introduce complements with less reliable 
performance, saving on costs. 
Loss of reputation and market 
share for the primary product 
firm, critical when the 
complement is relevant to the 
success of the primary product 
and there are only a few 
complementors producing it 
Eastman Kodak Company had to 
voluntarily recall 120,000 AC 
adapters that were sold for use with 
certain Kodak digital cameras 
(1999) because the batteries in the 
camera overheated when the 
connector plug of the AC adapter 
was not properly inserted into the 
camera. They were made by an 
independent complementor and 
sold separately as optional 
accessories, however were 
authorized for use by Kodak. 
Kodak incurred significant 
expenses on account of this 
complement interface malfunction 
in the form of adapter replacement 
charges and recalls in electronic, 
computer, camera stores and web 
retailers.   
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        Table 8:  Governance structures in TCE       
Context  Hazards (of 
markets/contracting) 
Governance 
form in Market 
Hierarchy 
Continuum 
Governance 
attributes 
Mechanisms 
  
Degree of 
control 
Applicability to 
Type of 
Complementarit
y 
Technology 
development 
 
Weak 
Appropriability 
regime (Teece, 
1986) 
 
 
1.Leakage Full ownership   Highest Symmetric 
complements 
 
When: In the 
early stages of 
product evolution, 
typically before 
dominant design 
Technology 
development/transf
er transactions 
(major technology 
updates such as 
generational 
innovation) 
1.Level of 
difficulty involved 
in transferring tacit 
know-how  that 
determines extent 
of intimate 
personal contact, 
teaching, 
demonstration and 
participation, 
prolonged 
collocation of 
participants 
(Polanyi, 1962; 
Kogut, 1988) 
When contracts are incomplete 
because of gaps in specification, 
moral hazard risks are high from 
both partners.  
1. It may later find a better 
partner and so deliver an inferior 
product/technology to its partner 
than promised in the original 
document.  
2. The complementor  may use or 
modify the technology in ways 
that were not intended in the 
contract and  which may hurt the  
other firm’s profitability (Oxley, 
1997; Anand & Khanna, 1997) 
 
Joint Ventures 
1.creation of 
separate 
entity, where 
each partner 
owns a 
portion of the 
equity 
2.a distinct 
hierarchy of 
managers  
Incentive 
alignment: 
mutual hostage 
by shared 
equity 
 
Command 
structure and 
authority 
system:  a 
distinct 
hierarchy of 
managers 
 
Exchange of 
resources: 
autonomous 
entity 
  
High Symmetric 
complements 
 
When: In the 
early stages of 
product evolution, 
typically before 
dominant design 
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  Table 8 (continued) 
1. Involvement of a 
technology 
component (such as 
technology 
upgrades/exchanges) 
2. Technological 
interdependence 
requires 
collaboration 
3. there could be a 
divergence in 
interests 
4.Involvement of 
transaction specific 
assets 
5. Firm lacks the 
capabilities to 
develop the 
technology itself 
(due to difference in 
technologies, 
industries) 
6. Emerging 
technologies 
(Nichols-Nixon & 
Woo, 2003) 
 Minority equity 
agreements (Pisano, 
1989; Gulati & 
Singh, 1998; Teece, 
1986; Steensma & 
Corley, 2000; 
Nichols-Nixon & 
Woo, 2003) 
1.One partner takes a 
minority equity 
position in the other 
(less that 50%) 
2. investing partner 
joins the board of 
directors of the partner 
that received the 
investment (control & 
authority, dispute 
resolution through 
board member 
intervention) 
3.concern for value of 
equity (incentives for 
investor) 
4. regular information 
exchange & decision 
sanctioning through 
board (in place of 
SOPs) 
 
Incentive 
alignment: 
mutual hostage 
by shared 
equity 
 
Command 
structure and 
authority 
system:  a 
distinct 
hierarchy of 
managers 
 
Control of 
resources: 
autonomous 
entity 
 
Moderate After the emergence 
of dominant design: 
Asymmetric 
complementary 
product 
development 
 
Interoperability 
collaboration with 
symmetric 
complementor for 
primary product 
upgrades 
New technology 
development ,  
there is less know-
how related to its 
application, making 
contract 
specification 
incomplete 
ex post contract 
disturbances are not 
expected to be too severe 
 
defection is likely in the 
event of highly 
consequential 
disturbances, leading to 
the problem of dispute 
resolution in court 
Bilateral contract 
Examples: cross-
license, technology 
sharing agreement, 
joint research 
agreements, 
exclusive 
agreements 
 Mutual 
hostage by 
way of  
commitment 
of technology 
on both sides 
or exclusivity 
Moderate-
low 
After the emergence 
of  dominant design:  
Asymmetric product 
development,  
Symmetric 
complementary 
product 
development 
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   Table 8 (continued) 
Age of 
technology: 
“Routine” 
technology 
transfer – both 
partners share 
information 
about the 
application of 
the technology 
making contract 
specification 
relatively 
detailed 
 Unilateral contract 
Examples: unilateral 
licensing 
agreements, 
long-term  supply, 
distribution 
agreements,  
 contracts,  R&D 
contracts 
1. Similar to arms’ 
length market 
exchanges 
2.No shared ownership 
or administrative 
structure 
3. Almost no 
command structures, 
authority systems, 
incentive systems, 
SOPs, dispute 
resolution procedures, 
pricing systems- i.e. 
members of the 
partner firms work 
directly from their 
own organizational 
confines 
4. New decisions are 
jointly negotiated 
Markets and 
prices 
Lowest After the emergence 
of dominant design 
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            Table 9: Pair wise correlations between study variables 
  
  Mean S.D. Min Max (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
TypeCmp(1) 0.365 0.482 0 1 1                     
Age(2) 34.3 25.21 0 91 0.039 1                   
          (0.501)                     
Size(3) 4.392 0.867 1.146 5.608 -0.001 0.797*** 1                 
          (0.982) 0                   
CapInten(4) 0.062 0.031 0.011 0.265 0.068 0.331** 0.311* 1               
          (0.238) 0 0                 
R&Dinten 
(5) 0.062 0.027 0.015 0.255 0.153* 0.11** -0.013 0.081 1             
          (0.007) (0.053) (0.825) (0.158)               
TechCap(6) 4282.645 6867 1 35228 0.022 0.717*** 0.569* 0.304* -0.084 1           
          (0.696) 0 0 0 (0.14)             
AlliExp(7) 149.013 192.1 1 1400 0.007 0.655* 0.534* 0.21* -0.054 0.889* 1         
          (0.903) 0 0 0 (0.346) 0           
TechU(8) 0.265 0.061 0.12 0.331 0.075 -0.031 -0.09 -0.054 0.238** 0.31** 
-
0.272* 1       
          (0.191) (0.584) (0.114) (0.342) 0 0 0         
MktU(9) 0.027 0.016 0.011 0. 058 -0.009 -0.011 -0.021 0.296* -0.112* 0.112* 0.075 -0.262* 1     
          (0.881) (0.848) (0.717) 0 (0.05) (0.049) (0.192) 0       
Strtgy(10) 0.909 0.807 0 2 -0.015 0.089 0.061 0.054 0.004 0.143* 0.065 0.124** -0.005 1   
          (0.794) (0.121) (0.285) (0.343) (0.939) (0.012) (0.257) (0.029) (0.925)     
Ind(11) 0.945 0.229 0 1 -0.024 0.025 -0.047 0.091 -0.016 0.072 0.058 -0.035 0.057 -0.027 1 
          (0.68) (0.663) (0.412) (0.111) (0.78) (0.208) (0.308) (0.546) (0.322) (0.633)   
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                      Table 10: Multinomial logit results – full sample, all governance choices.The likelihood of  a) alliance vs. complementor make   
                                                             b) VI vs. buy 
 
 
 
  
  Model1 Model2 
Model3: with repeat strategy 
dumies 
Model4: with repeat 
strategy dumies 
 
a: Alliance b:Internalize a:Alliance b:Internalize a:Alliance b:Internalize a:Alliance b:Internalize 
Type of 
complement -0.411 -0.123 -0.411 -0.123 -0.411 -0.123 -0.411 -0.123 
 
(1.721) (1.760) (1.834) (1.623) (1.781) (1.780) (1.755) (1.781) 
Firm age -0.0117 -0.0139 -0.0117 -0.0139 -0.0117 -0.0139 -0.0117 -0.0139 
 
(0.0151) (0.0168) (0.0215) (0.0138) (0.0123) (0.0166) (0.0123) (0.0166) 
Firm size 0.0556 0.0845 0.0556 0.0845 0.0556 0.0845 0.0556 0.0845 
 
(0.321) (0.323) (0.451) (0.420) (0.267) (0.340) (0.267) (0.340) 
Firm CapIntensity -4.782 0.132 -4.782 0.132 -4.782 0.132 -4.782 0.132 
 
(5.636) (5.407) (8.223) (5.492) (4.984) (4.644) (4.882) (4.642) 
Firm R&Dintensity  5.128 -0.371 5.128 -0.371 5.128 -0.371 5.128 -0.371 
 
(5.506) (8.054) (6.594) (9.089) (7.177) (8.172) (7.205) (8.170) 
FirmTechCapability 0.000205*** 0.000218*** 0.000205** 0.000218*** 0.000205*** 0.000218*** 0.000205*** 0.000218*** 
 
(6.73e-05) (6.40e-05) (8.33e-05) (7.83e-05) (5.28e-05) (6.11e-05) (5.28e-05) (6.11e-05) 
Firm AllianceExp 0.00350* -0.00412** 0.00350 -0.00412* 0.00350* -0.00412* 0.00350* -0.00412* 
 
(0.00208) (0.00194) (0.00233) (0.00227) (0.00202) (0.00242) (0.00205) (0.00243) 
TechUncertainty 10.77*** 8.069** 10.77*** 8.069 10.77*** 8.069** 10.77*** 8.069** 
 
(3.269) (3.878) (3.211) (4.941) (3.294) (4.016) (3.299) (4.016) 
MktUncertainty 4.164 2.796 4.164 2.796 4.164 2.796 4.164 2.796 
 
(12.53) (12.95) (11.91) (12.61) (9.035) (13.43) (9.029) (13.43) 
typeXtechU 1.662 -0.267 1.662 -0.267 1.662 -0.267 1.662 -0.267 
 
(5.504) (5.562) (4.980) (5.387) (5.678) (5.726) (5.648) (5.733) 
typeXmktU -0.584 -0.941 -0.584 -0.941 -0.584 -0.941 -0.584 -0.941 
 
(18.26) (20.87) (22.51) (18.98) (15.92) (20.96) (14.72) (20.94) 
Industry -1.042 -0.437 -1.042 -0.437 -1.042 -0.437 -1.042 -0.437 
 
(0.680) (0.763) (0.696) (0.711) (0.640) (0.634) (0.640) (0.634) 
fm_ad1 (repeat alliance, repeat prd pair) 
    
-1.268 -1.221 
       
(2.245) (1.439) 
fm_ad2(repeat alliance, firm) 
     
72.91*** -1.443 
       
(14.86) (0.967) 
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  Table 10 (continued) 
 
  
fm_i3 (repeat internalize) 
     
2.516* 40.46 
      
(1.366) (0) 
Constant -2.269 -2.134 -2.269 -2.134 -2.269 -2.134 -2.269 -2.134 
 (1.758) (1.923) (1.728) (2.272) (1.660) (2.029) (1.660) (2.030) 
Observations 307 307 307 307 307 307 307 307 
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  Table 11: Multinomial logit regression results for different levels of technological uncertainty 
 Technological Uncertainty=low Technological Uncertainty=moderate 
  base strategy=0 base strategy=2 base strategy=1 base strategy =0 base strategy =1 base strategy =2 
Predicted 
strategy 
1 2 0 1 0 2 1 2 0 2 
0 1 
Type of comp  0.95 0.4* 5.4 6.71** 0.811 0.148** 1.811 6.976** 0.552 3.85*** 
0.14** 
0.26**
* 
  (0.454) (0.218) (7.637) (6.281) (0.635) (0.138) (1.406) (6.671) (0.429) (1.979) (0.137) (0.1) 
Market Unc 2.3e+63*** 6.49E+36    0 0 6.3e+12 1.1e+27 0 1.8e+14 0 0 
  (1.12E+65) (4.8E+38)    (0) (0) (4.9e+14) (7.8e+28) (0) (1.414e+16
) (0) (0) 
Firm size 0.821 1.316 1.052 0.768 1.370 1.302 3.169* 1.874 0.316* 0.591 0.534 1.692 
  -0.389 -0.864 (1.183) (0.704) (1.322) (1.194) (1.898) (1.327) (0.189) (0.396) (0.378) (1.134) 
Firm age 1.01 0.988 1.027 0.901 1.140 1.110 0.963 0.952 1.038 0.988 1.051 1.012 
  -0.0326 -0.0418 (0.04) (0.088) (0.0961) (0.109) (0.0366) (0.0410) (0.0394) (0.0355) (0.0453) (0.036) 
Firm Cap 
Intensity 
0*** 0** 0*** 6.2e+07 0*** 1.6e-08 2.3e+06 3.347e+11 4.26e-07 142,472 
2.7e-05 1,717 
  0 0 (0) (2.1e+09) (0) (5.4e-07) (6.8e+07) (8.483e+12
) 
(1.24e-05) (3.608e+06
) (0.0005) (24,75) 
Firm R&D 
Intensity 
6.705e+30* 4.07E+23 1.8e+89*** 0 3.23e+11
4* 
1.80e+25 6.3e+07 37,128 1.57e-08 0.000582 
0 7.2e-06 
  -2.596E+32 -2.1E+25 (8.56e+90) (0) (3.3e+116
) 
(1.7e+27) (1.39e+09
) 
(604,997) (3.43e-07) (0.00840) 
(7.5e-11) (0.002) 
Firm 
TechCapability 
1.000* 1.000** 0.999*** 1.000 0.99*** 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
1.000 1.000 
  -0.00015 -0.00012 (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.00028) (0.0003) (0.00042) (0.000356) (0.000402
) 
(0.000257) 
(0.0004) (0.003) 
AllianceExp 0.998 0.997       0.986 0.990 1.014 1.005 1.010 0.995 
  (0.006) (0.004)       (0.0116) (0.00974) (0.0120) (0.00696) (0.0093) (0.007) 
rdixmktu 0*** 0 *** 0 ***   0 0  0                   1.1E+163 
             (8.81E+163) 
   0 0  (0)    (0) (0)     
Industry -1.042 -0.437 -1.142 -0.437 -1.042 -0.437 -1.002 -0.437 -1.032 
 
-1.011           -0.4 
  (0.680) (0.763) (0.680) (0.763) (0.680) (0.763) (0.680) (0.763) (0.680) (0.763) 
Constant 0.522 0.0751 0*** 0*** 1.5e+17** 1.4e+33* 0.01 0.0248 65.20  40.2           0.618 
  -1.486 -0.288 (0) (0) (1.1e+18) (1.2e+34) (0.05) (0.05) (229.0) (5.519)  
Observations 84 84 84 84 84 84 120 120 120 120 120 120 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1         
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  Table 12: Multinomial logit regression for different levels of market demand uncertainty 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
   
  
  Market uncertainty=lo Market uncertainty=moderate Market uncertainty=hi 
  base strategy =0 base strategy =0 base strategy  =1 base strategy =2 base strategy =0 
Predicted 
strategy 
1 2 
1 2 0 2 0 1 
1 2 
Type of 
Complement 
0.732 1.087 
1.377 0.546* 0.726 0.396** 1.832* 2.524** 
1.099 0.924 
  (0.409) (0.501) (0.632) (0.199) (0.333) (0.184) (0.670) (1.171) (0.783) (0.782) 
Firm age 1.090** 1.123*** 0.982 1.011 1.018 1.030*** 0.989 0.971*** 1.007 0.963*** 
  (0.0445) (0.0321) (0.0135) (0.0119) (0.0139) (0.0108) (0.0116) (0.0102) (0.0196) (0.0128) 
Firm size 0.821 1.316 1.052 0.768 1.370 1.302 0.534 1.692 1.052 0.768 
 
-0.389 -0.864 (1.183) (0.704) (1.322) (1.194) (0.378) (1.134) (1.183) (0.704) 
Firm 
CapIntensity 
5.489e+22** 4.581e+34*** 
1.00e-10 5.88e-11* 9.986e+09 0.587 1.700e+10* 1.703 
0.00102 0.824 
  (1.237e+24) (7.914e+35) (1.53e-09) (7.17e-10) (1.521e+11) (9.724) (2.072e+11) (28.18) (0.00809) (3.743) 
Firm R&D 
Intensity 
3.30e-10* 0*** 
67,271 947.0 1.49e-05 0.0141 0.00106 71.04 
3.80e-06 2.24e-07 
  (4.30e-09) (0) (514,305) (6,638) (0.000114) (0.0653) (0.00740) (329.4) (4.73e-05) (4.51e-06) 
Firm 
TechCapability 
1.000 0.999** 
1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000 1.000*** 1.000 
1.000 1.000** 
  (0.000501) (0.000237) (0.000113) (0.000105) (0.000113) (0.000113) (0.000105) (0.000113) (0.000103) (9.64e-05) 
Tech 
Uncertainty 
1,222 49.80 
1.093e+07*** 116.3* 9.15e-08*** 
1.06e-
05*** 0.00860* 93,997*** 
1.280e+06** 91,048* 
  (9,746) (572.4) (5.529e+07) (333.9) (4.63e-07) (3.99e-05) (0.0247) (352,584) (7.400e+06) (593,742) 
Firm 
AllianceExp 
0.992 1.003 
0.986*** 0.984** 1.014*** 0.997 1.016** 1.003 
1.004 1.000 
  (0.0140) (0.00888) (0.00463) (0.00728) (0.00476) (0.00661) (0.00752) (0.00665) (0.00291) (0.00221) 
  0.0273 0.0209 (0) (0.724) (1.939e+09) (0) (2.763) (0) 0.0292 0.101 
Industry -1.002 -0.437 -1.042 -0.437 -1.142 -0.437 -1.002 -0.437 -1.042 -1.002 
 
(0.680) (0.763) (0.680) (0.763) (0.680) (0.763) (0.680) (0.763) (0.680) (0.680) 
Constant (0.0795) (0.0879) 0.0354* 1.397 28.25* 39.45*** 0.716 0.0253*** (0.0656) (0.204) 
      (0.0717) (1.789) (57.25) (55.84) (0.917) (0.0359)     
Observations 93 93 110 110 110 110 110 110 104 104 
           
Robust standard errors in parenthesis: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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  Table 13: Logit Pooled Regressions results: a) alliance vs. complementor make b) internalize vs. complementor make  
  c) alliance vs. internalize (rrr).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable 
Model1: alliances vs. 
complementor make Model2 : internalize vs. complementor make Model3: internalize vs. alliance 
Type of 
complement 1.187 0.680 1.352 
  (2.087) (1.099) (2.768) 
Firm age 0.985 0.989 1.001 
  (0.0242) (0.0129) (0.0173) 
Firm size 1.130 0.980 1.006 
  (0.535) (0.442) (0.299) 
Firm CapIntensity 0.0115 2.855 1,278 
  (0.0985) (13.84) (8,362) 
Firm R&Dintensity  149.6 0.254* 0.00825 
  (1,244) (2.501) (0.0418) 
FirmTechCapability 1.000* 1.000*** 1.000 
  (0.000126) (0.00006) (5.23e-05) 
Firm AllianceExp 0.996 0.996** 0.999 
  (0.00376) (0.00176) (0.00107) 
TechUncertainty 8.168*** 2.078*** 0.00998 
  (254,432) (9,709) (0.0422) 
MktUncertainty 499.5 0.0366 0.0327 
  (5,981) (0.469) (0.372) 
typeXtechU 1.052 0.997 0.141 
  (5.130) (5.356) (0.770) 
typeXmktU 0.0132 116.8 0.556 
  (0.313) (2,340) (15.51) 
Industry 0.356 0.628 1.791* 
  (0.262) (0.441) (0.582) 
Constant 0.0666 
 
1.804 
  (0.123) 
 
(3.078) 
Observations 220 202 192 
Robust std errors in parenthesis: *** p<0.01,  ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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              Table 14: Logit panel regression results - Choice of 1) alliance vs. compl make 2) VI vs. compl make 3) alliance vs. VI    
 
  
 
Logit -fixed effects Logit -random effects 
Variable Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 
Type of 
complement 0.8730286 0.2080057 0.721 13.21 0.653 1.076 
  (1.770709) .4315838 (1.627) (45.64) (1.411) (2.332) 
Firm age 0.991 0.999 1.019 0.992 0.990 1.003 
  (0.0158) (0.0146) (0.0160) (0.0269) (0.0141) (0.0132) 
Firm size 1.042 0.852 0.655 1.129 0.887 0.935 
  (0.343) (0.322) (0.235) (0.616) (0.312) (0.288) 
Firm CapIntensity 0.00110 19.76 219,100* 3.39e-06 5.413 13,492 
  (0.00659) (105.0) (1.564e+06) (3.92e-05) (32.65) (88,706) 
Firm R&Dintensity  421.6 10.96 0.00122 16.51 0.131 0.00144 
  (2,881) (75.09) (0.00762) (200.7) (0.969) (0.00853) 
FirmTechCapability 1.000*** 1.000** 1.000 1.000** 1.000*** 1.000 
  (0.000101) (7.52e-05) (6.14e-05) (0.000156) (0.00086) (5.84e-05) 
Firm AllianceExp 0.994** 0.997 1.000 0.994* 0.995* 1.000 
  (0.00282) (0.00224) (0.00183) (0.00406) (0.00243) (0.00174) 
TechUncertainty 3.532* 2.799 0.00214 6.8807*** 1.169* 0.00828 
  (15,498) (1,033) (0.0108) (267340) (4,670) (0.0364) 
MktUncertainty 0.537 0.000795 0.0752 2.510e+09 0.0224 0.00335 
  (8.307) (0.0118) (1.264) (5.565e+10) (0.332) (0.0474) 
typeXtechU 7.326 86.37 0.967  1.092859 1.686 0.286 
  (47.32) (581.7) (6.718) (6.537185) (11.97) (1.925) 
typeXmktU 8.715 1.330e+06 1.192 .0192036 84.29 15.30 
  (195.5) (2.980e+07) (28.03) (0.3917242) (1,933) (329.7) 
Industry 0.854 0.832 1.060 0.403172 0.608 1.567 
  (0.594) (0.668) (0.807) (0.2734) (0.526) (1.080) 
Constant 
     
  
Observations 204 186 174 220 202 192 
Groups 18 17 19 28 77 29 
Robust std errors in  parenthesis       *** p<0.01,  ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 2: Conceptual Model for primary product firm’s governance strategy  
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 Figure 3: Data collection steps 
  Primary product firm selection process: 
i. Download all firms from  Compustat (SIC 3570, 3571) 
ii. All firms from 1980 to 2010 
iii. Non diversified at the start of the entry (in data table) { total revenues 
, <=80%): Rumelt’s criteria 
 
Step 1a:   The pairs of complements - me 
Step1b:   Categorization for type - experts 
Step 1c:   Inter coder agreement 
 309 pairs/312 
Step 2:   The set of all primary product firms  
 
34 firms 
 Complementary product pair categorization process: 
 i. Validation of the definition & distinction between 
symmetric and asymmetric complements (2 ind experts) ii. 
Categorization into three categories according to sorting technique by 
Anderson & Gerbing by 4 experts  iii. 88% agreement for more than 3 
or more coders  on 288/312 pairs,  iv. I provided a definition of the 
complements from the trade manuals the complement pairs where 
there was disagreement and re categorization resulted in inter-rater 
 agreement >91% (309 pairs) 
 
 
Step 3:   All announcements in Lexis Nexis for 
the primary product category: 
17,891 announcements 
   Announcements selection process 
Flow chart below (figure 4) 
 
 
 
Step 4a:   Match the firms and complements 
(firm in header and complement lead para or 
header) 
Step 4b: Code the DV 
Step 4c:  696 data points 
Step 4d:  Filtering for primary product firm 
announcements only: 307 data points for 31 
primary firms, between 1980 & 2010 
  Software programs 
  (4a) :i) Input the validated complement matrix, the set of   
primary product firms into the program1. Execution resulted in  9,672  
announcements. ii. Manual Validation (100  announcements): firm 
announcements not in Compustat are being not captured; there are 
complements  where there is no primary product firm (4299); others were 
not complement related announcements (reliability - 75%). iii. Took all 
firms from the Lexis Nexis itself 230 firms – redid process 4a: resulted in  
13,971 announcements; manual validation : 84% reliability  
 (4b) i) Validate strategy keywords with two industry (business)     
 experts &  two academic experts. ii) Match the primary product 
 firms with the strategy keyword; unmatched set is the 
 complementor make set 
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Search: computer / PC / 
desktop/laptop/ ipad / 
tablet /notebook /netbook/
handheld/Mac/Palmtop/
PalmPC
Newsdb* 16,611,308
RESULTS: no of 
announcements
Step 1 + validated 
complementary product 
keywords
Newsdb937,451
133,917
1
Newsdb
Figure 4: Process model for selection of announcements
2
3
Step 1 + validated 
complementary product 
keywords (headline & lead 
Para)
17,891 Newsdb
SOFTWARE 
PROGRAM
*Lexis Nexis/Factiva
Anywhere in 
text
Step 1 + validated 
complementary product 
keywords(headline & lead 
para)
Business Wire
4
1980-2010
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              APPENDIX 
  
 
 
A. Comparison of primary products for the number of complementary products between different primary product markets 
 
Primary product Symmetric Asymmetric Hardware (non components) Software(non 
components) 
PC (Kottrell & 
Coput, 1998; 
Bresnahan & 
Greestein, 1999; 
Sengupta, 1998; 
Nambisan, 2002; 
Evans et al., 
2006) 
OS, CPU, adapter, monitor, 
motherboard, chips, bus, 
controller, graphics card, 
sound card, clock, RAM, 
keyboard, host adapter, 
sound card, video adapter 
External hard disk, 
printer, scanner,  mouse, 
DVD drive,  
GPS, camera, Bluetooth, 
email, search, games, 
social networking, UPS, 
fan cooler, screen, 
webcamera, docking 
station, cover/case/bag, 
digital camera, modem, 
fax,  USB hub, port 
replicator, video capture 
device, trackball, plug 
add-on controller, 
internet phone/radio/TV 
Monitor, mouse, keyboard, 
printer, flash drive, external hard 
disk, flash drive, speakers, 
headphones, UPS, webcamera, 
docking station, cover/case/bag, 
digital camera, PC lamp, 
microphone, RAM, screen pen, 
USB hub, keyboard vacuum, USB 
cable, videocam, cooling stand, 
locking kit, SSD drive, floppy drive, 
modem, fax, host adapter, video 
card, sound card, heat sink, wrist 
rest , port replicator, video 
capture device, trackball, add-on 
controller, USB based internet 
phone/radio/TV ….. 
Anti virus, disk 
check, printer 
driver, games, 
range of business 
productivity 
software such as 
Word, Excel, 
powerpoint….. 
Video game 
console 
(Clements & 
Ohashi, 2005; 
Dube, Hitsch et 
al., 2010) 
Games, gamebox, 
controller, joystick, 
cartridge/CD,  
Speakers, Controller,  
cartridge, charger, 
gaming headset, gaming 
mouse 
Speakers, Controller,  
cartridge/CD, charger, gaming 
headset, gaming mouse 
Games 
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Television 
(Gupta, Jain, et 
al., 1999) 
TV set, cathode ray tube, 
programming service,   
DVD player, CD player, 
headphones , mounting 
kit, cover, remote 
controller, antenna, 
viewing glasses, video 
capture device 
DVD player, CD player, 
headphones , mounting kit, cover, 
remote controller, antenna, 
viewing glasses, video capture 
device 
programming 
VCR (Cusumano 
& Mylonadis, 
1999) 
VCR box, CDs, movies, 
Television 
Headphones VHS tapes Movies 
Smartphone Handset, service, graphics 
chip, OS,, CPU 
GPS, camera, Bluetooth, 
email, search, games, 
social networking , range 
of application software , 
protector, case, docking 
station, earphones, video 
capture device 
Earphones, adapter, video capture 
device 
Variety of 
application 
software….. 
 
B. Sources for list of complementary products for the computer product category   
 
I. Academic and  manufacturer provided technical and non technical books 
1. IBM Dictionary of Computing 
2. Wilkinson, Barry, 1987. Computer Peripherals, Inc. Upper Saddle River, NJ 
3. Thorne, Julie. 1992. Computer Peripherals.  
4. Stallings, W. 2006. Computer Organization & Architecture – Designing for Performance. Pearson Prentice-Hall, 
Inc 
5. Hennessy, & Patterson, 2006. Computer Architecture: A quantitative approach, Morgan-Kaufman 
6. Grattan, Nick. 2002. Pocket PC, Handheld PC - Developer’s guide. Prentice-Hall, Inc. Upper Saddle River, NJ 
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 II:   Trade Publications (Computer hardware) 
  
  
Trade Journal Website Links Description 
APPLIANCE 
Magazine 
http://www.appliancemag
azine.com/ 
Supplier Solutions 
Market Research 
Whitepaper library 
a premiere electronic industry information source 
Automation 
World 
http://www.automationw
orld.com 
Products 
Networking 
Industrial automation, including latest trends in computer 
networking  
BusinessWee
k 
http://www.businessweek.
com/ 
Technology 
companies & Industry 
 
BYTE http://www.informationw
eek.com/personal-tech/ 
Security 
Mobility 
Big Data 
Tablets 
Wireless technology 
Desktop PCs 
Home Automation 
Gaming  
News, analysis , discussions and expert reviews on product 
releases, product comparisons and analysis of firm 
strategies 
Chip Design 
Magazine 
(FPGA 
Developer e-
Newsletter) 
http://chipdesignmag.com
/ 
 Targeted towards integrated circuit designers, it includes 
news and analysis of product introductions on EDA 
development and tools, chip architecture, test& verification, 
tool interoperability and power regulation 
CNET News http://news.cnet.com/  One of best unbiased reviews of computers, digital 
electronics products delivering the consumer reviews of 
technology products on the Web. 
Communicati
ons Engineer 
 
http://digital-
library.theiet.org/content/j
ournals/ce 
 this magazine provided in-depth coverage in the area of 
communications, including the design, development, 
operations and application of systems for communication 
and information networking 
CRN 
Magazine 
www.crn.com  leading advertising medium for the IT industry targeted 
mainly to computer resellers 
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 Trade publications (continued) 
Computer 
Shopper 
Magazine 
http://www.computershopper.co
m/ 
  Computer buyer’s source for labs-based reviews of 
laptop computers, desktop computers, tablets, and 
related computer products. Provide ratings, 
rankings, and pricing to help find the top computer 
products and best computer deals. 
 Computer 
Technology 
Review 
Magazine 
http://www.wwpi.com/ Data Centers 
Security 
Data Protection 
Data backup 
White Papers 
Covers enterprise storage and networking, 
connectivity, tape and optical media and the 
Internet. 
ComputerWo
rld 
http://www.computerworld.com/ covers a wide range of 
technology topics, 
including software, 
security, operating 
systems, mobile, storage, 
servers and data centers 
leading source of technology news and information 
for IT influencers worldwide for over 40 years, 
having won more than than 100 awards in the past 
five years alone 
Digital Trends www.digitaltrends.com   
Data Storage 
Review 
http://www.storagereview.com/ Consumer reviews 
Enterprise reviews 
offers in-depth news coverage and detailed 
reviews for hard drives, SSDs, NAS units, other 
storage hardware, and software for enterprise and 
consumer markets 
Electronic 
Engineering 
Times 
www.eetimes.com Power Management 
Wireless & Networking 
News source for resource for news, analysis, design 
ideas & solutions, products, education, & engaging 
for the electronic engineering community. 
Handheld 
Computing 
Magazine 
http://hhcmag.com/ Pen computing 
Rugged PCs 
Tablet PC 
Personal Media 
A consumer’s guide to mobile electronics – 
features latest product releases including updated 
features, market forecasts and expert product 
reviews 
IEEE 
Spectrum 
http://spectrum.ieee.org/ Reports 
Archives 
 
Topics: robotics, 
electronics, computing, 
energy, biomedical devices 
A flagship monthly publication of the IEEE, the 
world's largest professional technology association 
exploring future technology trends and the impact 
of those trends on business. 
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 Trade publications (continued) 
Laptop 
Magazine 
http://www.laptopmag.com/ Laptops 
Tablets 
Ultrabooks 
Reviews of latest product releases, pricing of 
mobile computers that benefits consumers and 
small and medium enterprises 
MacWorld http://www.macworld.com/ Macs 
MobileEntertainment 
Review of Apple based product introductions 
Microprocess
or report 
  publication for engineers and other industry 
professionals on microprocessors. The publication 
is accessible only to paying subscribers. 
MIT 
Technology 
review 
http://www.technologyreview.co
m/ 
Magazine – Current 
Issue/Past Issues/Business 
reports 
Targeted towards business leaders and early 
adopters, the news analysis and reviews  covers 
technology areas in various aspects of computing 
and the reports are freely accessible online 
Network 
Computing 
http://www.networkcomputing.c
om/ 
Backup & recovery 
Cloud Storage 
Data Center 
Data protection 
Networking &Mgmt 
Servers & Storage 
Storage & Mgmt 
WAN & App Acceleration 
Wireless 
Focused towards product architecture information 
seekers, it provides expert reviews, analysis and 
blogs on enterprise technologies, such as back-up 
and recovery, data center architecture and 
technologies, data protection, network and storage 
management, unified communications, 
virtualization, wan acceleration, and wireless 
networking. 
PC World www.pcworld.com  Test and review computer- and Internet-related 
products and services, report technology news and 
trends, and provide shopping advice and price 
comparisons 
Printweek http://www.printweek.com/   Publishes reviews and analysis in the printer 
industry 
PC Magazine www.pcmag.com  Test and review computer- and Internet-related 
products and services, report technology news and 
trends, and provide shopping advice and price 
comparisons 
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 Trade publications (continued) 
InfoWorld www.infoworld.com   
Silicon Valley 
Journal 
http://www.bizjournals.com/sanj
ose/ 
  
Smart 
Computing 
http://www.smartcomputing.co
m/ 
PCs/Drives/Accessories 
Printers/Shredders/Machi
nes 
Hardware and software reviews related to 
computing 
Wall Street 
Technology 
http://www.wallstreetandtech.co
m 
Data Security 
Data Management 
IT infrastructure 
News, analysis , discussions and expert reviews on 
product releases, product comparisons and firm 
strategies 
Webcom 
Communicati
ons 
http://www.webcomcommunicat
ions.com/category/magazines 
E Drive 
Electronics protection 
Battery Power 
 
Zdnet www.zdnet.com  A business technology news website published by 
CBS Interactive 
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C:  Validation with industry experts for the type of complementarity between given two products    
Validation of conceptual definition (2 industry experts) 
Definition: In symmetric complementarity, the primary product is functionally dependent on the complement and the two products are 
always used together to provide value to a user of the primary product. 
In asymmetric complementarity, the primary product maybe functionally independent of the complement, but joint use of the two products 
provides additional value to a user of the primary product.   
Please indicate the extent to which you agree (or disagree) with the definition based on the following scale: 
1. Completely agree 2. Moderately agree 3. Not sure 4. Moderately disagree 5. Completely disagree 
 
 
D. Examples included along with definition of type of complementarity for industry expert validation 
Symmetric  Complementarity Asymmetric complementarity 
PC microprocessor/chipset PC printer 
PC keyboard PC scanner 
PC Batteries/power supply PC web camera 
PC host adapter PC videophone 
PC Internal hard disk drive PC earphones 
PC OS   
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E. Complementary product list categorization summary 
 
 
  
                                                          
 
9
  :  the disagreement (the first time) occurred for the following reasons- 
i. Some of them were unfamiliar enough to evaluate the complementarity,  
ii. The assumptions experts formed in the context of larger systems as opposed to the given primary product led them to categorize some 
complements as asymmetric as opposed to symmetric.  Subsequent clarification improved the agreement on categorization  
Agreement 
on  Type of complementarity 
Agreement 
on  Type of complementarity 
 
Agreements 
Not 
known Disagreements  Agreements 
Not 
Known Disagreements 
Expert1 
(product pairs) 320,322 2,0 0,0 Expert3 286 , 309  29,0 8, 12 
Expert2 
(product pairs) 232, 310 90,0 2,12 Expert4 235, 286  5 12, 0 
IRR1 0.990430622,1.00 IRR3 0.870813397, .96 
IRR2 0.818181818, .97 IRR4 0.813397129 
IRRavg 0.89; 0.95
9
 IRRavg 0.87; 98
10
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F. Strategy Keywords 
Make Hybrid Let them make  
Release(s/ed), 
debut(s/ed), 
introduce(s/ed) new,  
unveil(s/ed), 
launche(s/ed), 
ship(s/ed), 
announce(s/ed) new, 
deliver(s/ed), 
extend(s/ed) support, 
Offer(s), Produce(s), 
Present(s), 
manufacture(s), 
develop(s),reveal(s/ed) 
 
Acquire(s), 
purchase(s),   
Takeover, Buyout, 
Merger, 
Consolidation, 
Subsidiary, 
Syndicate, 
Hostile, 
Absorb, 
Parent 
White Knight 
Suitor, 
integrate 
acquire 
purchase 
buy 
merge 
equity stake 
equity position 
Agreement 
alliance 
ally 
allies 
signs pact 
sign pact 
signs deal 
sign deal 
pact 
collaboration 
collaborates 
jointly develop 
joint development 
jointly developed 
jointly market 
joint market 
joint marketing 
joint production 
joint R & D 
joint R&D 
co-brand 
co-develop 
co development 
co produce 
co production 
co-market 
co-marketing 
co-branding 
cross license 
cross-licensing 
cross licensing 
joint distribution 
joint advertizing  
Release(s), debut(s), 
introduce(s) new,  
unveil(s), launche(s), 
ship(s), announces 
new, delivers, 
extends support, 
announces & 
availability 
offers, Produce(s), 
Present(s), 
manufacture(s), 
develop(s) 
 
Acquire(s), 
purchase(s),   
Takeover, Buyout, 
Merger, 
Consolidation, 
Subsidiary, 
Syndicate, 
Hostile, 
Absorb, 
Parent 
White Knight 
Suitor, 
integrate 
acquire 
purchase 
buy 
merge 
equity stake 
equity position 
joint sales 
joint technology 
join forces 
join together 
join hands 
work together 
relationship 
strategic relationship 
joint venture 
JV 
partnership 
partner 
team 
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Figure 2: SOFTWARE PROGRAM FLOWCHART11 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
11
 A high level description of the flow of logic      
LEGEND 
Begin/End Flowchart 
Action Box 
Decision Box 
For Loop (repetitive 
process)    
  Next item in list 
Connecter 
Results data 
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G. Brief description of different scenarios handled in the software program: 
The content analysis program primarily does a headline analysis, but also incorporates certain 
document level analysis as described below for the different use cases. 
Internalization decision:  On encountering any of the validated keywords for internalization, the 
program checks for the occurrence of the primary product 
Case1: The firm name, primary product and complement and strategy keyword appear in the 
headline 
For example: Starfish Announces REX Synchronization for Microsoft Outlook 98 and Other 
Popular Organizers; Essential REX Accessory Works Directly With Most Popular Organizers or 
HP Announces Ultimate Desktop-Replacement Notebook PC With New Intel Mobile Pentium II 
Processor 
The program compares the master list of complements with the complement in the header, viz. 
“processor”. Upon encountering the appropriate primary product- complementary product entry 
in the master list, it moves on to examine the strategy keyword in this case “announces” 
combined with “new”.  Then the program compares the primary product firm master list with the 
company name in the headline. Since it finds a match, viz., “HP” it compares the primary 
products viz., desktop and notebook with the strategy keyword and is programmed to recognize 
that the primary product firm is not introducing the product, but is a complementor make.  So it 
lists the strategy, the primary product firm, primary product and the complement correctly, but 
does not fill in the complementor name – viz., Intel. This needs to be complete manually.  
Case 1.1: New HP OmniBook 7100 Notebook PC Delivers High Level of Processor and Graphics 
Performance (Products in headline) 
 
The program compares the master list of complements with the complement in the header, viz. 
“processor”. Upon encountering the appropriate primary product- complementary product entry 
in the master list, it moves on to examine the strategy keyword in this case “delivers” combined 
with “new”.  Then the program compares the primary product firm master list with the company 
name in the headline. Since it finds a match, viz., “HP” it compares the primary product viz., 
notebook PC with the strategy keyword and is programmed to recognize that the primary product 
firm is introducing a primary product and so skips the announcement altogether 
Case 2: The firm name, complement and strategy keyword appear in the headline 
For example: Kensington Unveils Mouse-in-a-Box Scroll; New Input Device Makes Scrolling 
Simple and Affordable 
The program compares the master list of complements with the complement in the header, viz. 
“mouse” . Upon encountering the appropriate primary product- complementary product entry in 
the master list, it moves on to examine the strategy keyword in this case “unveils”.  Then the 
program compares the primary product firm master list with the company name in the headline. 
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Since it does not find a match, it lists the strategy as “complementor make” and the company. 
Sometimes the company is not accurately captured by the program because of the high level of 
complexity in program needed to incorporate the occurrence of the company anywhere in the 
headline.    
 
Case 3.1: Firms and strategy in headline (no products in headline) 
For example: nStor Signs Distribution Agreement with PTG, Inc. 
 
The program checks for the occurrence of all the possible pairs of primary and complementary 
product pairs contained in the master list in the header paragraph of the text document. Further it 
checks for the keywords as well. It encounters “information storage solutions” and extracts the 
primary product-complementary product into the output file.  
Case 3.2: Firms and strategy in headline (no products in headline) 
For example: Technitrol To Acquire GTI Corp. 
 
The program checks for the occurrence of all the possible pairs of primary and complementary 
product pairs contained in the master list in the header paragraph of the text document. Further it 
checks for the complementary keywords as well. Either the complementary keyword or the 
complement may only be found in the lead paragraph. Then the output prints the names of the 
firms and the strategy word. I have to manually fill in the rest of the information. 
Programmatically retrieving the information from the rest of the document when there is little 
information relating to the products in either the headline or lead paragraph gives results to high 
percentage of spurious results. 
 
Case 3.3: Firms and strategy in headline (no products in headline) 
For example: Electro-Sensors Announces Dividend 
 
The program checks for the occurrence of all the possible pairs of primary and complementary 
product pairs contained in the master list in the header paragraph of the text document. Further it 
checks for the complementary keywords as well. Neither the complementary keyword nor the 
complement is found in the lead para. In such a case the program skips the line.  
 
Case 3.4: Complementary product not in master list 
Maxwell Technologies to Acquire Unit of Primex Physics International; Solidifies Global 
Leadership in Pulsed Power Technology 
This is a limitation of the software program.  
Validity of the content analysis program  
The threats to the validity of the program arises from  
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i. inaccurate classification of individual announcements either from a mismatch of the 
primary product-complementary product pair  
ii. from the inaccurate classification of the strategies with the primary product-
complementary product pair 
iii. Inadequate vocabularies in identifying the complementary products. Such a threat has 
been noted in prior research employing custom programs for content analysis of 
archival text documents in strategy research (Uotila et al., 2009). 
iv.  the  order to ensure that software program errors did not impact the reliability of the 
data, I   adopted the following procedure 
To address reliability issues arising from the above threats, I performed the following checks. 
Correcting for Program errors: 
Procedure: I manually examined the first 100 lines of output from the program and detected few 
inconsistencies, reasons for which are stated below. Subsequently, I examined 75 lines of output 
and did not encounter a different issue. Additionally, I randomly examined 50 lines of the output.  
After accounting for the discrepancies in the software program and re execution of the program, I 
examined 75 lines of the result set and did not find any different errors in the program 
output. I further examine 50 lines and reached the same conclusion at which point I 
stopped the manual validation of the program results. 
Errors in results set (19 errors out of 225 examined) 
1. Announcements where multiple complementary products appear in the same announcement 
such as – “AIWA launches data products line; company announces series of computer 
peripherals including CD-ROM drives, fax/modems, and PCMCIA cards”,  listed only the first 
complementary product, viz., CD-ROM drives. 
2. Distinction between standard and product: Some vocabularies needed to be defined more 
specifically. For example,  USB 2.0 and USB 2.0 terminal or USB 2.0 port. 
 For example, Sealevel Systems, Inc. Introduces 16-Port USB to Serial Servers, Silicon 
Laboratories Introduces Complete 8-Bit MCU Evaluation Tool in a USB Stick; ToolStick 
Demonstrates Easy-to-Use MCU Development Tools; SMSC Provides Industry's First ULPI 
Stand-Alone Transceiver for Hi-Speed USB Industry Specification; Newly Released ULPI 
Interface Promotes Stand-Alone PHYs 
Program correction: Code for not “USB Industry Specification”  or  USB standard 
3. If the complement is introduced by a primary product firm, then I code it as make strategy. 
Specifically, I examine the firm in the announcement whether it is part of the list of firms 
compiled from Computat which are single business/dominant business firms (in the primary 
product line). The program codes the product introduction as a “Make” if the match with any of 
the firms from Sic code 3570 or 3571 is found. 
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Bias: If the firm is a multiproduct firm (such as Sony, Mitsubishi, Toshiba), then it will not be 
recognized by the program as a primary product firm.  
Program Correction: Consider the set of all firms in the corresponding SIC codes from 
Compustat.  
4. 17  announcements were coded as part of the alliance agreement, when it was not to be 
considered. Manual validation revealed that although these agreements involved the 
development/distribution of the complementary product, a primary product firm was not 
involved. 
For example – 
“Imation and Panasonic Announce Joint Development of SuperDisk Drive For USB Interface 
Availability To Coincide With First Shipments Of New Apple iMac” 
Such errors cannot be eliminated programmatically without significant complexity into the 
program.  
To establish the validity of the content analysis software program, I also conducted a  
manual procedure for  identifying the strategy.   
Manual Validation results:  Summary of manual validation by another individual (with a non 
computer background) not involved in the data collection process is provided below 
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H. Manual validation checks  conducted for the accuracy of the software program 
 
 
  
 No of lines 
examined 
Missed 
cases  
Reasons Correction 
procedure 
Sequential 
checking 
100 4 2 cases: Complement was not 
part of the master list 
  
 
2 cases: program cannot 
handle, too complex- 
identified above 
 
Complements were 
verified with two 
industry experts and 
added to the master 
list 
 
Cannot be handled 
by the program 
75 3   Errors by coder : (due to 
unfamiliarity/insufficiency of 
coding rules) 
a. identified software as 
complement, but  there was no 
product associated with the 
release 
b. identified back-up 
technology agreement as a 
strategy, but it was not directly 
related to any complement 
c. mistake 
 
 
Coder was informed 
of the errors and 
asked to code the 
next set of lines 
accordingly 
50 4   1 case: complement was not 
part of the master list 
 
3  cases: program cannot 
handle, too complex- 
identified above 
 
 
Complement was 
verified with two 
industry experts and 
added to the master 
list 
 
Cannot be handled 
by the program 
Random checking: 
 
100 3   3 cases: program cannot 
handle, too complex- 
identified above 
 
Cannot be handled 
by the program 
50 2   : program cannot handle, too 
complex- identified above 
 
Cannot be handled 
by the program 
206 
 
 
 
VITA 
 
 
 
EDUCATION 
   PhD. Management, Drexel University, June 2014 
   LeBow College of Business, Drexel University, PA-19104 
   Major:  Strategic Management and Entrepreneurship 
 
Dissertation Committee 
Dr. V.K. Narayanan (Chair), Dr. Sucheta Nadkarni, Dr. Donna 
DeCarolis Dr. Konstantinos Serfes, Dr. Daniel Tzabbar, Dr. Susan 
K. Cohen (University of Pittsburgh) 
 Bachelor of Engineering (Electronics & Telecommunication), 
 June 1998, Shivaji University, Maharashtra, India 
 
RESEARCH 
1. Dissertation 
Essays on Complementary Products and Strategies, Defended on June 03, 2014 
2. Conference Presentations 
 
 “Team Mental Model Characteristics and Performance in a Simulation Experiment (with 
Yang, Y., Narayanan, VK & Swaminathan, S.” Presented at the Academy of 
Management Conference. Boston, MA, August  2012. 
“The Cognitive Architecture of Innovation”  Presented at the PDW “Cognition in the 
Rough” at the Academy of Management Conference.  Montreal, Canada, August 2010. 
“Relational and Legitimation Perspectives on the Alliance Management Function” (with 
De Carolis, D.) Presented at the Academy of Management Conference. Anaheim, 
California, August  2008. 
“The Impact of Social Networking Technology on Information Seeking for 
Entrepreneurs.” (with Tribbitt, M. & Anandarajan, M) Presented at Drexel University 
Research Day, Drexel University, Philadelphia, April 2009. 
 
 
207 
 
 
 
3. Manuscripts 
 
Baburaj, Y., co-authored with Yang, Y., Narayanan VK & Swaminathan S., “Team 
Mental Model Characteristics and Performance in a Simulation Experiment”   
Baburaj, Y.,  Narayanan V.K., & Tzabbar D.  “A conceptual framework for Product 
Complementarity”  
Baburaj, Y., co-authored with Narayanan, VK., “Five Forces Framework”,  Palgrave 
Encyclopedia of Management, 2013.  
TEACHING   
1. Course Taught 
Strategy and Competitive Advantage (MGMT 450) 
Course Evaluation: 3.09/4.0; 3.14/4.0; 3.32/4.0 
 
Management Simulation (MGMT 451) 
Course Evaluation: 3.40/4.0; 3.47/4.0 
 
2. Manuscripts 
  
Strategy Toolkit for MBA students, co-authored with Tribbitt M.  
  
SERVICE 
Academy of Management Reviewer for the TIM and BPS divisions for 2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011, 2012, 2014 
 
Organizer at the Eastern Academy of Management, 2012, Philadelphia, PA. 
 
Session coordinator for Business Professor Teaching Summit, 2012, Drexel University, 
Philadelphia, PA. 
 
PROFESSIONAL WORK EXPERIENCE 
Sept 2004 to June 2006  
Senior Software Engineer, IBM Global Services India Ltd, Pune, India 
Sept 1998 to June 2004  
Senior Software Engineer, Patni Computer Systems Ltd, Pune, India
 
 
 
 
 
